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Kidwell Receipt number: 0035110 Dated:
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BNDC
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Jon J Shindurling

BNDC

PHYLLIS

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35112 Dated
12/11/2007 for 100. 00)

Jon J Shindurling

1/14/2008

TRAN

PHYLLIS

Transcript Filed

Jon J Shindurling

1/15/2008

MISC

GABBY

Statement Of Issue On Judicial Review

Jon J Shindurling

1/18/2008

NOTC

PHYLLIS

Notice of Lodging of Transcript

Jon J Shindurling

2/15/2008

NOTC
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Notice of Settling Transcript on Appeal and Notice Jon J Shindurling
of Time for Hearing Oral Argument

HRSC

PHYLLIS

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 06/10/2008 03:00
PM) Oral Argument

Jon J Shindurling

MOTN

GABBY

Motion To Augment Agency Record/Transcript
And For Stay Of Briefing Schedule

Jon J Shindurling

STIP

GABBY

Stipulation To Augment The Record

Jon J Shindurling

ORDR

PHYLLIS

Order Granting Leave to Augment Agency
Record /Transcript and Staying of Briefing
Schedule; Vacating Date of Hearing for Oral
Argument

Jon J Shindurling

HRVC

PHYLLIS

Hearing result for Hearing held on 06/10/2008
03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Oral Argument

Jon J Shindurling

5/13/2008

NOTC
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Notice Of lodging Transcript

Jon J Shindurling
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MOTN

GABBY

Petitioner's Motion For Extension Of Briefing
Schedule And Continuance Of Oral Argument

Jon J Shindurling
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MOTI\J
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Motion To Reschedule Oral Argument

Jon J Shindurling

AFFD

GABBY

Affidavit Of Dale W. Storer In Support Of Motion
To Reschedule Oral Argument

Jon J Shindurling

HRSC

PHYLLIS

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
10/21/2008 02:00 PM)

Jon J Shindurling

ORDR

PHYLLIS

Order Granting Motion to Reschedule Oral
Argument

Jon J Shindurling

MISC

GABBY

Petitioner's Brief

Jon J Shindurling

MISC

GABBY

Certificate Of Compliance

Jon J Shindurling

8/5/2008

MISC

SHILL

Respondents Brief

Gregory W Moeller

8/26/2008

RPLY

PHYLLIS

Petitioner's Reply Brief

Jon J Shindurling

10/21/2008

MINE

PHYLLIS

Minute Entry Hearing type: Hearing Hearing date: Jon J Shindurling
10/21/2008 Time: 2:43 pm Court reporter: Nancy
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DPHR

PHYLLIS

Hearing result for Hearing held on 10/21/2008
02:00 PM: Disposition With Hearing Oral
Argument
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ORDR

PHYLLIS

Order

Jon J Shindurling

1/20/2009

MISC

GABBY

Amended Petition For Judicial Review

Jon J Shindurling

2/6/2009

MISC

GABBY

Amended Statement Of Issues On Judicial
Review

Jon J Shindurling

2/10/2009

MISC

PHYLLIS

Findings of Fact

Jon J Shindurling

5/26/2009

MISC
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Request for Scheduling Order

Jon J Shindurling
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PHYLLIS

Petitioner's Reply Brief

Jon J Shindurling

5/10/2009

ORDR
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Order Governing Procedure on Appeal
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AGREEN

Administrative Order

Gregory W Moeller

6/23/2009

NOTC
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Notice Of Non-Filing Of additional Brief
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Respondent's Supplemental Brief
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Petitioner's Second Reply Brief
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NOTH
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Notice Of Hearing
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Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/18/2009 02:00
AM) Oral Argument

Gregory W Moeller

8/12/2009

HRRS
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Hearing Rescheduled (Hearing 08/18/2009
11 :00 AM) Oral Argument

Gregory W Moeller
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NOTH
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Amended Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W Moeller

8/18/2009

MINE

PHYLLIS
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Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 8/18/2009
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Tape Number:
Dale Storer Atty for Applicant
Dan Dansie - Atty for APpiicant
Kathy SPltzer - Attorney for County

Gregory W Moeller

ADVS

PHYLLIS

Gregory W Moeller
Hearing result for Hearing held on 08/18/2009
11:00 AM: Case Taken Under Advisement Oral
Argument

9/29/2009

MISC

PHYLLIS

Decision on Review

Gregory W Moeller
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MEMO
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Memorandum of Costs
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MOTN

PHYLLIS

Motion for Reconsideration
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Brief ln Support of Motion for Reconsideration
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1/17/2009

ORDR
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Order Re Motion for Reconsideration

Gregory W Moeller

2/4/2009
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Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review

Gregory W Moeller

MISC

PHYLLIS

Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Gregory W Moeller
Review
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Motion to Augment Agency Record
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AFFD
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Affidavit of Kurt Hibbert
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NOTH

PHYLLIS

Notice Of Hearing
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Hearing Scheduled (Motions 01/05/2010 02:00
PM)
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12/21/2009

ORDR

PHYLLIS

Order Governing Procedure on Review

Gregory W Moeller

1/5/2010

MINE

PHYLLIS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion to Augment the Record
Hearing date: 1/5/2010
Time: 2:50 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: David Marlow
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:

Gregory W Moeller

DCHH

PHYLLIS

Hearing result for Motions held on 01/05/2010
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: David Marlow
I\Jumber of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated at: Less than 50

Gregory W Moeller

1/7/2010

MINE

PHYLLIS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion to AUgment Record
Hearing date: 1/5/2010
Time: 2: 19 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: David Marlow
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
Dale Storer Attorney for Petitioner
Kathy Spitzer Attorney for Respondent

Gregory W Moeller

1/12/2010

MISC

STACEY

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law

Gregory W Moeller

ORDR

PHYLLIS

Order Denying Motion to Augment

Gregory W Moeller

1/14/2010

NOTC

STACEY

Notice of Filing

Gregory W Moeller

2/10/2010

MISC

PHYLLIS

Breif in Support of Second Amended Petition for
Judicial Review

Gregory W Moeller

3/10/2010

MISC

GABBY

Respondent's Reply Brief Second Amended
Petition For Judicial
Review

Gregory W Moeller

3/24/2010

NOTH

GABBY

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W Moeller

MISC

GABBY

Reply Brief In Support Of Second Amended
Petition For Judicial Review

Gregory W Moeller

HRSC

GABBY

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 04/20/2010 02:00
PM)

Gregory W Moeller

I 2/17/2009

Judge
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MINE

PHYLLIS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Hearing
Hearing date: 4/20/2010
Time: 3:02 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
Dale Storer Plaintiffs Attorney
Kathy Spitzer Defendant's Attorney

Gregory W Moeller

DCHH

PHYLLIS

Hearing result for Hearing held on 04/20/2010
02:00 PM:
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated at: Less than 200

Gregory W Moeller

ADVS

PHYLLIS

Case Taken Under Advisement

Gregory W Moeller

6/10/2010

MISC

PHYLLIS

Third Decision on Review

Gregory W Moeller

6/24/2010

MOTN

GABBY

Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration

Gregory W Moeller

6/28/2010

NOTH

GABBY

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W Moeller

HRSC

GABBY

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/03/2010 02:00
PM)

Gregory W Moeller

MOTN

GABBY

Motion To Continue

Gregory W Moeller

ORDR

PHYLLIS

Order to Continue

Gregory W Moeller

CONT

PHYLLIS

Hearing result for Motions held on 08/03/2010
02:00 PM: Continued

Gregory W Moeller

7/8/2010

HRSC

PHYLLIS

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/17/2010 02:00
PM) for Reconsideration

Gregory W Moeller

8/6/2010

MISC

GABBY

Petitioner's Brief In Support Of Motion For
Reconsideration

Gregory W Moeller

8/10/2010

MISC

GABBY

Respondent's Reply Brief In Opposition To
Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration

Gregory W Moeller

8/17/2010

MINE

PHYLLIS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Oral Argument
Hearing date: 8/17/2010
Time: 4:02 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: David Marlow
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
Kathy SPltzer, Respondents Attorney
Dale Storer, Plaintiffs Attorney

Gregory W Moeller

8/18/2010

DCHH

PHYLLIS

Hearing result for Motions held on 08/17/2010
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated at: less than 100

Gregory W Moeller

10/1/2010

MISC

PHYLLIS

Amended Third Decision on Review

Gregory W Moeller

7/5/2010

Judge

Iate: 1 2/28/2010

Se

ime: 01 :05 PM

User: SHILL

h Judicial District - Teton County

ROA Report

'age 5 of 5

Case: CV-2007-0000376 Current Judge: Gregory W Moeller
Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County

Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County
)ate

Code

User

0/1/2010

CDIS

PHYLLIS

Civil Disposition entered for: Board of County
Commissioners of Teton County, Defendant;
Burns Holdings, LLC, Plaintiff. Filing date:
10/1/2010

CSCP

ISC2

Case Status Closed But Pending: closed pending Gregory W Moeller
clerk action

PHYLLIS

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Gregory W Moeller
Supreme Court Paid by: Holden Kidwell
Receipt number: 0045861 Dated: 11/10/2010
Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Burns Holdings,
LLC (plaintiff)

BI\JDC

PHYLLIS

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 45862 Dated
11/10/2010 for 200.00)

Gregory W Moeller

NOTC

PHYLLIS

Notice of Appeal

Gregory W Moeller

11/24/2010

ORDR

PHYLLIS

Order Suspending Appeal

Gregory W Moeller

11/30/2010

JDMT

PHYLLIS

Final Judgment

Gregory W Moeller

11/10/2010

Judge
Gregory W Moeller

Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166)
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-07-376

INRE:
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SECOND
AMENDED PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner and Applicant,
V.

TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.
COMES NOW Petitioner, Burns Holdings LLC, and submits this Brief in Support of
Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review. The Second Amended Petition is brought for
the reason that the Respondent has again disregarded the Court's previous decisions in this
matter by ( 1) basing its decision on grounds foreclosed by this Court in its earlier
Memorandum Decision, (2) failing to issue a decision that complies with LC.§§ 65-6519 and

ORIGINAL

6535, and (3) issuing a decision that is arbitrary and capricious because there is no factual
basis in the record for the Commissioners' findings that it is impossible to fashion conditions
that would render Bum's batch plant compatible with the surrounding commercial and
industrial uses. This Court has given the Board ample opportunity to issue a reasoned
decision that fulfills the requirements of Idaho law and the Board has not done so. For the
reasons set forth below, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and remand the matter
with specific instructions to grant the Petitioner's application.
Introduction ·
More than two years ago the Respondent Teton County Board of Commissioners (the
"Board" or "County") held a public hearing on a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP")
application filed by Petitioner, Burns Holdings LLC ("Burns"). Bums sought the CUP in
order to construct a seventy-five (75) feet high concrete batch plant within the M-1 zone and
in a location surrounded by a variety of industrial and commercial uses. Because the
proposed batch plant was located within the Driggs area of impact, the application was
considered under the applicable provisions of the Driggs Zoning ordinance. The Driggs
Zoning Ordinance specifically allows buildings over forty-five ( 45) feet when "approved by
conditional use permit." DCZ0 1 § 2(13)(C).
At that hearing, and for the two years leading up to this Second Amended Petition for
Judicial Review, the Board has acted arbitrarily and capriciously with respect to Bums' CUP

1

For convenience, the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Driggs, Idaho, 274-07 (January 16, 2007), which was in effect
at the time Burns filed the CUP application, is herein referred to as "DCZO." A complete copy of the DCZO was included as an
exhibit on the CD-ROM which Petitioner included with the Petitioner's Brief filed on July 10, 2008.
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application. The Board has consistently disregarded the provisions of the Local Land Use
Planning Act ("LL UP A" or "Act") requiring issuance of a reasoned decision setting forth the
facts and legal basis for its decision, notwithstanding stern admonition by this Court, as well
as Judge Shinderling. For more than two years, the Board has abdicated its duty and has used
a "moving target" approach to deny Burns' CUP application. An examination of the record
of the hearing reveals the reason for the evasive and ungrounded decisions issued by the
Board: there are no facts in the record upon which a denial could be premised. Bum's
application met the parameters of the CUP ordinance in every respect. These tactics have
frustrated justice and made effective resolution of this matter impossible. Further, in Board's
most recent action on this matter, one of the newly installed county commissioners, Kathy
Rinaldi, participated in the deliberations antecedent to the adoption of the Amended Findings
and Conclusions of Law and voted to deny Burns' CUP application -

despite testifying

against Burns' CUP application at the earlier hearing. R. At 99, 107.
The Board held its initial public hearing on this matter on November 15, 2007. When
the Board initially denied Burns' CUP application, it found that the CUP application did not
comply with the County Comprehensive Plan and that an earlier rezone was conditioned on
a building with a height ofless than forty-five (45) feet. CUP Tr. Vol. III, p.32, 11. 1-7. 2 As
was noted in Burns' earlier Brief, such condition was nowhere found within the Board's
earlier decision granting a rezone of the subject property to M-1. 3 Further, despite the clear

2

The scheme for citing to transcripts of hearings associated with this case and the agency record is explained in
footnotes 2 and 3 of the initial Petitioner's Brief filed on July 11, 2008.
3

See Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, filed May 21, 2009, at 12-15.
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requirement of I.C. §65-6519, the Board failed to make written findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Bums filed this petition for Judicial review on December 11, 2007,
citing the lack of written findings, attacking the merits of the Board's decision, and
identifying several statutory and constitutional errors committed by the Board during the
CUP process.
On October 21, 2008, Judge Shindurling heard oral argument on the matter. At that
hearing, the County argued that verbal findings contained in the transcript and reflected in
the minutes of the proceedings satisfied the requirements of the Act. The Court disagreed
and held that the Board's failure to produce written findings was inconsistent with I.C. §§
65-6519, 6535: "The Court finds that Respondent, Teton County failed to prepare written
findings and a reasoned statement as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535." Order4 at 1. Judge
Shindurling remanded the matter to the County without addressing the merits of Bums' other
arguments.
On remand, the Board issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
("Second Findings" 5), which again denied Bums' CUP application. The Second Findings
were again based on the Board's belief that the earlier rezone was premised on a forty-five
(45) foot tall building. Second Findings at 5. The Board also found that the proposed
building would conflict with the Comprehensive Plan, "specifically an exceedingly high
structure would be located along the scenic corridor." Id. However, it is undisputed that the

4

5

Filed on October 30, 2008.
Dated December 22, 2008. The Board's earlier "verbal" findings will be referred to somewhat loosely as the "First"

Findings.
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proposed use was outside the scenic corridor. CUP Tr. Vol. III, p. 3, 11. 20-22. Again,
despite the Court's order that the Board comply with§ 67-6535, the Second Findings failed
to identify the relevant contested facts or the applicable law as required by the Act.
In response to the Second Findings, Bums filed an Amended Petition for Judicial
Review on January 14, 2009. Once again Burns pointed out that the earlier rezone did not
contain a limitation on building height, that the Board continued to unlawfully use the
Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance6 , and that the Board's decision did not comply
with LC.§ 67-6535. In its responsive brief, filed on July 16, 2009, the County argued-for
the first time since the CUP application process began~ that Burns should have requested
a variance rather than a CUP. The Board made such conclusion, despite the clear language
in the DCZO authorizing buildings over forty-five (45) feet when "approved by conditional
use permit."
The Court heard argument on the Amended Petition for Judicial Review on August
18, 2009. In a written decision issued on September 29, 2009, the Court agreed with Bums
that the Second Findings did not comply with Idaho Code § 67-653 5, stating: "The County's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to state the relevant contested facts and fail to
explain the County's rationale for denying Burns' application." Decision on Review at 7.
The Court specifically noted that the "County's decision lacks any citation to the relevant
contested facts" and found that the Board's "minimal citation[s] to evidence fails to satisfy
the standard" contained in§ 67-6535 and Workman Family Partnership v. City a/Twin Falls,

6

See Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000).
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104 Idaho 32, 655 P.2d 926 (1982). Id. at 9. The Court further noted that the "County's
decision must state the facts relied upon, as well as the weight given to that evidence." Id.
at 10.

The Court also held that the County's variance argument was "untimely and

disingenuous." Decision on Review at 12.

Specifically the Court found that it was

"unreasonable to make this argument at this point in the case" because the DCZO specifically
directs applicants for buildings over forty-five (45) feet to pursue a CUP and also because
waiting for more than two years after Burns initially filed the CUP application to suggest that
Burns should have pursued a variance is "fundamentally unfair and a blatant disregard" for
Bums' rights. Id. at 12-13.
On November 9, 2009, the County filed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law ("Third Findings"), which denied Burns CUP application for the third time. Like the
first two denials, the Third Findings do not comply with Idaho Code§ 67-6535 because they
again do not identify the relevant facts upon which the Board based its decision. Moreover,
in the Third Findings the Board blatantly disregarded this Court's Decision on Review in a
number of important respects. First, the Board denied the CUP on the basis that Bums
should have applied for a variance -

a basis the Court rejected at the August 18, 2009,

hearing and in the Decision on Review. Second, the Third Findings, contrary to the mandate
of Idaho Code§ 67-6535, failed to identify what the Board found to be the salient facts and
dispositive law. Finally, as argued below the Third Findings are arbitrary and capricious
because they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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More than two years have passed since the hearing on this matter and it is abundantly
clear that the County continues to ignore well-established law and is not acting in good faith.
All of the Board's decisions have violated§ 67-6535. Twice the Court has heard argument
on this issue and twice the Court has remanded the matter back to the Board with instructions
that the County comply with the statute. Following both remands, the County has ignored
the Court's directions. The Board's reasons for denying the CUP change and evolve with
each new decision. This continued misconduct on the part of the County has prejudiced, and
continues to prejudice, Bums' right to use his property. Additionally, the Board's conduct
has cost Bums tens of thousands of dollars in costs and attorney's fees.
The time for a remand to the Board with instructions to prepare findings that comply
with § 67-6535 has passed. The Board has demonstrated that it will not comply with the
statute -

indeed it cannot because there are no facts in the record that would support a

denial. Remanding the matter back for additional findings would allow the Board to yet
again produce findings that do not comply with the statute, would continue to deprive Bums
of fundamental fairness and further delay resolution of this matter. There is no competent
evidence in the record supporting the Board's decision to deny the CUP. Thus for the
reasons set forth below, this Court should, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3), reverse the
Board's decision and remand the matter to the Board for "further proceedings" consistent
with the Court's findings (i.e. with directions to approve the CUP application.)
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ARGUMENT
1.

The Board's Finding That Burns Should Have Pursued a Variance, Rather than
a CUP, Was Foreclosed by the Court's Earlier Decision; to Rely on That
Argument Again Is Arbitrary and Capricious.
a.

The Board's Use ofthe Variance Argument as a Basis to Deny the Application
Violates the Law of the Case Doctrine.

Instead of identifying facts and applying law, as required by LLUPA and the Court's
previous decisions, the Third Findings again deny the CUP for the reason that Burns should
have pursued a variance instead of a CUP. Third Findings at 1. Given the Court's earlier
decision, that finding is arbitrary, capricious and borders on contempt of court.
"The doctrine of law of the case provides that where an appellate court states a
principle of law in deciding a case, that rule becomes the law of the case and is controlling
in the lower court and on subsequent appeals." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,
360, 2 P.3d 738, 745 (2000). Where a case is remanded after an appeal, the decision on
remand must be made "in light of and in consonance with the rules of law as announced by
the appellate court in that particular case." Union Pacific Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n,
139 Idaho 572, 575, 83 P.3d 116, 116 (2004) (citation omitted). "When a district court
entertains a petition for judicial review, it does so in an appellate capacity." Burns Holdings,
LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 662, 214 P.3d 646, 648

(2009).
The Court's second decision remanding this matter to the County clearly held that it
was "unreasonable" for the County to defend the denial of Burns' CUP application on the
basis that Burns should have pursued a variance. Decision on Review at 12. The Court held

- - -nnnnDT

OF SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

that DCZO § 2(13)( C) "specifically directs applicants to apply via a conditional use permit"
when seeking to construct a building over forty-five (45) feet. Id. Thus, that decision
became the "law of the case." On remand, the Board was obligated to make a decision "in
light of and in consonance" with the Court's ruling on the variance argument. Instead, the
Board disregarded the Court's decision and once again used the variance argument as a
reason for denying Bums' CUP application: "Bums Holding, LLC must apply for a variance
to exceed the 45 height limitation in the M-1 zone ... The County finds that the applicant
did not make the correct application for a height variance ... " Third Findings at 1. In sum,
the Board cavalierly ignored the Court's previous decision and, for that reason alone, the
Board's decision should be reversed and remanded.
b.

The Board's Decision to Ignore the Plain Language ofDczo § 2(13)(C) When
Evaluating Burns' CUP Application Was Arbitrary and Capricious.

The law regarding statutory interpretation is clearly established in Idaho: meaning and
effect must be given to "every word and clause of a statute." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 123,
126, 138 P.3d 323,326 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Farberv. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho
307, ---, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (statutes must be interpreted in a manner that "give[s]
effect to all the words of a statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant")
(emphasis added); Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 862, 188 P.3d 834
(2008) (in matters of statutory construction courts "prefer[] an interpretation that gives
meaning to every word, clause, and sentence"). Principles of statutory construction are
applicable to local ordinances. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 77, 73 P.3d 84, 90
(2003).
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In the Third Findings, the Board interprets DCZO § 2( l 3)(C) - a provision which
clearly permits buildings over forty-five (45) feet when approved by a conditional use permit
-

"as if it had never existed." Third Findings at 1. Having conveniently excised the

provision of the ordinance that unambiguously authorizes the CUP application filed by
Bums, the Board finds that Bums "must apply for a variance to exceed the 45 foot height
limitation." Third Findings at 1. On its face, the Board's decision is disingenuous and is
directly contrary to well-established principles of statutory interpretation cited above. As
such, the Board's interpretation is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

2.

The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Are, Again, Deficient
under Idaho Code § 67-6535 Because They Do Not Adequately Explain the
Factual and Legal Basis for the Board's Denial of the Permit.

a.

Idaho Code§ 37-6535 Requires a Reasoned Statement of the Facts and the
Law Justifying the Board's Decision.

The LLUPA clearly outlines the standard which a local government body must meet
when denying a land use application:
The approval or denial of any application provided for in this
chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned
statement that explains the criteria and standards considered
relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and
explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and
factual information contained in the record.
Idaho Code § 67-6535(b ). The Idaho Supreme Court has provided local governments with
further guidance on preparing written findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Workman

Family Partnership, the court held:
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What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement
of what, specifically, the decision-making body believes, after
hearing and considering all the evidence, to be the relevant and
important facts upon which its decision is based. Conclusions
are not sufficient.
104 Idaho at 37,665 P.2d at 931 (quoting South ofSunny side Neighborhood League v. Bd.

of Commissioners, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063 (1977)). In a recent decision, the Idaho
Supreme Court again emphasized that when issuing a local land use decision"[ c ]onclusory
statements are not sufficient." Cowan v. Bd. a/Comm 'rs a/Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,
511, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257 (2006).

In addition to the text of§ 67-6535 and the cases interpreting it, the Board has had the
benefit of instruction from this Court explaining the proper way to prepare written findings
of fact and conclusions of law. This Court instructed the Board to prepare a "written
decision that (1) adequately states the facts the Board relied upon and (2) clearly explains
how the Board applied the law to those facts." Decision on Review at 5. Order at 1. The
Court also explained that "[t]he Board's written decision must state the facts relied upon, as
well as the weight given to that evidence ... " Id. at 10.

b.

The Third Findings Violate§ 67-6535 Because They Do Not Adequately State
the Facts the Board Relied upon and Clearly Explain How the Board Applied
the Law.

Despite this Court's specific instruction to the Board, the Third Findings do not
clearly "explain[] the criteria and standards considered relevant," they do not "state[] the
relevant contested facts relied upon," and they do not adequately "explain[] the rationale for
the decision." Instead, the Third Findings are entirely conclusory. The fundamental problem
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with the County's findings is that they fail to apply law to facts, as is required by Idaho Code
§ 67-6535. A brief discussion of each of the findings illustrates the Board's failure and
demonstrates why the Board's decision should be reversed.

Finding 1.
The County's first "finding" is, as discussed above, the erroneous conclusion that
Bums needed to apply for a variance rather than a CUP. The only fact to which to the
County cites in support of this conclusion is the uncontested fact that the building is "30 feet
higher" than the unconditionally permitted 45 foot height provision. Third Findings at 1.
The building's height is, of course, the reason for seeking the CUP in the first place. There
is no discussion ofrelevant facts, rather the finding is nothing more than the erroneous legal
conclusion that Bums should have applied for a CUP.

Finding 2(A).
The County finds that a height of 75 feet is not permitted by the ordinance. Third
Findings at 2-3. However, this too is an erroneous legal conclusion -

not the application

of facts to law. The Board contends that the CUP cannot be granted because a height of75
feet is not expressly mentioned as a conditional use. Third Findings at 2-3. As noted above,
buildings over 45 feet are specifically permitted conditional uses. Again, however, the
County does not apply law to relevant facts; the building's height is the only fact mentioned.
Denying the request for a CUP to build a seventy-five (75) foot building merely because the
proposed building is seventy-five (75) feet high is a clear bootstrap, especially in the face of
an ordinance which specifically allows buildings of such height when approved by a CUP.
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Finding 2(A) is based on entirely on the County's irrational - and, for purposes of
this litigation, irrelevant -

fear that if Burns' CUP is granted the County would have to

approve "a building of any height and size, skyscrapers included." Third Findings at 3. This
is a policy discussion appropriate to a legislative forum; it is not the application of law to
facts required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535. If the County wished to enforce aper se maximum
height restriction, it should have expressly included such limitation in the ordinance. The
fact that the ordinance apparently would allow consideration of "skyscrapers" is of no
relevance whatsoever to this proceeding.
Finding 2 (B).

Next, the County contends that the CUP could not be granted pursuant to the specific
conditions listed in the ordinance. Third Findings at 4. Far from applying facts to law in
order to reach their conclusion, the Board made its decision based only on the
commissioner's opinions and feelings. The Board declared that it "does not feel that there
are any conditions that are specific to the height provision." Third Findings at 5. Beyond
that "feeling", they provided no rationale or factual basis for their apparent conclusion that
it was impossible to mitigate the visual impact of 30 additional feet of a multi-faceted, tan
colored building upon adjoining industrial uses and set back 550 feet back from Highway 33
- well beyond the scenic corridor.
The County also reaches the conclusion that "no on-site facilities or services or more
restrictive standards could minimize the impact of a building this size." Third Findings at
5. This conclusory statement indicates the County's view that in the universe of possible
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conditions, none exist which could possibly mitigate the impact of the building's height. As
illustrated in Section 4, below, this conclusion is unsupported by any explanation, rationale
or evidence in the record. Under§ 67-6535, the finding is deficient because the Board does
not explain why Bums' mitigating conditions would not work, and why it felt it was
impossible to craft conditions which could mitigate the building's impact. Rather, the Board
merely states the bald conclusion that such is the case. Further, as noted below, the record
clearly shows there were numerous means by which the visual aspect of the additional height
could be mitigated.
Finding 2 (CJ.

Even this finding, which actually favors Burns, is deficient under §67-6535. The
County merely reaches the conclusion that political subdivisions, including schools, would
not be affected by the proposed building, but the County does not explain the rationale which
led to that conclusion. Third Findings at 5.
Finding 2(D).

The County focuses upon a single "gateway" prov1s1on m the 90-page plus
Comprehensive Plan and finds that Bums' proposal is not compatible therewith. Third
Findings at 6. Nowhere does the Board make any effort to define the meaning or intent with
respect to the "gateway" reference in the Comprehensive Plan. 7 Nor does it explain why
Bums' proposal is inconsistent with the gateway provisions or why the scenic corridor
provisions should be extended beyond their defined bounds. Those failings aside, the

7

The most likely meaning of the reference to the Driggs "gateway" is the 330 foot scenic corridor paralleling State
Highway 33. Again, Burns' property is located outside such corridor.
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Board's conclusion on this point is also suspect because it cherry-picks one rather oblique
provision with which the Board, erroneously, believes Bums' building is inconsistent, while
ignoring a host of other provisions in the Comprehensive Plan with which Burns' proposal
is entirely consistent. For example, the County ignores a provision in the Comprehensive
Plan stating "[T]he area around the airport has been consistently envisioned as an appropriate
industrial area because of the noise impacts of the airport and fairgrounds, the existence of
other light industrial and commercial uses." Comprehensive Plan at 82.
The Board's other findings with respect to the Comprehensive Plan also do not
comport with§ 67-6535 because they do not explain the Board's rationale for reaching the
conclusion that Burns' plan is inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan. The Board asserts
that Burns' proposal is incompatible with the Comprehensive Plan "because it creates a large
industrial structure which cannot be adequately shielded in the area that Driggs would like
to see become a memorable gateway." As noted above, the Board makes no attempt to
ascertain the meaning or identify the area referenced as a "gateway." Further, the Board does
not explain how it reached its conclusion that the building cannot be adequately shielded,
what would constitute adequate shielding, or even why such shielding is necessary on

property which is, unquestionably, outside the scenic corridor and located within an area
north of the airport that has been identified as particularly appropriate for heavy industrial
use. The Board seems hung up on "shielding" and ignores the design elements of the
building itself (i.e. color, texture, roofline and other design features breaking up the building
profile and making the building attractive). Finally, the Board does not describe the nature
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or proximity of the adjoining industrial uses and why Bums' additional building height might
be objectionable to or otherwise interfere with their operation.
Third, the County's continued use of the comprehensive plan as a regulatory
ordinance is a violation of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Urrutia v. Blaine County,
134 Idaho 3 53, 2 P .3d 73 8 (2000). Burns addressed this issue in Section III of Petitioner's
initial brief filed July 11, 2008, and will not here repeat that argument.
Finding 2(E).

The County determines that it cannot impose any conditions on Burns' proposal which
would make that proposal compatible with the surrounding uses because it calls for an
"additional 30 feet of height." Again, the only fact the Board refers to is the undisputed fact
that the plan calls for 75-foot building. The Board's decision implies aper se rule that a 75foot building is under all circumstances absolutely incompatible with surrounding uses. This
conclusion ignores the fact that buildings which exceed the general height allowance are
expressly permitted under DCZO § 2(13)(C) -

by finding the additional height cannot be

mitigated, the Board effectively imposes a de facto, but unexpressed height limit. The
conclusion is also directly contrary to§ 67-6535 because it is not supported by an evaluation
or explanation of any fact justifying a finding of incompatibility with adjoining uses, other
than the building's height itself.
The Board acknowledged that the property in question is in an industrial zone, but
failed to explain what the surrounding uses are and why a 75-foot building is incompatible
with those industrial uses. Instead, the County based its decision on the wholly conclusory
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statement of Sandy Mason, one of the witnesses who appeared at the hearing: "You cannot
mitigate that height." Third Findings at 6-7. Neither Mr. Mason nor the Board offered any
factual basis or rationale supporting that conclusion nor any explanation why the statement
was relevant. 8 As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Workman, "[c]onclusions are not
sufficient." Workman, 104 Idaho at 37, 655 P.2d at 931. The Board's reliance upon such
irrelevant opinion flies in the face of I. C. § 67-6535 and the Court's earlier instructions to
the Board. The Court specifically instructed the County that "[w ]hat is needed are clear,
precise statements of the facts and a full explanation of why those facts lead to the decision.
What is needed are citations to the relevant conflicting facts relied upon." Decision on
Review at 9 ( emphasis added, citations omitted).
The Board's conclusion ignores - and did not discuss - the substantial evidence in
the record discussing the measures that Bums has taken to ensure that the building would be
compatible with the surrounding uses.

See R. at 31-33 (identifying design elements

implemented to ensure compatibility with surrounding uses: a landscaped wall intended to
mitigate both the view of the building and the noise produced by the facility; external
landscaping intended to break up the external profile and roofline of the building; a design
which mitigates noise, vibration, dust, and sound; and a building color similar to other
structures in the area). See also R. at 75-78 (the "Developer's Agreement" between Burns
and the County which identified several measures which the parties agreed would "assure
compatibility with other surrounding uses"); CUP Tr. Vol. III, p 4, 11. 9-22 (noting that Bums

8

As explained below Mason's statement was made with respect to his view that Burns' building obstructed the "view
of the Tetons" and that such obstruction could not be mitigated. It had no reference to adjoining uses.
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designed the building so that the highest part of the building would be roughly 550 feet off
the highway). Specifically, the Board's decision fails to explain why these mitigating
features will not work.
In short, there is nothing in the Third Findings which amounts to a "reasoned
statement" that "explains the rationale for the decision." See Idaho Code § 67-6535. After
three attempts, the Board has demonstrated that it simply will not, and as illustrated below
can not, issue a decision in this matter which complies with§ 67-6535. This Court should
not give the Board the opportunity to yet again issue an arbitrary decision which does not
comply with the statute - and, as a result, again burden Bums for a fourth time with the
additional time, expense and delay in order to exercise his constitutional and statutory right
to a decision "founded upon sound reason and practical application of recognized principles
of law." LC.§ 67-6535(c).

3.

No Facts Justifying Denial of the Permit Were Presented to The Board at The
Hearing.
The Board's difficulty in applying the law to the relevant facts, as required by§ 67-

6535, stems from the fact that there are simply no facts in the record which justify a denial
of Bums' CUP. The uncontroverted evidence in the record demonstrates that Bums project
is compatible with the surrounding properties and uses. R. at 5-22, 31-33, 75-77, 124-35
(Bums' project will be located in an industrial zone; the design incorporates rural and
agricultural themes; the building's colors will match surrounding buildings; the project will
be built outside the scenic corridor; the property will be enclosed by a wall and landscaping;
varied rooflines break up the building's profile and visual impact; the additional height itself
- - ·~ •-.. m1,.mpn PETITJON,l;OR JUDICIAL REVIEW

is necessary to conceal equipment which mitigates sound, dust, noise, and vibration). By
contrast, none of the witnesses appearing in opposition to Bums' project presented any facts
which controvert the evidence presented by Bums. None of the witnesses introduced
evidence of incompatibility.

Rather, as illustrated below, the witnesses appearing in

opposition based their testimony solely on philosophical opinions, visionary ideals for the
community and unsupported conclusions, none of which had any relevance to the
compatibility of the Bums plant with surrounding industrial uses.
A.

Testimony ofJohn Bach.

Mr. Bach was the first witness to speak in opposition to Burns' proposal. CUP Tr.
Vol. II, p. 19, 11. 13-15. Mr. Bach offered factual testimony about his own property, but
offered no facts related to Bums' application. Instead he offered a rambling opinion about
the adequacy of the notice process and a reminiscence about his appearance before the Board
on an unrelated matter in 1993 and 1994. CUP. Tr. Vol. II, p. 19-24. At one point Chairman
Young had to remind him that "I did ask that we confine our comments to the question on
the table, which is the height variance at this particular hearing." CUP Tr. Vol. II, p. 22, 11.
12-15. The gravamen of Mr. Bach's testimony was his opinion that Bums' plant "is
completely detrimental in all aspects of what your criterias [sic ]for this zone." CUP Tr. Vol.
II, p. 23, 11. 2-3 (emphasis added). While testimony regarding appropriate uses for the area

might have had some relevance to the earlier rezone hearing, his philosophical meanderings
never addressed the building height issue. Moreover, Mr. Bach did not support his opinion
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with any factual basis demonstrating how the height of the building was detrimental or
otherwise incompatible with surrounding properties and uses.
B.

Testimony of Sandy Mason.

The only other witness appearing at the hearing in opposition to the proposal was
Sandy Mason, the executive director ofVARD, a local environmental advocacy group. CUP
Tr. Vol. II, p. 25, 1. 2. As noted above, Mr. Mason's testimony was founded on the
conclusory assertion that "you cannot mitigate that height." Cl.JP Tr. Vol. II, p.27, 11. 13-14.
Taken in context, his mitigation statement appears to be made with respect to the "view of
the Tetons" rather than with respect to adjoining industrial uses. Mason's testimony did not
include any facts beyond the undisputed description of the height and width of Burns'
proposal. He suggested that a height of 7 5 feet alone was, in itself, sufficient grounds to
deny the CUP. Bums has previously pointed out the fallacy of using the height of the
building, alone, as a basis for denying a CUP, when the DCZO specifically authorizes
buildings over 45 feet if they are approved by a CUP.
Mr. Mason further stated that he disagreed with the line-of-sight drawings Burns

presented- again an indication that his concerns focused upon the "view of the Tetons" and
not upon concerns about adjoining industrial uses. CUP Tr. Vol II, p. 26, 11. 16-22. He
offered an opinion that Burns' proposal "certainly blocks the view of the mountains, no
question about it. When you put 64 feet wide [sic J, it definitely is going to block that view."
Id. However, other than this irrelevant allegation, he did not offer any additional factual

evidence.

Preserving a "view of the mountains" is nowhere listed as a criteria for
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disapproval of CUPs. Rather, the sole criterion is compatibility with adjoining "uses."
DCZO § 4(2)(A). Further, by limiting the scenic corridor-which does allow consideration
of aesthetic values -

to 330 feet from Highway 33, the Board appears to have implicitly

ruled out the use of aesthetic considerations for properties situated outside that corridor.
Mr. Mason presented no facts showing that Burns' proposal is inconsistent with

surrounding industrial properties or was inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan. Indeed,
his opposition to Burns' CUP application was not based on facts at all, but on his personal
views of appropriate planning policy: "[T]his variance, if you will, granted in the CUP, sets
a bad precedent." CUP Tr. Vol. II, p. 26, 1. 24 through p. 27, 1. 1. Suggesting that the CUP
decision should be based on policy considerations and not the facts of Burns' application,
Mr. Mason states "in the County in general, if you grant a variance for CUP [sic], now
engineering-wise it might make sense, but I think you have to look at a bigger picture than
that." CUP. Tr. Vol. III, p. 27, 11. 2-5. Apparently the Board heeded Mr. Mason's advice:
it based its decision not on the facts related to Bums' application, but on personal opinions
and visionary planning goals. While these considerations may have been arguably relevant
at the rezone hearing -

they have no relevance at a CUP hearing considering building

height.
C.

Written Com1nents.

In addition to the two witnesses who appeared in opposition at the hearing, the
Commission received written comments from several other individuals and organizations.
As noted above, Kathy Rinaldi, now a commissioner who participated in the deliberations
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leading to the Third Findings, appeared on behalf of V ARD in opposition to the Bums
Proposal. R. at 99, 107. Like J\1r. Mason, Ms. Rinaldi did not offer any factual evidence
upon which the Board could rely when making its decision. She merely concluded that
granting the CUP "will set a bad precedent for the vicinity of the Scenic Byway." R. at 99.
While acknowledging that the building will be located outside the scenic corridor, she still
suggested that Board should deny the CUP for the same aesthetic reasons the Board could
rely if the building were located in the Scenic Corridor. 9 Again, while this testimony might
have had some relevance at a rezone hearing where the Board considers appropriate uses for
the area, it had no relevance to the issue at hand. None of the other witnesses who submitted
written testimony offered any factual evidence that Burns' proposed building was
incompatible with surrounding uses or in conflict with the comprehensive plan. R. at 100-02,
105-06, 108-11.
Simply stated, there is nothing in the record which shows that Bums' proposed 75'
foot building is inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan or could not be made compatible
with surrounding properties and uses. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence demonstrates
that there are many steps which Burns could and did take to ensure compatibility with the
surrounding properties.

9

Burns does not dispute that the proposed batch plant will have some impact on the view of the mountains if the
vantage point is close to the plant. However, it is undisputed that the building will not be located close to Highway 33 or within
the Scenic Corridor. Thus, it is unclear what basis the Board had for relying so heavily on aesthetic considerations. See Third
Findings at 6-7. Moreover, as Burns' line-of-sight drawings reveal, Bums could -without the need to obtain a CUPconstruct a 45 foot building closer to Highway 33 which would have a greater impact on the view of the Tetons than the 75 foot
building in its current location.
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4.

The Board's Finding that Burns Failed to Demonstrate Conditions That Could
Mitigate the Impact of the Proposed Building Was Arbitrary and Capricious.

a.

The Court Is Not Obligated to Give Deference to Findings Not Supported by
Substantial Evidence.

In addition to being legally deficient under Idaho Code § 67-6535, the Board's

conclusion that there are no conditions which could mitigate the impact of the proposed
building's height is arbitrary and capricious because that conclusion is directly contradicted
by the undisputed evidence in the record. A reviewing court can reverse the decision of a
county board which is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Galli v. Idaho

County, 146 Idaho 155, 158, 191 P.3d 233,236 (2008); Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(d).
To uphold the Board's decision, the Court must find that it is supported by substantial
and competent evidence. "Substantial and competent evidence is 'relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."' Lane Ranch Partnership v. City

ofSun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007) (citing Lamar Corp. v. City of
Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 43,981 P.2d 1146, 1153 (1999)). In this case, the Board provides
no rationale for its conclusion that there were no conditions which could make Burns'
proposed building compatible with surrounding uses. Because the Board's finding is not
supported by substantial competent evidence, it is entitled to no deference from this Court.

Lewis v. State, Dept. ofTrans., 143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Urrutia
v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 734, 742 (2000)).

b.

Burns Offered Ample Evidence of Mitigating Conditions Which Assured
Compatibility with Adjoining Industrial Uses.

The Board found that "[t]he applicant did not show the County how the adverse
impact of this height increase could be minimized nor can the County determine a way to
minimize the impacts" of a seventy-five (75) foot building. Third Findings at 5. The Board
further found that it "has not been presented with any plausible way to mitigate the extra 30
feet now being requested, nor is it able to craft conditions that would assure surrounding
properties, uses and neighborhoods protection and compatibility." Third Findings at 6.
If this is truly the Board's position, then the Board is acting in bad faith. The record

is replete with uncontradicted evidence of Burns' efforts to implement height-mitigating
design elements in order to ensure the building blended in with surrounding uses and that
operational elements would not infringe upon adjoining property owners. 10 See R.at 31-33,
75-77, 124-35. Indeed, it is curious that County identified and imposed conditions in the
"Developer's Agreement" which would "assure compatibility with other surrounding uses"
and yet now states that no such conditions could possibly exist. See R. at 77.
Bums submitted extensive written and verbal testimony to the Board at the time of the
hearing. R. at 124-35; CUP Tr. Vol. II, p. 5-18. The record contains uncontradicted
testimony that a height of seventy-five (7 5) feet was necessary to enclose the mechanical
equipment designed to mitigate impacts of the plant operation upon adjoining uses and

10

Indeed, dust, noise, vibration and truck traffic would have been a potential problem for adjoining landowners if
Burns had chosen to build a batch plant within the forty five foot height initial limitation. R. at 126. Burns' efforts to build a
plant that is quieter, cleaner, more efficient and more environmentally friendly have been wholly ignored by the Board, who
appears to be fixated solely on aesthetic considerations. One wonders if the Board truly believes that, when weighed in the
balance, the community would be better off having a noisier, dustier, dirtier, more wasteful plant enclosed within a building
meeting the 45 foot limit, in comparison to an environmentally friendly, fully-enclosed structure 75 feet in height.

ensure responsible environmental compliance. CUP Tr. Vol. II, p.15, 11. 10-12. Those
features include equipment necessary to facilitate energy efficiency, reduce dust emissions
and minimize sound and vibration. R. at 13. 11 Ironically, the very feature the Board finds
objectionable - that is, the height of the enclosure -

is necessitated by environmental and

compatibility considerations. In addition to describing why the additional height is necessary
to accommodate ·a sound, dust and vibration reduction system, the written testimony
demonstrates that the building was specifically designed to "break up the visual appearance
of the taller building" by employing "differing heights of ... adjoining plant buildings ...
varying color schemes, and rooflines and facade textures between the panels." R. at 127.
The record also contains evidence Bums presented to the Driggs Planning and Zoning
Commission demonstrating how the use of a barrier wall and landscaping could mitigate the
view of a taller building. R. at 31-33. The record is replete with evidence describing
mitigating efforts undertaken by Bums, including conditions the Board, in the Development
Agreement, has already agreed to and acknowledged will ensure compatibility with the other
properties in this industrial area. R. at 31-33, 75-77, 124-35.
All of these are conditions Development Agreement -

some self-imposed and some adopted pursuant to the

were designed to ensure the building harmonized with

surrounding uses and the visual appearance of a taller building was diminished. R. at3 l-33,
75-77, 124-35. The written testimony propounded by Bums clearly contradicts the Board's
finding that the applicant presented "no" evidence of mitigating conditions. R. at 124-3 5.

11

A Bates-Stamped version of the Agency Record is included as an exhibit on the CD-ROM Petitioner filed with the
initial Petition for Judicial Review.

The Board's statement that Bums did not present "any" evidence of mitigating conditions
is disingenuous, is not supported by "substantial competent evidence," and is not binding on
the Court. Lewis v. State Dept. of Trans., 143 Idaho 418,421, 146 P.3d 684,687 (Ct. App.
2006). To hold that it had not been presented with any evidence of mitigating conditions,
demonstrates the Board's bad faith in this matter. The Board's decision to base the denial
of the CUP on a purported inability to impose mitigating conditions is arbitrary and
capricious, particularly in view of its failure to explain why Bums' proposed mitigating
elements would not work. 12
5.

The Board's Conclusion That Burns' Proposed Use Was Not in Accordance with
the Comprehensive Plan Was Arbitrary and Capricious.

The Board's conclusion that Bums' proposed use is conflict with the Comprehensive
Plan because it could not be adequately "shielded" is also arbitrary and capricious because
the Board provides no factual support for such conclusion and ignores other provisions in the
Comprehensive Plan specifically designating the area north of the airport as being
particularly well suited for industrial and manufacturing uses.
The Board cites to a provision of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan describing the
Driggs "gateway." Third Findings at 6. The Board asserts that Burns proposed building
"conflicts" with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan's gateway provision. Id. Again, the Board
cites to no facts, other than the mere fact of the building height itself, demonstrating the
manner in which the additional height is inconsistent with the "gateway" provisions. The
12

The Board did not point to any evidence that the conditions identified by Bums would not have their intended
effect. The Board merely cites to Commissioner Young's statements in the record that he was "skeptical" about the line-of-sight
diagram. Third Findings at 5. However, his opinion about the diagram is not a fact which the Board could justify its denial.
Further, the "view of the Tetons" was not a relevant consideration in any event.

Board does not define where the "gateway" is, how deep the gateway corridor is nor what
feature or features of Bums' cream-colored building in fact conflict with this vague,
undefined "gateway" concept. It simply refers to the nebulous "gateway" provision and then
finds an inconsistency without any supporting rationale or facts. As noted above, "mere
conclusions are not sufficient." Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Fremont County, supra.
Nor does the Board explain why it continues to use the Comprehensive Plan as a
regulatory ordinance, contrary to the holding in Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2
P.3d 738 (S. Ct. 2000). 13 See also Petitioner's Reply Brief at p. 13. 14 Most egregiously, the
Board ignores other provisions of the Drigg's Comprehensive Plan which state that "[t]he
area immediately around the airport has been consistently envisioned as an appropriate
industrial area because of the noise impacts of the airport and fairgrounds, the existence of
other light industrial and service commercial uses." 15 Driggs Comprehensive Plan at 82.
"Large or high impact (noise, odor, etc.) manufacturing and industrial uses should be
confined to an area north of the airport." Id. at 88. It is undisputed that the industrial use
proposed by Bums is located in the area immediately north of the Driggs airport. R. at 2.

13

See Section III of the initial Petitioner's Brief for the argument that use of the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory
measure and as a basis for denying Burns' CUP application is improper under the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Urruita v.
Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 734 (2000).
14

Burns continues to urge that use of the broad, visionary criteria contained in a Comprehensive Plan also violates due
process and vagueness principles under the Idaho and United States Constitutions. The argument will not here be repeated, but
the Court is referred to Petitioner's Brief, dated July 11, 2008, pp 25-30; Petitioner's Reply Brief dated August 26, 2008, pp I 722.
15

The Driggs Comprehensive Plan in effect at the time Burns' CUP application was filed is included on the CD-ROM
filed as an attachment to the initial Petitioner's Brief.
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There is no evidence in the record supporting the Board's finding that Burns'
proposed use is in conflict with the "gateway" provision of the Comprehensive Plan. To the
contrary, the only substantial, competent evidence in the record indicates that the proposed
use is completely consistent with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan. Indeed, by approving the
February 2007 rezone, the Board implicitly found that an industrial use-such as Burns'
batch plant-was consistent with the Comprehensive Plan and therefore harmonious with the
surrounding properties and uses. See Taylor v. Canyon County Ed. of Comm 'rs, 147 Idaho
424, ---, 210 P.3d 532, 546 (2009) (noting that when examining a request for a rezone a
county board must make a factual inquiry into whether the request is consistent with the
comprehensive plan); see also Idaho Code§ 67-6511, Love v. Board of County Comm 'rs,
105 Idaho 558,671 P.2d 471 (1983). 16
6.

This Court Can and Should Remand this Matter to the Board with Instructions
to Approve Burns' Cup Application.

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act allows this Court to set aside the Board's
decision and to remand the matter back to the Board for "further proceedings as necessary."
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(2). In Workman the court noted that "in circumstances such as these
in which there are no findings or the findings are clearly inadequate, the district court should
at least initially remand the case to the agency." 104 Idaho at 38, 655 P.2d 932 (emphasis
added). The Workman court noted that "[w]e express no opinion on the issue of whether
remand would be necessary in a case in which an agency refuses to comply with the orders

16

See also Petitioner's Reply Brief dated August 26, 2008,pp. 14-17, wherein Burns argues that by revisiting the
Comprehensive Plan consistency issue the County violated LLUP A's appeal period and princip !es of res judicata.

28

-

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

0 t-r; •'.,- '(..,')

of a district court" -

thus suggesting that where an agency consistently refuses to comply

with a court order, a court could remand the matter to the board with specific instructions to
grant the permit. Id. n.8. After Workman, the Supreme Court held, in a slightly different
context that where a County has acted arbitrarily and where there is no indication in the
record suggesting that further determinative findings can be made, a district court may
properly refuse to remand the matter and order the County to grant the requested petition.
In Bonner General Hosp. v. Bonner County, 133 Idaho 7, 981 P.2d 242 (1999), the County
contended that the district court should have remanded an indigency determination back to
the County for further proceedings, instead of ordering the County to grant the indigency
petition without an opportunity for further factual findings. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision that the findings of the county commissioners were "not
supported by substantial and competent evidence" and that the County's denial of the petition
was "arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion."

Id. at 11, 981 P .2d at 246.

Importantly, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's refusal to allow the County to
make additional findings, holding that "[Where] there is no indication in the record that
further findings could be made from the paucity of evidence that would affect the outcome
of this case ... we hold that no remand by the district court was necessary." Id.
In this case, the Court has twice found that the Board's decision on the CUP
application fails to comply with§ 67-6535. The Court has nvice remanded the matter to the
Board to prepare written findings justifying their decision and in each instance the Board has
only recited broad, conclusory statements with no factual support in the record. It is quite
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obvious why the Board continues to resort to broad, conclusory statements: there are no facts
in the record which would support a denial. Like Bonner General Hosp., remand in this case
would serve no purpose. The salient facts regarding the nature of Burns proposal are
uncontroverted; given the absence of evidence supporting a denial of the requested CUP, no
findings of fact could be made that would affect the outcome of this case. Allowing the
Board to once again produce unsupported and conclusory findings would only give the Board
license to once again frustrate Bums' right to a reasoned decision and further delay resolution
of this matter. This Court should declare the Board's decision to be arbitrary and capricious
and order the Board to grant the permit without the need to make further findings.

Burns Is Entitled to Attorney Fees Because the Board Blatantly Disregarded the
Court's Previous Decisions.

7.

An award of attorney fees is appropriate in a proceeding against a county where, "The
court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-117(1). Such an award is particularly appropriate
where the non-prevailing party has received "the district court's repeated explanations of the
lawsuit's failings." Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 339, 160 P.3d 1272, 1274
(2007). Here, the Board has twice ignored the Court's admonition to adopt specific factual
findings and avoid unsupported legal conclusions. Instead, Burns has on each occasion been
plagued with a target which seems to move with every decision issued by the Board.
Initially, the Board held that the earlier rezone expressly limited the building height
to 45 feet. When confronted with the written transcript showing otherwise, the Board quietly
dropped this conclusion in their next written findings. Later, the Board disingenuously raised
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the argument the Bums should have pursued a variance rather than a CUP. At the August

18, 2009, hearing and in its Decision on Review, the Court reprimanded the Board for raising
that issue for the first time at such a late stage in the proceeding. Nevertheless, in the Third
Findings, the Board again denied the CUP application based on Burns' failure to request a
variance. Clearly, the Board has received "repeated explanations" of the argument's failings
and of the need to support its decision with reasoned conclusions supported by substantial
competent evidence. Finally, the Board continues to ignore the clear mandate of Urrutia
directing that a comprehensive plan cannot be used as a regulatory ordinance.
If this Court remands the matter to the Board with instructions to grant the pem1it, the
situation becomes different from the facts of Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City ofSun

Valley, which the County identified in its Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court's earlier decision awarding Bums attorney fees. In that case, the Supreme Court
vacated the district court's award of attorney fees as being premature because the matter was
"remanded to the City in order for it to make reviewable findings of fact." 144 Idaho 72, 78,
156 P.3d 573, 579 (2007). However, in this case there is simply nothing in the record from
which the County could make findings that support a decision to deny the permit. Thus,
there is no need for the Court to remand the matter back with instructions to make review ab le
findings -the Board has tried three times and failed miserably on all occasions. Rather this
Court should, consistent with Workman and Bonner General Hospital, remand the matter
with instructions to grant the CUP, thus bringing this matter to a conclusion. In that
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situation, Crown Point Development would no longer be applicable. Thus, Bums is entitled
to attorney fees pursuant to § 12-117 and Doe v. City of Elk River.

CONCLUSION
The Third Findings do not comply with Idaho Code § 67-653 5 because they do not
clearly state the facts the Board relied upon nor explain how the Board applied the law to
those facts. The Board's decision to deny the CUP application for Burns' failure to seek a
variance is arbitrary and capricious. The Board's findings are arbitrary and capricious
because they are not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
The Board has demonstrated that it is unwilling to comply with this Court's
instructions to issue findings that comply with the Idaho Code. Given the absence of any
evidence in the record supporting a denial of the CUP, this Court should find that the Board
has acted arbitrarily and that there is no indication in the record that further factual findings
will be of benefit. The Court should bring this long and troubled saga to a close by
remanding the matter back to the Board with specific instructions to grant the CUP, without
making further findings.
DATED this

q1,._

day of February, 2010.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P .L.L.C.
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89 N. Main Street
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, AN IDAHO
LIMITED LIMffED LIABILITY COMP ANY,

Case Nos.: CV-07-376

Petitioner,
V.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF
SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF TETON
COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO,

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Respondent.

COMES NOW Respondent, Teton County Board of Commissioners, and submits
this Reply Brief in answer to Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Board of County Commissioner's (BOCC) issued Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law that adequately comply with the standards set forth by Idaho
law. The Amended Findings give insight into the BOCC's reasons for denial of the
permit and are based upon factual evidence applied to local and State law.

Petitioner's

request for well reasoned findings has been satisfied.
Petitioner's Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review is
comprised mainly of concerns regarding the BOCC's alternative finding that a variance
should have been applied for by the applicant. In their Amended Findings the BOCC sets
forth several reasons for the denial, any one of which could serve on its own as a basis for
denial.

In their ·Amended Findings, the BOCC thoroughly analyzed the application

according to the law surrounding conditional use pennits (CUPs)1 and reveal their
thoughts as to why they denied the CUP based exclusively on the facts applied to CUP
law.

The Amended Findings also iterate the BOCC's concern that a variance may have

been the proper application for a height modification based upon State law, but this
concern is just one of several reasons for their denial.
Once this Court determines that the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law are adequate, Petitioner must accept the denial of his permit application.
Although the Board needed to issue a written decision that set forth their reasons for
denial, the Board has discretion to deny conditional use permit applications so long as
their reasoning is not completely erroneous. Absent such a finding, the Court cannot

1

The tenns "conditional use permit" and "special use permit" are synonymous. Taylor v. Canyon County
Bd. of Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424,435,210 P.3d 532,543 (2009). Because Teton County uses "conditional"
rather than "special" I will refer to them as conditional use permits.

Reply Brief
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interfere with the Board's decision. Furthermore, even if the Court could say that the
decision was erroneous, the Court still cannot interfere with the Board's decision unless
Petitioner proves that a substantial right has been prejudiced, a right that is separate and
apart from the Board's issuance of a written decision.

The CUP denial only affects

Petitioner's ability to construct a building that is 75 feet high.

Petitioner is still free to

operate a concrete batch plant, it just cannot be 75 feet tall. Therefore, Petitioner cannot
say (and has not said) that a substantial right has been prejudiced.
Because conditional use permits are zoning decisions, the comprehensive plan
must be followed. Analyzing the conditional use permit application for conformance
with the comprehensive plan is not only reasonable, but necessary under the law.
Caselaw is clear that before a CUP can be granted it must be found that it does not
conflict with the comprehensive plan; visionary goals, aesthetics and symmetry are all
proper considerations when deciding whether to grant a conditional use permit.
The BOCC properly analyzed the conditional use permit application at length,
they had a long public hearing on the application and their Amended Findings list several
valid reasons for their denial, any one of which could stand alone as a basis to deny and
all of which are logical and supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, their denial
does not impair a substantial right of Petitioner. Obviously Petitioner wants a different
answer then the County has been giving him for two years; but the County's answer
remains the same and it is an appropriate answer.

Reply Brief
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II. ARGUlVIENT
A. THE AMEl'-i1JED FINDINGS OF FACT .AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE ADEQUATE
i.

The Amended Findings of Fact Comply with Idaho Law
Teton County followed the standards dictated by statute and case law when it

drafted its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The section of the Local
Land use Planning Act (LLUPA) which describes written Findings states:
The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall
be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the
criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested
facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the
applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual
information contained in the record.
Idaho Code § 67-6535(b ). Court cases provide further insight into Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law, stating that they should reveal "the underlying facts or policies that
were considered .... " Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32,
38, 655 P.2d 926, 932 (1982). Written Findings are supposed to provide insight into the
County's decision. Id. The County's written decision provides this insight. The Board of
County Commissioners weighed the evidence before them in light of the relevant law and
explained their belief as to why a height of 75 feet is not conditionally permitted, why a
75 foot height could not be granted pursuant to specific conditions listed in the ordinance,
why a height of 75 feet in that area conflicted with the comprehensive plan, and why a
height of 75 feet was not compatible with the surrounding properties, uses and
neighborhood. The BOCC also explained that they were presented with no means nor
could they craft any conditions that would adequately protect the area or insure that the
75 foot tall building was compatible with the neighborhood. They also explained their
Reply Brief
Second Amended Petition
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belief that granting a CUP in this instance would violate State law, but they did not rely
upon this as their reason for denial since the application already failed at least one State
or local requirement for CUP granting.

In the Workman Family Partnership case the only "findings" were a letter of
denial to the applicant signed by the Community Development Director which stated:
Reasons for the refusal to rezone are as follows:
1. Too great of change from an R-2 Zoning District to a C-1 Zoning
District.
2. Residential property to the south of the proposed mall would be
adversely affected by devaluation of property values.
3. A rezone would violate the integrity of existing residential zoning
districts."

Id. at 37. The Court determined that this letter did not constitute Findings and thus
remanded down for adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to be prepared.
"Nothing in the letter reveals the underlying facts or policies that were considered by the
Council. The reasons listed in the zoning action sheets are likewise conclusory, and they
provide very little insight into the Council's decision." Id. at 38 (emphasis added).

The

Court in Workman clearly does not think that an unofficial letter could serve as a
governing board's findings.

But the Court made it clear that by asking for proper

Findings it was not setting a legal standard that would be difficult for governing bodies to
follow.
No particular form is required, and no magic words need be employed.
What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what,
specifically, the decision making body believes, after hearing and
considering all the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon
which its decision is based. Conclusions are not sufficient.
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls 104 Idaho 32, 37 655 P.2d 926, 931
(1982) (emphasis added); quoting South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of
Reply Brief
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Commissioners, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977). The"'c:ourt is looking for the
reasoning behind the decision, the information that is not apparent in the oral decision. In
many other cases the Supreme Court has found adequate Findings that are much less
detailed and insightful than the ones at issue. See Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont

County, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257+, 143 Idaho 501, 512 (2006) (" ... the Board's written
findings and conclusions did not violate Cowan's due process rights.)
Teton County's Amended Findings thoroughly explain their reasons for denying
the CUP application.

They analyze and consider the stated purpose of the Driggs

Ordinance, and explain the rationale for their decision based on Chapter 4, Section 2 of
the Driggs Ordinance dealing with Conditional Use permits; Chapter 2, Section 13 of the
Driggs Ordinance dealing with the M-1 zone; the Driggs Comprehensive Plan; as well as
State law.

The County's Amended Findings take the points of law provided by State

Code and local ordinance and apply them to the facts in the application and the evidence
provided at the public hearings. The County's Findings provide conclusions, but only
after they consider, at length, the underlying facts and policies pertinent to the
application. Petitioner's contention that the Findings are deficient is based solely upon
their negative result (denial), not upon their application of fact to law.
ii.

THE BOARD'S DECISION WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE

The County's decision was rational and justifiable. Petitioner contends that the
County's interpretation of its own ordinances is flawed.2 Petitioner obviously disagrees
with the outcome of the County's analysis, but this does not mean that their analysis is

2

Per Title 7 of the Teton County Code the City of Drigg's zoning ordinances and comprehensive plan were
adopted by the County for the Drigg's area of impact.
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wrong. There is a strong presumption of favoring the validity o the actions of zoning
boards, which includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances.

Howard v. Canyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 480, 915 P.2d 709, 711
(1996). Review of the Board's action is subject to the requirements of LC. § 67-5279.

Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. of Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 431, 210 P.3d 532,539 (2009)
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
( a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).

In his brief, Petitioner appears to argue that the Amended

Findings violate (d) and (e) above.
The Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial and

competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion." Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 590, 166
P.3d 374, 380 (2007) (citing Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 43, 981
P.2d 1146, 1153 (1999)). The main fact before the BOCC was Petitioner's proposal to
build a structure 30 feet higher than the any other building in the vicinity. The BOCC
was not persuaded by the applicant's assertions that the height would not impact the
community and that the building would essentially "blend in".

In their Amended

Findings the BOCC analyzed the application in light of all the relevant laws and all the
evidence submitted by the applicant and others through written and oral comment and
reached a decision based upon consideration of all the facts and law. A reasonable mind
Reply Brief
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would accept the Board's findings as adequate to support their conclusion that the CUP
not be granted.
The Board's decision does not have to be the only possible conclusion that could
be reached from the facts presented. Even if the matters presented to the Board could
have been decided differently, the law is clear that the reviewing Court cannot substitute
its own judgment for that of the Board. "Substantial and competent evidence sufficient to
support factual determinations made by the Board of County Commissioners in zoning
cases need not be uncontradicted, nor must it necessarily lead to a certain conclusion; it
need only be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the fact finder". Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho
448, 456,180 P.3d 487, 495 (2008).

Even where there is conflicting evidence the

County's determinations are binding on the court. Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun

Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007).
While there was disputed evidence on both sides of this issue, it is not this
Court's duty, sitting in its appellate capacity, to weigh the evidence in this
matter and re-determine the facts. Again, the standard governing judicial
review in a case involving the LLUPA (local Land Use Planning Act)
provides that this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency
as to the weight of the evidence presented. Idaho Code § 67-5279(1). Rather,
this court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous.

Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005)."When deciding
whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence pursuant to LC. § 67-5279(3)(d),
a court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board." Wohrle v. Kootenai County,
147 Idaho 267, 207 P.3d 998, 1005 (2009). 3 "In reviewing an agency's findings of fact,
3

Kootenai County's findings were as follows:
5.01 The granting of the variance requested in this application would not be in conformance with Kootenai County
Zoning Ordinance No. 348, Section 30.03, Section 30.02 and Idaho Code§ 67-6516. The evidence presented
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the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence presented." Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196, 46 P.3d at 13. The
Court in Angstman v. City of Boise found that there was conflicting evidence before the
City Council regarding the adequacy of a parcel that was the subject of a CUP
application, but refused to reverse findings that were clear, dispositive and supported by
the record. Angstman v. City of Boise, 917 P.2d 409, 128 Idaho 575, 579 (1996). The
Court stated the standard of review of an agency's findings as follows:
[A] court reviewing an administrative decision pursuant to the IAPA
may reverse or remand for further proceedings only if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. LC. § 67-5279(4);
Jefferson County v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, 127
Idaho 495, 497, 903 P.2d 84, 86 (1995). There is a strong presumption
favoring the validity of the action of a zoning board. South Fork
Coalition v. Board of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho
857, 860, 792 P.2d 882, 885 (1990). The party attacking a zoning
decision bears the burden of proving that the zoning ordinance was
applied improperly. Sprenger, 127 Idaho at 586, 903 P.2d at 751. The
reviewing court must apply a presumption of validity afforded to the
zoning board when considering the adoption, interpretation and
application of zoning ordinances by the board. South Fork Coalition,
117 Idaho at 860, 792 P.2d at 885.
Angstman v. City of Boise, 917 P.2d 409, 128 Idaho 575, 577-578 (1996). The County's
denial of the CUP must be upheld according to Idaho law.

regarding the Applicants' inability to construct structures on the steep topography of the subject parcel does show
that an undue hardship exists. However, this request fails to meet the requirement of public interest and the intent
of the zoning ordinance, specifically Section 30.03(d). The issuance of variances that not only encroach into the
required setback but also the lakebed is not in the public interest and would allow ~ benefit that is not afforded to
other property owners fronting Coeur d'Alene Lake.
5.02 The granting of the variance requested in this application does not meet the requirements of Idaho Code§ 676516 because it would serve to legitimize the Applicants' construction of decks without required building
permits, which would be considered a special privilege.
5.03 The requested variance does not conform to Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 348 and Idaho Code§
67-6516 because the requested variance is not necessary to accommodate the recreational use of the property and
would be detrimental to surrounding properties and the public welfare if zero setbacks and lake encroachments
were to be allowed, even by special permit.
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The BOCC's written decision explains at length how it

ached the conclusion

that the CUP application must be denied. In their Amended Findings they considered
every aspect of local and State law surrounding CUPs, they explained the law and the
facts and gave a full explanation of why those facts led to their decision. A decision is
not arbitrary and capricious if it is "sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that it considered
applicable standards and reached a reasoned decision .. " Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock

Owners, 141 Idaho 517, 523 112 P.3d 805 (2005) They took the law and applied reason
and came to a conclusion, thus it cannot be said that their decision was arbitrary or
capricious.
So long as the Board's "findings, conclusions and decision are sufficiently
detailed to demonstrate that it considered applicable standards and reached a
reasoned decision, we [will] find that the decision was not arbitrary and
capricious and was based on substantial evidence in the record."

Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. of Com'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 204, 207 P.3d 169, 180
(2009); citing I.C. § 67-6535(a-b) and Brett v. Eleventh St. Dockowner's Ass'n, Inc., 141
Idaho 517, 523, 112 P.3d 805, 811 (2005). The Board of County Commissioners had
many concerns which were outlined in their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law.
The bottom line for this Court is that the Board's Findings are supported by substantial,
competent evidence in the record and their decision must be upheld.

B. THE BOARD'S DECISION MUST BE AFFIRMED UNLESS APPLICANT DEMONSTRATES
THAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED
Finally, even if the Board's decision had not been based on substantial evidence or
was

otherwise

invalid

under

LC.

§

67-5279(3),

LC.

§

67-5279(4)

states:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action
shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." This
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Second Amended Petition
Page 11 of 38

0 ;:;· ~t~1

section of the Code has often been quoted and used by the Supreme Court. Wohrle v.
Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 207 P.3d 998, 1006 (2009); citing Lane Ranch P'ship v.
City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 591, 166 P.3d 374, 381 (2007); see also Dry Creek
Partners, LLC, v. Ada County Com'rs, ex rel. State, 148 Idaho 11, 217 P.3d 1282, 1287
(2009); In re Idaho Dept. of Water Resources Amended Final Order Creating Water Dist.
No. 170, 148 Idaho 200, 220 P.3d 318, 323 (2009); Sanders Orchard v. Gem County,
137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002). The legislature is very clear that they do not intend
agency action to be overturned unless there has been actual harm to a fundamental right.
The code section in LLUPA dealing with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law parrots
the language found in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act:
Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation
of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a
remedy or reversal of a decision.
Idaho Code § 67-6535(c). In the Wohrle case the Court determined that the denial of a
variance request did not deprive the applicant of any substantial rights because the
applicant was "still able to use their property as permitted under state laws and
regulations and county ordinances-all of which were in effect when Respondents
purchased their properties." Id.

Although the applicants could not build without a

variance, the Court determined that they were "still able to put their property to
reasonable use by using and enjoying a dock on Coeur d'Alene Lake, so no substantial
rights have been prejudiced." Id. at 1007.

In the present case, Petitioner purchased a

property that was zoned C-3. He obtained a zone change to M-1 so that he could operate
a cement batch plant. No substantial rights of Petitioner's have been prejudiced because
Petitioner is able to conduct a myriad of activities on his property. Most significantly,
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Petitioner has been able to operate a concrete batch plant whose height exceeds 45 feet
for two and a half years. Petitioner was permitted to operate this tall but temporary
facility for a period of 18 months beginning August 31, 2007 after which the County had
the right to revoke the authority to operate the temporary facility.

The County has

allowed the facility to remain operational.
Thus, regardless of whether the Board of County Commissioner's actions meet
the standard set forth in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), the district court must affirm the
board's action "unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." LC.§ 675279(4); Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. of Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 431, 210 P.3d 532,539
(2009) ("It is the burden of the party contesting the board's action ... to first illustrate
how the board erred in a manner specified under LC. § 67-5279, and then establish that a
substantial right has been prejudiced." Citing Druffel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho
853, 855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002); Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 920 204
P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009); Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,
208, 159 P.3d 840 (2007) ([LJand-use decision must be upheld if substantial rights of the
appellant have not been prejudiced.); Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho
584, 590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007)) (A party appealing a county board of
commissioners' decision must first show that the board "erred in a manner specified in
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), and then it must show that a substantial right has been
prejudiced.") Furthermore, it is the burden of the party contesting the board's action to
prove that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Petitioner has not even raised the
subject, much less proven that a substantial right has been prejudiced.

Reply Brief
Second Amended Petition
Page 13 of 38

n ·'; : l··;
V

,:.._. 1~_}

)

Although the Amended Findings are adequate, even if they were not this is not the
"substantial right" that is envisioned by J.C. § 67-5279(4). As stated above, a Board's
zoning decision can only be overturned where the petitioner first demonstrates that the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law violate LC. § 67-5279(3) and then additionally
proves that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Again, Idaho Code § 67-5279(4)
states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency
action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced."
The "notv,rithstanding" language is there to show that regardless of the inadequate
Findings described in subsection (3), the petitioner must prove that a substantial right has
been prejudiced.

The inadequate findings cannot be this substantial right, otherwise

there would be no second step and no "notwithstanding" language. Thus, Petitioner must
show that a substantial right was prejudiced in order for the court to take any action other
than to affirm the Board's decision. Petitioner has made no such showing.
C. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS HAD DISCRETION TO DENY

Both the County Code for the Driggs Area of Impact4 and the Idaho Code 5
provide that a conditional use permit ( aka special use permit) "may" be authorized under
certain circumstances. They do not state that a conditional use permit "shall" be granted
4

The Planning Commission may, following the notice and hearing
procedures provided under Section 67-6509, Idaho Code, permit
conditional uses where the uses are not in conflict with the
Comprehensive Plan nor the zoning ordinance. If the proposed
conditional use cannot adequately meet the conditions necessary to
assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties,
uses and neighborhood, the Planning Commission will not approve the
proposed use. Driggs Ordinance 275-07, Chapter 4, Section 2(a)(l) (emphasis added).
* The County adopted the Drigg's Code for the area of impact.
5

A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the
terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the
ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the proposed use, and
when it is not in conflict with the plan. LC.§ 67-6512(a) (emphasis added).
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if those circumstances are proven at a public hearing. The use of the word "may" rather
than the word "shall" clearly gives the governing board discretion in determining whether
to grant an application. Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 501, 817 P.2d 160, 167
(1991); citing Saxton v. Gem County, 113 Idaho 929, 750 P.2d 950 (1988); Marks v.

Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 671 P.2d 473 (1983); State v. Bunting Tractor, 58 Idaho 617, 77
P.2d 464 (1938); State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868, 811 P.2d 44 (Ct.App.1991); Frazier v.

Neilsen & Co., 115 Idaho 739, 769 P.2d 1111 (1989) (Where a statute used the word
"may" the court held that, "If the statute was intended to provide exclusive remedies, it
would have used mandatory 'shall' language, rather than the pennissive 'may.' "). "The
use of the word "may" shows that the City Council had discretion regarding the decision
to grant or deny the special use pennit." Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls,
144 Idaho 203, 211-212, 159 P.3d 840, 848-849 (2007). According to the clear wording
of the statute, the governing body may, in its discretion, choose to deny a conditional use.

Davisco Foods Intern, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 788, 118 P.3d 116, 120
(2005).
Even absent the clear language of the Idaho Code and the Driggs ordinance the
general rule of thumb is that there is discretion in quasi-judicial acts. For the purpose of
judicial review, the grant or denial of a conditional permit is a quasi-judicial act within
the discretion of the governing body. 3 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning §
61:47 (4th ed.). Although the Driggs ordinance does not establish definite standards for
approval "conformity with the express standards does not mandate approval of the
application." Id.
The courts have the power and duty to ask the board for its reasons, so as to
determine whether they were lawful ones or such as reasonable minds could
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act on. For a court to say that those reasons are not
enough would
mean that the Judges have taken over the duties and powers of the board.
1
Special exception 1 disputes are to be resolved by the common-sense
judgments of representative citizens doing their best to make
accommodations between conflicting community pressures, and for the
courts to intervene, in the absence of clear illegality, would be contrary to
settled and practical necessities of zoning procedure.

Id. The Commissioners job is not an easy one. Without any special training they
must deal with a myriad of issues that are often replete with conflicting
community pressures.

In the present case they had neighbors, community

members and advocacy groups voicing opposition to the CUP application. They
also had the applicant, a sound businessman and his recognized land use attorney,
pushing for its approval. The BOCC is elected by the citizens of the County to
balance these pressures and reach a decision: that is their job. The 2008 elections
prove that the community supports their decision making capability and absent
clear illegality this Court must as well.

The reasons stated in the Board's

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are ones that reasonable
minds could act upon. There are over 6 single spaced pages of reasons why the
Board felt compelled to deny the application, including those outlined in Idaho
Code§ 67-6512(a) and the City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07.

D.

DENIAL OF A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT APPLICATION Is MANDATORY IF
CERTAIN CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET.

Allowing a permit is discretionary, but denying it can be mandatory. "If the
proposed conditional use cannot adequately meet the conditions necessary to assure
protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood, the
Planning Commission will not approve the proposed use." Driggs Ordinance 275-07,
Chapter 4, Section 2(a)(l) (emphasis added). In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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Law the County found that it could not grant the CUP because it was unable to impose
conditions upon the use that assured protection and compatibility with the surrounding
properties, uses and neighborhood.

The conditional use permit application requested a

height of 75 feet in a neighborhood where the surrounding properties all maintain a
maximum height of 45 feet. The Board found that it could not identify a way to mitigate
the impact of a 62 foot wide, 75 foot tall building; a 75 foot tall building would stand out
high above the existing skyline in an area where there are low level single story buildings
and no projections above the building lines. The applicant did provide "line of sight"
drawings which the Commissioners found unpersuasive. "Commissioner Young pointed
out at the hearing that he was not persuaded by the applicant's line of sight argument
because although the sight angle would be lower, the top of the building would still be so
high that it would even project above the crest of the Tetons, unlike any existing building
in the vicinity." Burns Holding, LLC CUP Denial Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, Footnote 3. Although the Zone change application imposed some
conditions regarding the change in zone to M-1, obviously none of these were crafted to
address the CUP application for a 75 foot tall building that followed. Because they were
not presented with any plausible method to protect neighboring properties or any way to
make the height compatible with the surrounding properties, the Commissioners had no
choice but to deny the application.

E. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS PROPERLY CONSIDERED AESTHETICS
WHEN DECIDING WHETHER TO GRANT BURN'S APPLICATION FOR A CONDITIONAL
USE PERMIT

In the 2007 Idaho Supreme Court case Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin

Falls, Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. (Turner) applied for a special use permit to operate a
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primary television station with wireless communication facilities. After a hearing and
consideration of the matter, the City Council decided that the proposed use was not
consistent with the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan, that it was not consistent with
the zoning provisions of the City Code, and that it would be unsightly in the proposed
location. One of the Petitioner's contentions on review was that these findings were not
supported by substantial evidence because the Council based decision based upon
aesthetics. Petitioner asserted: "[I]t appears the City Council was concerned strictly with
aesthetics and nothing more, as evidenced by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law." Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 211, 159 P.3d 840,
(2007). The Court was clear in its answer that aesthetics most certainly can be a reason
for the denial of a CUP:
The City Council was also entitled to consider aesthetics when deciding
whether to grant Turner's application for a special use permit. As this Court
stated in Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 41, 981 P.2d 1146,
1151 (1999) (citations omitted), with respect to billboards: "A city's
appearance is a substantial government interest, and cities may enact zoning
ordinances to preserve aesthetics. A city may regulate the construction and
placement of billboards for the purpose of preserving aesthetics even though
aesthetic judgments are 'necessarily subjective.' "Likewise, in Williamson v.
City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 19 P.3d 766 (2001), we upheld a district
court's determination that landowners had failed to prove that their request to
separate their property from the city would not materially mar the symmetry
of the city .... The City Council did not abuse its discretion in denying the
special use permit based upon its finding that "[a] 120' lattice
transmission/receiving tower [at a gateway entrance to the city] would be
unsightly and appear to be out of place in this area."

Id. at 212. The present case is very similar to Turner. Like the Twin Falls City
Council the BOCC denied the CUP in part because it would be unsightly, blocking
the view of the mountains and marring the North entrance to the City and it could
not be integrated with the other buildings in the area. The City Council in Turner
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relied exclusively on the fact that the tower would "be out of place", whereas the
BOCC had five other self supporting reasons for denial. If the Supreme Court
determined that the Twin Falls City Council could base its determination of denial
on a finding that something would be unsightly, it cannot be said in the case at hand
that the BOCC improperly used aesthetics as one of five reasons for denial.
F. PuBLIC COMMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN IT IS PROVIDED
In a quasi-judicial agency hearing the public is allowed to comment and the
governing board should listen and consider any public comment that is given. Petitioner
argues in his brief that the written comments and oral testimony at the hearing should
have been disregarded because they lacked specific facts. The Supreme Court was very
clear in the Turner case that a public hearing is "not a trial where the weight of the
evidence presented determined the result." Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls,
144 Idaho 203, 211, 159 P.3d 840, 848 (2007). In support of its assertion that the City
Council's decision was not supported by evidence in the record, Turner had argued,
"What more compelling proof is there than not one citizen appeared and objected to the
tower during the Planning and Zoning hearings and not one person appeared before the
City Council, even after notice to the entire Magic Valley area, to voice any objection to
the tower?" Id.

In response to these arguments the Court stated: "Turner's argument

misapprehends the nature of the public hearing .. " Id. at 211. The Court went on to
remind the Petitioner that the decision to deny a CUP is purely discretionary. In the
present case, advocacy groups and individuals actually did comment in writing and orally
at the hearing. If a City Council has the discretion to deny an application despite a lack
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of community opposition, the Board of County Commissioners certainly had the right to
exercise their discretion and deny an application when faced with community opposition.
District courts acting in their appellate capacity are not authorized to interfere
with a governing body's decision making process and a part of that decision making
process is listening to the thoughts and concerns of the public.
To sanction such interference in the ordinary case would undermine the
important role local agencies play in the land use planning process and
possibly negate meaningful participation by the public in the decision
making process.

Daley v. Blaine County, 108 Idaho 614, 618, 701 P.2d 234, 238 (1985)

6

;

quoting

Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 39, 655 P.2d 926, 933
(1982).

In Daley, the petitioner sought a conditional use permit in order to move a pre-

existing Victorian style two-story home onto a lot in a flood plain management district.
The Court, noting that they were acting only in an appellate capacity, concluded that the
Commissioner's decision was sustainable "at least on some of the grounds set out in the
decision." Id. at 617-618.

In the present case, the Commissioner's received numerous

comments from the public stressing reasons that the CUP should be denied.
6

Public

Blaine County's Findings were as follows: 1. Approval of the reduced setbacks would affect the BLM's
and public's use of the affected adjacent property. 2. There are serious questions which have been
unanswered by the applicant and by the applicant's engineer concerning the location of the well and the
required and actual distance between it, the property line, and the proposed septic system. 3. The reasons
for adopting and maintaining the 100 foot setback from Highway 75 (allowing area for future highway
expansion, separating adjacent lot activities and congestion from highway through-traffic activity, and
maintaining the visual corridor of Highway 75) apply to this lot although the requirement came into effect
after approval of Lake Creek Subdivision. 4. The location of a historic house in a precarious floodplain
situation and on a lot which is below the elevation of the floodplain and which is protected from flooding
only by the adjacent BLM parking lot is contrary to the county's established policies for the floodplain
management district. 5. The lot (being .3 acre in area) is too small for the size house and garage being
proposed to be placed on it, as evidenced by the minimal setbacks requested. 6. The location of the house
and garage five feet from the property line with the BLM would cause the house to be adversely affected by
the future development of the BLM property for public use.
7. From the site information presented by the applicant, the lot does not appear to be buildable and cannot
be determined to be buildable without detailed engineering data. 8. The Board of County Commissioners of
Blaine County does not wish to approve a building site that will need future protection from flooding.
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comment is a necessary part of the hearing process, it is not just there for show, but is
there to provide "a meaningful chance to comment on the CUP's impact on community or
other facts affecting surrounding property." Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,
355, 109 P.3d 1091, 1097 (2005). The Supreme Court has been very clear that public
input heard and weighed by an elected board is valuable, yet Petitioner feels that unless
the public can testify to a certain legal standard that their opinions should not be
considered. Petitioner does state on page 21 of his brief that the public's concerns may
be relevant at a rezone hearing. As discussed below, a CUP hearing is akin to a rezone
and thus the comments of the public are even more relevant.

G. THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN MUST BE FOi.LOWED IN ZONING DECISIONS

i. Conditional use permits are zoning decisions.
The Local Land Use Planning Act's requirement of consistency with the
comprehensive plan applies to zoning ordinances and conditional use permits (which are
in essence "mini-zones") and not to other land use actions such as subdivisions. Idaho
Code §§67-6511, 67-6512(a), 67-6513. Conditional use permits are zoning decisions,
subdivisions are not. Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 786, 86 P.3d 494, 500
(2004).

The Board of County Commissioners is specifically directed by Idaho Code §

67-6512(a) and by the Driggs Ordinance 274-07 Chapter 4, Section 2(A)(l) to find that
the proposed conditional use is not in conflict with the comprehensive plan. Courts have
consistently held that when evaluating a conditional use application conformance with
the comprehensive plan must be determined. Evans v. Board ofCom'rs of Cassia County

Idaho, 137 Idaho 428, 434, 50 P.3d 443, 449, (2002).
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Petitioner continues to misinterpret the Urrutia v. Blaine County case, believing it
supports their proposition that the County erred by addressing compliance with the
comprehensive plan in their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Urrutia case
is easily distinguished from the present case because it involved a subdivision
application, not a conditional use permit. It is well established that a comprehensive plan
is not a legally controlling law when governing bodies are analyzing subdivision
applications. Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1984);

Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357-358, 2 P.3d 738, 742-743 (2000). While it
is true that the comprehensive plan plays a limited role in subdivision applications, its
role in zoning issues is different - zoning decisions must be in accordance with the
comprehensive plan. LC. § 67-6511; State v. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 514, 633
P.2d 576, 580 (1981). "Planning is a determination of public policy, and zoning, to be a
legitimate exercise of police power should be in furtherance of that policy." Giltner

Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633, 181 P.3d 1238, 1241 (2008). For
subdivisions, the comprehensive plan guides the interpretation and exercise of a specific
authority articulated in the ordinance but it cannot be used to create new requirements or
obstacles at odds with land uses permitted under the ordinance. The applicant in Urrutia
applied to subdivide property and his application complied with Blaine County's zoning
and subdivision ordinances. Id. at 356. Because subdividing land into twenty-acre lots
for single family residences was specifically permitted, the comprehensive plan could not
alone be used to deny the applicant what they were otherwise by law permitted to do.
But, conditional use permits are different. Their whole purpose is to allow something
that is not otherwise permitted by law.

Because there is no underlying zoning that

Reply Brief
Second Amended Petition
Page 22 of 38

'! i;

\ ) r'(

\.-

.

'I
..._

affects them they are discretionary zoning decisions. In Howard v. Canyon County Bd. of

Com'rs, the applicant applied for a CUP and was denied. He argued that he satisfied all
reasonable conditions of the Canyon County CUP ordinance and thus should get a CUP.
The Court disagreed. Howard v. Canyon County Bd. of Com'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 481, 915
P.2d 709, 711 (1996).

The Court concluded that the use was prohibited by the

comprehensive plan and that this was a proper reason for denial.
Moreover, we also affirm the decision that Howard's proposal is in
conflict with the Comprehensive Plan. . . . Substantial and competent
evidence supports the Commissioners' conclusion that approval of
Howard's subdivision in the middle of a large agricultural tract would be
the "scattered nonfarm" use prohibited by the Comprehensive Plan and
would cumulatively affect the area's character in conflict with the
Comprehensive Plan.

Id. at 482.
For subdivision applications there is no need to address the comprehensive plan,
because LLUPA mandates no "accordance" or "not in conflict" requirement for them.
Section 67-6535 requires that the comprehensive plan be addressed where "appropriate"
and "applicable," that is, in the case of a rezone or a conditional use permit. The reason
for the special treatment of conditional use permits is that, by their nature, they allow
uses not in accordance with the normal zoning for an area. Thus, conditional use permits
are, in essence, mini-zones. Therefore, the consideration given to whether the zoning for
a property is in accordance with the comprehensive plan must be re-visited when an
applicant seeks a conditional use permit.
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ii. Compliance with the comprehensive plan is a question of fact for the
governing body and their decision can only be overturned if it is proven to be clearly
erroneous.
When analyzing zoning requests a determination of compliance with the
comprehensive plan must be made. Sprenger, Grubb &Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey,
133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999).

Whether approval of a CUP would conflict with

the comprehensive plan is a question of fact that must be addressed and answered in
factual findings. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003).
Because the issue of accordance with the comprehensive plan is one of fact, the city or
county adopting the zoning ordinance has considerable leeway in determining whether
the requirement is met. Love v. Board of County Comrrs of Bingham County, 108 Idaho
728, 730, 701 P.2d 1293 (1985)7.

That determination can only be overturned by a

7

The Love cases illustrate that the issue of accordance with the comprehensive plan is one of fact. At the
first Love case (Love l) it was determined that the initial findings were insufficient to support the
commissioner's decision that a zone change was in accordance with the comprehensive plan. The issue
was remanded and Bingham County Board of County Commissioners made and filed what the Court, in
Love 2, called: "extensive additional findings." 7 Id. at 729 (emphasis added). The Court then determined
that these "extensive" findings justified the Board's decision.
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF BINGHAM COUNTY, IDAHO
REGARDING THE PETITION FOR ZONE RECLASSIFICATION MADE BY W.W. HAYENS AND
NORANDA MINING, INC. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, OF BINGHAM
COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO, AFI'ER DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION, HEREBY
FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
l. The provisions of Chapter 3, Section I of the Bingham County Ordinance 80-1 (the Bingham County
Zoning Ordinance) and Title 67, Chapter 65, of the Idaho Code have been complied ·with, to-wit:
(a) All due and legal petitions have been made,
(b) All due and legal notices have been given, and
(c) All due and legal hearings have been held.
2. After the holding of a public hearing in accordance with legal requirements the Planning and Zoning
Board of Bingham County, Idaho, has recommended the granting of the Petition for a zone change on the
real property described on Exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, from" A"
Agricultural Zone, as described in Chapter l, Section VI, of said Bingham County Zoning Ordinance, to
"M" Manufacturing Zone, as described in Chapter 1, Section IX of said Bingham County Zoning
Ordinance.
3. In a public hearing held in accordance with legal requirements on May 13, 1981, before the Board of
County Commissioners, an opportunity was given to interested parties to express their views concerning
the petitioned zoning change. All Commissioners were present at said public hearing.
4. That the following are goals of the Bingham County Comprehensive Plan.
(a) To promote and encourage economic growth;
(b) To encourage the location of industrial development on marginal agricultural ground;
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reviewing court if it is obviously wrong. "Whether a zoning ordinance is "in accordance"
with the comprehensive plan is a factual question, which can only be overturned where
the fact found is clearly erroneous." Id. at 731 (emphasis in the original).

"[T]he

detennination of whether a zoning ordinance is 'in accordance with' the comprehensive

(c) That an adequate amount of suitable land should be zoned for light and heavy industry to insure new
and expanding industries will develop in areas suitable for that use;
(d) Industries and other facilities should be encouraged to locate away from congested metropolitan
areas;
(e) Consistent with human environmental values, sufficient economic growth should be promoted to
provide full employment for present residents of the area and former residents who wish to return.
5. The Comprehensive Plan is a policy document intended to be used as a guide. It should be followed
as closely as reason, justice and its own general character make practical and possible.
6. The Comprehensive Plan is not a precise plan and does not show nor intend to show the exact outline
of use districts. It shows, rather, the general location, character and extent of such land use patterns.
7. That Bingham County has many unemployed residents who could benefit from the rezoning because
of the potential job opportunities that would be provided.
8. That for every job created by such an industry, a potential of !wo or three more jobs would be created
by service and related type occupations thereby reducing the unemployment of Bingham County and
promoting the county's economic growth.
9. That said rezoning with the accompanying industrial development would result in an increase in the
tax base of the county which would benefit the county as well as the Snake River School District.
10. That the capital outlay required for such an industry as well as its yearly operating budget would
promote and benefit the economy of the county.
11. That there is an inadequate amount of suitable zoned for industry and that said rezoning is necessary
to encourage industrial expansion in the county.
12. That the rezoning of the land in question involves marginal agricultural ground because of the many
outcropings of rocks and the shallow topsoil.
13. That there exists suitable and adequate rail and road transportation as well as electrical power near
the proposed site.
14. That the rezoning and the accompanying industry would not adversely affect electrical power
availability to other residents and uses in the county.
15. That the Groveland Road would handle most of the traffic created by any new industry on the
rezoned side and that said road is capable of handling the anticipated traffic adequately.
16. That cobalt is important to the Government of the United States in that it is a strategic metal to the
United States.
17. The operation of the proposed plant is basically environmentally safe in that:
(a) There will be no discharge of water off the property;
(b) The tailings produced are not hazardous;
(c) There will be no significant air pollution;
(d) There will be no significant problem with the arsenic produced in that the arsenic produced is the
most insoluble form and there will be no problems with it leaching into the soil;
( e) The site can be adequately reclaimed.
18. That the information supplied by the petitioners concerning the environmentally safe operation of
the plant was supported by independent sources retained by the Board of County Commissioners.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, the Board of County Commissioners of Bingham
County, State of Idaho, conclude that the proposed zone classification is justified and in the general welfare
of the County; and, further, that it is in accordance with the intent and policy of the Comprehensive Plan
and that there is good and compelling cause to adopt the Ordinance ....
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plan is one of fact. As a question of fact, the determination is for the governing body
charged with zoning-in the present case the Board of County Commissioners." Balser v.
Kootenai County Bd of Comm 'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 39, 714 P.2d 6, 8 (1986).

In the present case the County found that the proposed use was not in accordance
with the Comprehensive Plan. The Plan states that the area North of Driggs was intended
to be a gateway, that there should be a sense of arrival that was harmonious with the
Tetons and surrounding mountains. The County could not rectify a 75 foot tall by 62 foot
wide industrial building with the vision of the Area of Impact's Comprehensive Plan and
therefore found that the proposed use conflicted with the plan. Unless the Court finds
that this conclusion is "clearly erroneous" the decision to deny the CUP on the grounds
that it conflicts with the Plan cannot be challenged successfully.
H. THE VARIANCE ISSUE IS PROPERLY ADDRESSED

i.

The Board's Finding that Burns Should Have Pursued a Variance is not
Foreclosed by the Court's Earlier Remand

For its first argument in its brief, Petitioner claims that the Board cannot raise the
"variance argument" because to do so violates the law of the case doctrine. The authority
relied upon for this assertion is Urrutia v. Blaine County.

Once again, Respondent

wonders if Petitioner has actually read the Urrutia case as it clearly declares that the law
of the case is not applicable when a reviewing court remands a matter back for further
findings: "The doctrine does not apply in the present case because the district judge did
not announce some principle of controlling law; rather, he sent the case back for further
factual findings." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 360, 2 P.3d 738 (2000). The
same is true in the present case. The only disposition of the case was a remand to the
BOCC for better Findings.
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The Law of the Case doctrine states that: "where an appellate court states a
principle of law in deciding a case, that rule becomes the law of the case and is
controlling both in the lower court and on subsequent appeals as long as the facts are
substantially the same." Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Co-op., Inc. 124 Idaho
125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Ct. App.1993) quoting Office of State Eng'r v. Curtis

Park Manor, 101 Nev. 30, 692 P.2d 495, 497 (1985). In order to establish this precedent
it must be a decision and it must be on an issue of law.
The doctrine is well established in Idaho and is limited to the appellate court's legal
pronouncements. It is similar to the doctrine of stare decisis, which requires that a
statement of law be necessary to the ultimate disposition of the case in order to be
binding on the lower courts. Otherwise, the statement is considered to be dictum
and not controlling.

Id (emphasis added); citing Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162
(Ct.App.1990). In the present case, the District Court stated in its Decision that the
variance struck the Court as unfair.

The Court's feeling of fairness is not a legal

pronouncement, nor did the Decision on Review result in an ultimate disposition of the
case. Because there was no legal decision, the law of the case doctrine clearly does not
apply.

ii.

The Variance Issue has been Raised for Over Two Years and has been
Continually Ignored by Petitioner.
For over two years the County has questioned whether petitioner's application

should have been for a variance.

On September 13, 2007, two months before the

November 17, 2007 hearing where the CUP was denied, Petitioner appeared in front of
the BOCC on a procedural issue regarding the CUP application.
residents had appealed the Driggs'

Two Driggs City

City Planning and Zoning Commission's

recommendation of approval of the CUP to the BOCC.
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At that hearing the BOCC

clarified that the Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission's recommendation could not
be appealed as it was merely a recommendation to the BOCC.

While they were

discussing procedure Chairman Young repeatedly questioned the nature of the
application.

"Well then, shouldn't we be hearing a variance?" 15:8-9. Mr. Bums

responded: "No. The City of Driggs ... The City of Driggs has height variances as a
CUP." 15:10,12-13. A little later Chairman Young again queried: "Then why aren't we
hearing a variance?" 27: 8-9. Dale Storer, Petitioner's attorney during this entire process,
stated that "in view of this confusion ... the only issue that is before this court [sic] is the
question of whether or not a conditional use permit for the additional height should or
should not be granted.

That's the only issue." 28:18-23. Shortly after this statement

Chairman Young again pointed out that everyone was using the terms CUP and variance
interchangeably and Dale Storer responds: "I'm not much for labels. I think the question
is can we build a plant 75 feet high, period. You put whatever label you want, but I think
that's the issue." 30:22-25. It is obvious from these statements that Petitioner was aware
that the County had doubts about the appropriateness of the application. Yet the
Commissioners were repeatedly assured by the Petitioner and his attorney that there was
no issue - that you could call it a CUP or a variance, the label did not matter. The
confusion regarding whether the CUP application was being properly brought continued
with references to "variance" occurring at least 20 times during the November 17, 2007
hearing.
In short, what plaintiff actually needed was a variance. However, it erroneously and
repeatedly assured the board that it sought only a special exception to which, in our
opinion, it was not entitled. Therefore, as there was no application before the board
for or a hearing held on a variance, we cannot say that the board or the circuit court
erred in not granting, sua sponte, a variance or in denying the specific and limited
request for a special exception.
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Id. at 894; citing Waeckerle v. Board of Zoning Adiustment, 525 S.W.2d 351, 358
(Mo.App.1975). As stated in their Findings, the County was aware that the Driggs Area
of Impact Ordinance may have caused confusion, but they tried to address that confusion
several times during two public hearings where Petitioner was represented by competent
counsel. That Petitioner chose to continue on with his CUP application was not solely
the responsibility or fault of the Board.
In the County's initial brief for the first judicial review the question as to whether
a CUP was the proper form of application for a height modification was also raised.
What is significant about Petitioner's CUP application is that is was not looking
to modify the zoning of the site, but rather to modify the allowable height of the
building on the site. Under Teton County Zoning Regulations, a modification
of the requirements of this title as to the height of buildings is defined as a
variance.
Respondent's Brief, Page 9. The brief goes on to explain that a variance is much more
difficult to obtain than a CUP; a variance requires a showing of hardship and a showing
of physical constraint and a CUP does not. The absence of this showing is pointed out in
the brief as one of several problems with the application. The appropriateness of the
CUP application not a "new argument" as Petitioner has led this Court to believe, it has
been raised from the beginning at every public hearing on the matter and in every brief
written during the judicial review process.

iii. The Plain Language of a Local Ordinance must be Ignored when it Conflicts
with State Law
Petitioner is correct, the law of statutory interpretation dictates that when a statute
is ambiguous meaning and effect must be given to every word, clause and sentence. But,
Respondent is not claiming that the Driggs ordinance is ambiguous and in need of
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interpretation. Rather Respondent states a fact of law: "a local ordinance that conflicts
with a state law or is preempted by state regulation of the subject matter, is void." Arthur

v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 862, 993 P.2d 617, 625 (Idaho App.2000); citing
Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho v. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000
(1987).

Statutory interpretation has nothing to do with conflict of laws. The Driggs

Area of Impact ordinance is not ambiguous, it is clear -- clearly in conflict with State law.
"IA] county ordinance cannot conflict with LLUPA." Johnson v. Blaine County, 146
Idaho 916, 925, 204 P.3d 1127, 1136 (2009) citing In re Quesnell Dairy, 143 Idaho 691,
694, 152 P.3d 562, 565 (2007); see also Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho
615, 618, 661 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1983). In Johnson v. Blaine County there was an issue
regarding the appealability of a Board decision. The Blaine County ordinance provided
for an appeal only upon a final decision whereas LLUPA allows for an appeal if as a
result of a decision the developer can alter the land. "[I]t does not matter if the ordinance
states that the issuance of the permit is or is not appealable. It is appealable under
LLUPA." Id. Another on point case concerns an applicant who was denied a CUP for the
operation of a towing business. The Shoshone County ordinance stated that an applicant
had 60 days to appeal a Board decision, whereas LLUP A provided for only 28 days. The
applicant filed a petition for judicial review within the 60 day period allowed for by local
ordinance, but after the 28 day period provided for by State law. In response to his
argument that his petition was timely the Court stated: "This argument is unmeritorious
because the ordinance's provision allowing sixty days for a petition for judicial review
conflicts with the twenty-eight-day limitation in LC. § 67-652l(l)(d) and is therefore
ineffective." Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 861, 993 P.2d 617, 624 (Idaho
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App.2000); citing Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho v. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689,

735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987). The Court went on to state "A local ordinance that conflicts
with a state law or is preempted by state regulation of the subject matter, is void." Id.
Although the issue of estoppel was not raised, the Court indicated that it would be barred
because the Petitioner's attorney was aware of the conflicting statute. Id. at 862. It is
well settled law that you may not assert estoppel if you knew or should have known the
truth.

8

In the present case, Petitioner's attorney cannot say that he unaware of the law or

that he could not have discovered the law, especially when the issue was raised so many
times in his presence and during briefing.

I.

COMMISSIONER RINALDI' S SIGNATURE ON THE AMENDED FINDINGS DID NOT
VIOLATE PETITIONER'S CONSTIUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL

Kathy Rinaldi's signature on the Amended Findings was inconsequential to the
outcome of the Bums Concrete CUP application as she was one of three commissioners
who signed the Amended Findings, and Commissioner Rinaldi did not participate in the
decision to deny the conditional use permit application as she was not a commissioner at
the time.

As a present commissioner Kathy Rinaldi agreed with and signed the

Amended Findings, but she was one of three decision makers so that any vote she had
could be disregarded and the outcome be the same. Also, Kathy Rinaldi was not even
present at the Board's November 9, 2009 regularly scheduled meeting where the
remaining two commissioners approved the Amended Findings. Chairman Young and
Commissioner Benedict were part of the discussion regarding the Amended Findings of
8

The elements of estoppel are: (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth, (2) the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the
truth, (3) the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon, and (4) the
person to whom the representation was made or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted
upon the representation or concealment to his [or her J prejudice. Regjovich v. First Western Investments,
Inc., 134 Idaho 154,158, 997 P.2d 615, 619 (2000).
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Fact and Conclusions of Law, Commissioner Benedict made the motion to approve the
Amended Findings and Chairman Young seconded.
The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed the problem of Commissioner bias
several times. In Floyd v. Board of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, et al., 13 7 Idaho 718,
52 P.3d 863 (2002) the Court reviewed a decision of a Board of Commissioners
regarding a road validation and found the bias of a commissioner who had spoken
publicly about the public status of the road in question prior to the hearing sufficient to
disqualify the commissioner. The Court nevertheless determined that due process would
be satisfied by simply disregarding that commissioner's vote, which was not a "swing
vote" among the three commissioners. Id. at 726.
Initially, the court must determine whether a member with a disqualifying
interest cast the decisive vote. If so, the ordinance must be invalidated. If the
ordinance would have passed without the vote of the conflicted member, the
court should examine the following three factors: (1) whether the member
disclosed the interest or the other council members were fully aware of it; (2)
the extent of the member's participation in the decision; and (3) the magnitude
of the member's interest.
Id.; quoting Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996). Kathy Rinaldi did
sign the Amended Findings, but she did not participate in the determination to approve
the Amended Findings. Her signature on the Amended findings could simply be
disregarded should the Court find that its presence affects Petitioner's constitutional
rights in any way. Petitioner cites no legal authority, or any authority at all, for its
contention that Kathy Rinaldi's signature on the Amended Findings somehow impaired
Petitioner's constitutional rights, especially as she was not a commissioner at the time he
was denied.
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J.

TETON COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON THIS REVIEW BECAUSE
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW LACKS A REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW

In Petitioner's Brief he claims that he should get attorney fees because the Board
had earlier held that the rezone "expressly limited the building height to 45 feet. When
confronted with the written transcript showing otherwise, the Board quietly dropped this
conclusion in their next written findings." Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition

for Judicial Review p. 30. The height of the building was a continuing theme throughout
the Board's Amended Findings. What Petitioner represented to the Board at the rezone
hearing was not dropped, but rephrased as was mandated by the Court when it remanded
the case back to the Board for clearer Findings. The Board chose to not re-hash the fact
that they were misled during the zone change in their Amended Findings; instead they
provided deeper insight into their denial as asked by the Court. But, since Petitioner has
raised the issue, the County feels compelled to clarify for the Court the claims made by
Petitioner at the rezone hearing. The transcript clearly shows that Petitioner represented
that his concrete batch plant would be 45 feet or less. At the February 26, 2007 zone
change hearing Chairman Young asked: "So, you're talking about a rectangular building
of what square footage and what height?" 25 :7-9. Mr. Kirk Burns responded:
We don't have that worked out. We're shooting to get the 45 foot limit. Concrete
plants are difficult on that. We discussed the five and ten foot possible variance.
We're going to come in looking for clearance (inaudible) and we are working on
getting that plant to be within the restricted heights now.
25: 10-16. Shortly after this Chairman Young stated:
And I guess I am concerned about a 45 foot high building. I am trying to think
of how high the biggest hangars at the airport are. I doubt any of them are over
35 feet, but that's just my guess. So, we're talking about a pretty big building.
. . . What kind of building appearance are you envisioning?
31:10-18.
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A voice, presumably Mr. Burns, replied:
Well, it's going to be similar to what you see a hanger - it will look very similar
to a hangar. It will be small in size than a hangar, by - substantially . ... There's
a high part of the plant that's probably 30-by-40 maybe -- 30-by-40 that will be
up in those upper areas, and the rest will be down probably in the 35 minus.
31:19-25; 32:1-5 (emphasis added). It is no wonder that the County noted in their initial
Findings that the height of the building had been represented as 45 feet or less. Their
underlying concern regarding the height of the building was apparent in the initial
Findings, and it is also a part of the Amended Findings. Thus, no issue was covertly
dropped (by the County at least) as Petitioner indicates.

However, in considering an

award of attorney fees the County urges to take this behavior into account - in this
Second Judicial Review Petitioner has wasted this Courts and the County's time on
irrelevant and misleading issues.
Throughout this process Petitioner has told only partial truths. In this Second
Judicial Review, Petitioner again attempts to make the BOCC's raising of the variance
argument appear disingenuous.

As discussed above, the variance issue was raised

throughout the process and is very familiar to Petitioner. Furthermore, far from being
disingenuous, the BOCC continues to raise the variance issue because it is necessary to
address the elephant in the room; to ignore a conflict with State law is disingenuous. The
confusion that the County felt by the language in their adopted Driggs Ordinance is
manifest throughout the hearings and yet they were repeatedly assured by Petitioner and
his counsel that the only issue the Board should focus on was the granting of the CUP,
that their confusion should be set aside as labels did not matter. In light of the fact that
the Board had every reason to deny the CUP application, Petitioner's attorney is correct
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m a manner, the label is somewhat superfluous. As has been demonstrated, the
Commissioners' denial of the CUP application is valid - without the variance question
being answered. Yet because the issue was raised throughout the process the BOCC felt
it should be addressed in their written decision.

In the First Judicial Review this Court

felt that the County should be sanctioned for raising an issue that was part of the
proceedings all along. Hopefully now that the Court has been better informed of the facts
and law it will award the County its attorney fees because Petitioner has repeatedly
ignored the facts and the law.
In support of his claim for attorney fees, Petitioner once again erroneously points
to the Urrutia case. As explained in detail above, Urrutia is about a subdivision denial so
its analysis of the use of Comprehensive Plans is completely distinguishable from the
present case. LC. § 12-217(1) states that the Court shall award attorney fees "if the party
against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
Petitioner's Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review is comprised of
frivolous and irrelevant questions on settled areas of law, and Petitioner's Brief, far from
adding any backbone to these issues, raises additional issues that have no basis in fact or
law.

"Award of attorney fees incurred for appeal may be made if court is left with

abiding belief that appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation." Moser v. Coca-Cola Northwest Bottling Co., 129 Idaho 709, 714,
931 P.2d 1227, 1232 (Idaho App.1997). Petitioner's only reason for bringing its Second
Amended Petition is to force this Court into believing that the County did not have the
right to deny the CUP even when all legal support says otherwise.
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In its request for attorney fees Petitioner goes so far as to ask the Court to remand
the case with instructions to the County to grant the CUP. Petitioner's reason for asking
this of the Court is extremely disingenuous -- it wants the Court to take this
unprecedented step to enable Petitioner to collect attorney fees. In support of its unusual
proposal, Petitioner cites Workman and Bonner General Hospital, neither of which allow
the Court to order a Board to grant a conditional use permit. In explaining why remand
is appropriate in rezone cases the Workmnan court states:
To hold otherwise would be to authorize the district court to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency despite the express provision prohibiting such
action in LC. § 67-5215(g). Furthermore, this Court's decision in Cooper that a
denial of a rezone application is a quasi-judicial act which requires procedural
due process, cannot be read as authorizing district courts to interfere with the
substantive decision making process in rezoning cases such as this one. To
sanction such interference in the ordinary case would undermine the important
role local agencies play in the land use planning process and possibly negate
meaningful participation by the public in the decision making process.
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 39, 655 P.2d 926, 939
(1982). Bonner General Hospital, 133 Idaho 7, 981 P.2d 242, (1999) is an indigency
case which has received some negative treatment on this subject in the more recent case,
Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, Bd. of County Commissioners of Ada County, 146
Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050 (2008). Furthermore, the substantial right portion of review is
usually quite clear in indigency cases and award of indigent benefits is controlled by an
entirely different set of laws than zoning decisions, many of which have override
provisions should the board of county commissioners not act in a timely or fit manner
(e.g. LC. § 31-3511(4) ). This case does not set any legal precedent for the issue that the
Court is currently reviewing.
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Even in the face of valid, well-reasoned findings, Petitioner refuses to accept no
for an answer. Petitioner has proven he will go to great lengths in order to get the
response he desires; misleading and wasting the time of both the County and this Court.
Petitioner ignores the relevant legal issues such as prejudice to a substantial right, and
raises arguments completely devoid of foundation in fact or law. It has been incredibly
time consuming for a county of limited resources to defend this action, the easy thing
would have been to give up and allow Petitioner to build his 75 foot building. The
County has instead chosen to properly represent its taxpayers and defend against this
unreasonable attack that clearly has no basis in fact or law. According to LC. § 12-117,
this Court must award fees because this appeal was pursued frivolously.

CONCLUSION
Through reason, fact and evidence the Amended Findings demonstrate the
Commissioner's belief that a height of 75 feet is not contemplated by the ordinance, is
not compatible with surrounding properties, and is in conflict with the Comprehensive
Plan.

Not only is their decision discretionary, local ordinance declares denial to be

mandatory if certain conditions cannot be met. Petitioner has made several failed legal
arguments regarding the BOCC's ability to consider aesthetics, public comment and the
comprehensive plan.

Petitioner has failed to prove that the Board of County

Commissioners erred in any legal sense and has failed to prove that the Board's decision
prejudiced a substantial right of Petitioner. The County has now issued an oral answer as
well as two sets of written findings all telling the Petitioner the same thing: No. The
County now respectfully requests the Court to affirm its Amended Findings, award the
County its attorney fees and deny Petitioner.
Reply Brief
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BURNS HOLDING, LLC CUP DENIAL
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The following are amended findings of fact and conclusions of law for the denial
of the Bums Holdings, LLC's Conditional Use Permit application by the Board of
County Commissioners of Teton County on November 15, 2007. All references to the
Driggs City Ordinances refer to the January 16, 2007 version.
1. Conclusion of Law
Burns Holding, LLC must apply for a variance to exceed the 45 foot height limitation in
the M-1 zone. Idaho Code § 67-6516 clearly states that: "[a] variance is a modification
of the bulk and placement requirements of the ordinance as to ... height of buildings, or
other ordinance provision affecting the size or shape of a structure." The applicant
requests a modification of the height of a building and therefore must apply for a variance
and not a conditional use permit. The Idaho Constitution, Article XII, § 2, provides, "Any
county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with
the general laws." "A local ordinance that conflicts with a state law or is preempted by
state regulation of the subject matter, is void." Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho
854,862,993 P.2d 617, 625 (Idaho App.2000); citing Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho v.
County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987). Because the County
cannot act in conflict with State law it reads any ambiguity in the Driggs Ordinance in
hannony with the Local Land Use Planning Act.

Finding of Fact
Chapter 2, Section 13 C of the City of Driggs' Ordinance 281-07 states that "[a]ny
building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45)
feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit." (Emphasis added.) The
County interprets this section of the ordinance as follows: "[ a]ny building or structure or
portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet in height." Any
other reading of this section of the Driggs City Ordinance would directly conflict with§
67-6516 of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") which clearly states that a
variance and not a conditional use pennit must be obtained before one can modify the
height of a building. That portion of the Driggs ordinance that could be interpreted so as
to conflict with State law is void, ofno effect, as if it had never existed. The County finds
that the applicant did not make the correct application for a height variance and that it is
not possible for the County to grant a CUP to Burns Holding, LLC in order to allow them
to build a structure which is 30 feet higher than the maximum height allowed in the M-1
zone. A conditional use permit is much easier to obtain than a variance. The applicant
cannot get around a very clear area of State law by applying for a CUP, even when the
Driggs code uses the term "conditional use pennit", when State law is clear that a
variance is required.

References to the need for a "variance" occurred at least twenty times during the
November 15, 2007 hearing. Some of Chairman Young's first words were: "This is a
conditional use permit hearing for a height variance." 4: 17-18. The first time the
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 1 of 7

O.j : ' tir
n

applicant himself speaks he states that he is requesting a height variance. 9: 15-16. Sandy
Mason, representing Valley Advocates for Responsible Development stated: "VARD
does not recommend granting a CUP for this height variance for several reasons." The
applicant's attorney, Dale Storer, a renowned local government, planning and zoning
attorney, 1 was present during the hearing and has represented the applicant during the
entire process. Mr. Storer failed to clarify the situation or give reasons in the applicant's
response why a CUP was the correct method for a height variance when the Idaho Code
is clear that a variance is required for an increased height. Regardless, the County does
not feel that the applicant was unaware or uninformed of the law. 2
2. Conclusion of Law
Idaho Code § 67 -6 512( a) states
A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is
conditionally pennitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions
pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of
political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the
proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan.
Section 2 of the City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07 also addresses conditional use pennit
procedures, offering criteria similar to the above and adding that there must be conditions
imposed upon the use that assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding
properties, uses and neighborhood. An applicant must meet all five of these tests in order
to be granted a ClJP. A finding that an applicant does not meet one of the five criteria is
sufficient to deny an application. Even if the County were to analyze the application
according to the rules governing a conditional use permit, Bums Holding failed to meet
four of the five of the necessary criteria for approval.
Finding of Fact.
A.

The CUP could not be granted because a height of 75 feet is not
conditionally permitted by the specific terms of the ordinance.

The Driggs M-1 zoning ordinance lists two categories of uses for the M-1 zone,
allowed and conditional. Allowed uses are listed under Chapter 2, Section 13(A) and
Section l 3(B) lists the ten ( 10) "Conditional Uses Permitted". A height of 75 feet is not

1

Excerpt from firm bio: Mr. Storer has served as the City Attorney for the City ofldaho Falls since 1982
and he also represents a number of other smaller cities, school districts, counties, electrical utilities and
private developers. He has served three terms as president of the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association
and he currently serves on the board of directors for the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association and as the
Idaho state chairman of the International Municipal Lawyers Association. He has frequently testified
before the Idaho State Legislature on a variety of issues affecting cities, counties and other public entities.
2

In the County's initial brief on judicial review of the CUP denial it states: "What is significant about
Petitioner's CUP application is that it was not looking to modify the zoning of the site, but rather to modify
the allowable height of the building on the site." Respondents Brief, August 5, 2008, page 9.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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listed under either of these two sections. Because a height of 75 feet is not mentioned in
Section l 3(B) the board finds that the use is not conditionally allowed.
Even though a height of 75 feet is not specifically listed as conditionally
permitted anywhere in the ordinance, the County is cognizant of the fact that height
regulations are mentioned in Section l 3(C) of the ordinance which states: "[ a]ny building
or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five ( 45) feet in
height unless approved by conditional use permit." The County does not believe that this
section overrides the specific provisions of Section l 3(B) of the ordinance. If Section
13(C) were interpreted as conditionally permitting a 75 foot high structure then the
ordinance would have to be interpreted as conditionally permitting a building of any
height and size, skyscrapers included. An ordinance provision cannot be read in isolation
but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document. Chapter 1(D) of Drigg's
City Ordinance 274-07 states as its intent "that this Ordinance be interpreted and
construed to further the purposes of this Ordinance and the objectives and characteristics
of the zoning districts." The stated purpose of the Ordinance is to:
[P]romote pride of ownership, health, safety, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the residents of the City of Driggs and to achieve the following
objectives:
1. To protect property rights and enhance property values.
2. To provide for the protection and enhancement of the local economy.
3. To ensure that important environmental features are protected and
enhanced.
4. To encourage the protection of prime agricultural lands for the
production of food.
5. To avoid undue concentration of population and overcrowding ofland.
6. To ensure that the development ofland is commensurate with the
physical characteristics of the land.
7. To protect life and property in areas subject to natural hazards and
disasters.
8. To protect recreation resources.
9. To avoid undue water and air pollution.
10. To secure safety from fire and provide adequate open spaces for light
and air.
11. To implement the comprehensive plan.
12. To provide the manner and form of preparing and processing
applications for modification of and variances from zoning regulations;
13. To encourage the proper distribution and compatible integration of
commercial and industrial uses within designated areas; and
14. To insure that additions and alterations to, and/or remodeling of,
existing buildings or structures are completed in compliance with the
restrictions and limitations imposed thereunder.
Chapter l(C) of Ordinance 274-07.
Allowing structures to far exceed allowable height limitations by obtaining a conditional
use permit is not in keeping with the purpose and intent of the Ordinance and thus the
height regulation paragraph cannot be read as adding such a "use" to those specifically
listed in Chapter 2, Section 13(B) of the M-1 zoning ordinance. Allowing a structure to
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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so exceed allowable height limitations through a CUP would violate the objectives of the
ordinance. Specifically, such an interpretation would: 1) fail to protect property rights and
enhance property values because property owners would have no idea how tall a
neighboring building could be; 2) fail to provide for the protection and enhancement of
the local economy because economic values in the area are largely dependent upon our
scenic offerings. Having a "sky's the limit" ordinance that could essentially block the
scenery would not protect this economy; 3) fail to ensure that important environmental
features are protected and enhanced because our scenic vistas are one of our area's
important environmental assets; 4) fail to ensure that the development of land is
commensurate with the physical characteristics of the land because such an interpretation
does not take physical characteristics of the land into account; 5) fail to protect recreation
resources and fail to provide adequate open spaces for light and air because these cannot
be provided without a height limitation, views and a feeling of openness being an integral
part of much of the Valley's recreation; 6) fail to implement the comprehensive plan as
explained in paragraph D below; 7) fail to provide the manner and form of preparing and
processing applications for modification of and variances from zoning regulations
because it would provide confusion in their processing; and 8) fail to provide for the
compatible integration of commercial and industrial uses within designated areas because
it is impossible to assure compatibility without some form of height limitation.
Furthermore, the County cannot reconcile an application for a conditional use
permit for 75 foot high structure with the clear meaning of Chapter 4, Section 3(A) of the
Ordinance. Section 3(A) is very similar to Idaho Code § 67-6516, and states:
A variance is a modification of the requirements of this ordinance as to
... height of buildings, size oflots, or other ordinance
provisions affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement
of the structure upon the lot. A variance does not include a change of
authorized land use.
When the County reads the City of Driggs Ordinance 274-07 as a whole it is clear that a
CUP can only be obtained in an M-1 zone for the uses listed in Chapter 2, Section l 3(B)
and that a height of 75 feet is not amongst those uses. The statement in Chapter 2,
Section 13(C) that a building or structure may be allowed to exceed forty-five (45) feet in
height cannot be read in isolation. Additionally, because there are no parameters around
this height allowance, the County cannot say that a seventy five foot high structure is
specifically permitted by the terms of the ordinance. Furthermore, as is explained in the
next section, a CUP can only be granted subject to conditions pursuant to specific
provisions of the ordinance. There are no specific provisions listed in Chapter 2, Section
13(C) that suggest how a height modification can be conditioned.
B. The CUP could not be granted pursuant to specific conditions listed in the
ordinance.
Idaho Code § 67-6512( a) also requires that a CUP not be granted unless it will be
"subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance." There are no
specific provisions regarding the conditioning of a 30 foot height modification in the
ordinance. The Driggs' ordinance that addresses conditional use permit procedures states:
"If the proposed conditional use cannot adequately meet the conditions necessary to
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses and
neighborhood, the Planning Commission will not approve the proposed use." The
ordinance goes on to suggest the imposition of conditions:
a. Minimizing adverse impact on other development;
b. Controlling the sequence and timing of development;
c. Controlling the duration of development;
d. Assuring the development is maintained properly;
e. Designating the exact location and nature of development;
f. Requiring the provision for on-site facilities or services; and
g. Requiring more restrictive standards than those generally required in this
ordinance.
Chapter 4, Section 2(A)of the City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07.
While all of these would be applicable to the uses listed in Chapter2, Section 13(B), none
appear applicable to the height regulation in Section 13(C). Idaho Code clearly states
that a CUP can only be granted "subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of
the ordinance." The County does not feel that there are any conditions that are specific to
the height variation provision of Section 13(C).
When the County does consider conditions a-g listed above, it is clear that the
applicant failed to show how they could be met. The applicant did not show the County
how the adverse impact of this height increase could be minimized nor can the County
determine a way to minimize the impacts of a building that is 30 feet higher than the 45
foot maximum. The applicant did introduce some "line of sight" evidence but the County
had issues with this evidence. Chairman Young explained his skepticism regarding the
line of sight evidence such as the site angle that was used on pages 40: 12 - 41 : 11 of the
November 15, 2007 transcript. The County also finds that it cannot control the sequence,
timing or duration of the height, once it is allowed it would continue, sequence, timing
and duration thus cannot be adequately controlled. The maintenance of the extra 30 feet
of height is equally difficult to condition and the applicant provided no suggestions.
Maintenance of a development usually refers to trash, weeds, etc., none of which are
concerns 75 feet up in the air. The exact location and nature of the development could not
minimize the impact of the additional 30 feet. Even though the applicant suggests that
placing the structure several feet from the property line would minimize its impact, the
Commissioners do not agree. Because the applicant needs the building to not only be 75
feet tall, but 60 feet wide these conditions are impossible to meet; applicant is not asking
for a 75 foot cell tower - a pencil in the air - but a 60 x 75 foot building. Likewise, the
County finds that no on-site facilities or services or more restrictive standards could
minimize the impact of a building this size and the applicant again provided no
suggestions as to how this condition could be met. The County thus is unable to grant
the CUP subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance.
C. The CUP could not be granted subject to the ability of political subdivisions,

including school districts to provide services for the proposed use.
Political subdivisions, including schools, would not be affected by the height
variation.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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The CUP could not be granted because the County found that the "use"
was in conflict with the comprehensive plan.

Throughout the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan the area North of Driggs is referred
to as a "gateway". Section 9.3 of the Plan lists gateways at the North and South entrance
to Driggs as a "need". The Plan's Vision for Community Design states:
The Vision for Hwy 33 outside of downtown is as an attractive, functional,
and memorable gateway into the community. The sense of arrival at each end
of the community should be dramatic, but in keeping with the beauty of Teton
Valley and the surrounding mountains. New buildings should be setback from
the highway, with ample landscaping, concealed parking and architecture that
draws on the western and agricultural vernaculars ...
Driggs' Comprehensive Plan, Section 9.4, Page 61. One of the stated actions under
Section 9.4 is to "[c]reate and maintain attractive gateways to Driggs on Highway 33
(South and North) and on Ski Hill Road." The County finds that the application conflicts
with the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan because it creates a large industrial structure that
cannot be adequately shielded in the area that Driggs would like to see become a
memorable gateway.
E. The County cannot grant the CUP because it is unable to impose
conditions upon the use that assure protection and compatibility with
the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood.
Because a concrete batch plant is a permitted use in the M-1 zone it is not possible
for the County to impose conditions on the use of the batch plant. This application is not
about the uses that will be conducted on the property but about the height of the building
in which the uses will be conducted. When the applicant was granted a conditional zone
change there were moderating conditions such as landscaping imposed, but none of the
conditions addressed a 75 foot height because it was a zone change process and the
height of buildings was not at issue. Now the County is presented with this application
for a conditional use permit to allow a building that is significantly higher than any other
in the area. The County has not been presented with any plausible way to mitigate the
extra 30 feet of height now being requested, nor is it able to craft any conditions that
would assure surrounding properties, uses and neighborhoods protection and
compatibility with the additional 30 feet ofheight. 3 The County therefore finds that a 75
foot height is not compatible with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood
where a maximum of 45 feet for all structures is maintained and that the protection and
compatibility of the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood cannot be assured and
3

No mitigation to surrounding neighbors was offered. As mentioned earlier, the applicant did present the
idea that setting the 7 5 foot tall by 60 foot wide building back from the edge of the property line would
mitigate the additional 30 feet of height [as viewed from the highway only], because the sight angle would
be lower. Commissioner Young pointed out at the hearing that he was not persuaded by the applicant's line
of sight argument because although the sight angle would be lower, the top of the building would still be so
high that it would even project above the crest of the Tetons, unlike any existing building in the vicinity.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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agrees with Sandy Mason's statement at the November 15, 2007 hearing: "you cannot
mitigate that height."
Section 2 (A) (1) of the City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07 notably states that the
Planning Commission "will not approve" the proposed use if such conditions cannot be
met. For all the reasons stated above, the County finds that the application failed to meet
one or more of the criteria outlined in the Idaho Code and the Driggs Ordinance, all of
such criteria being necessary before a County can grant a conditional use permit. For all
the reasons stated, The County must deny the conditional use permit application.
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Attorneys for Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
INRE:

Case No. CV-07-376

Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner and Applicant,
V.

TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.
COMES NOW Petitioner, Burns Holdings LLC, and submits the following Reply
Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review.

1.

The County's Finding Do Not Comply with Idaho Code§ 67-6535.
Notwithstanding the County's assertions to the contrary, the Amended Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Third Findings") do not comply with the requirements of

Idaho Code§ 67-6535. The County's Reply Brief asserts that the Board "take[s] the points
oflaw provided by State Code and local ordinance and appl[ies] them to the facts." Resp'ts
Br. at 7. However, nowhere does the County's Brief cite to the transcript of the proceedings
below to explain how the Third Findings complied with the requirements of§ 67-6535. The
County's Brief, just like the Third Findings, contain no citations to the record, nor any
explanation of the basis for their assertion that they indeed applied the appropriate law to the
facts at hand. Both are nothing more than bald assertions with no support whatsoever in the
record.
By now, the reasons for the County's failure to cross reference its findings and Brief
below to the record should be quite obvious, to wit: there is nothing in the record that
supports any of their conclusions. Specifically, there is nothing in the record that would
support a finding that the height of Bums' plant would be incompatible with surrounding
industrial uses. The County's failure to explain why the mitigating design elements proposed
by Bums would not work further underscores the Board's intransigent refusal to base its
decision upon a considered application of law to facts in the record. Bums proposed a
landscaped wall to shield adjoining properties from the view of the building and noise
produced by the facility, landscaping intended to break up the external profile and roofline
of the building and a building color intended to harmonize with adjacent industrial and
agricultural uses. Indeed the height the building itself was necessary to mitigate noise,
vibration, dust, sound and impact upon adjoining uses. There is absolutely nothing in the
record nor in the Third Findings explaining why these mitigating elements would not be
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effective. Small wonder then why the County stubbornly refuses to cite to the record in its
Findings and Brief.
Unfortunately for the County, continued repetition of a premise does not, by itself,
make the premise true. In the context ofland use decisions, "[c ]onclusory statements are not
sufficient." Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,511, 148 P.3d
1247, 1257 (2006). Just as the County's Brief omits any supporting citations to the record,
the Third Findings do not clearly state the relevant facts nor explain how the Board applied
the law to those facts. Because they do not clearly state the facts and appropriate legal
principles upon which it based the Board decision to deny Bums' CUP application, the Third
Findings are insufficient under Idaho Code § 67-6535.
Simply stated, there is nothing in the record that would support an inference or finding
of incompatibility. For that reason, this Court should again reject the Third Findings.
2.

The County's Discretion Has Limits
The County points out that "the grant or denial of a conditional use permit is a ·quasi

judicial act within the discretion of the governing body." Resp'ts Br. at 15. Bums does not
disagree with that premise. However, the Board does not have unbridled discretion or
discretion to act in an arbitrary and capricious manner. There are limits on the Board's
discretion. The County appears to believe that because its decisions are "discretionary," the
Board can make any decision it chooses - however outrageous or however unsupported by
the record. See Resp'ts Br. At 38 ("The County has now issued an oral decision as well as
two sets of written findings all telling Petitioner the same thing: No."). The County appears
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to claim "unfettered discretion" to arbitrarily deny permits, a claim which is a "retreat from
the rule of law to the rule of men, something which our constitutional system of justice has
abhorred from its inception." Condie v. Mansor, 96 Idaho 345, 347, 528 P.2d 907, 909
(1974) (Bakes, J., dissenting). Moreover, by arguing that Burns must submit to its broad
discretion to deny permits without factual support in the record, the County ignores the
provisions ofthe Idaho Administrative Procedures Act which expressly authorize an affected
person to challenge a governing board's decision when it is arbitrary and capricious and not
supported by the record. Idaho Code§ 67-5279.
Courts should not sustain an agency's action that is "not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole" or that is "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."
Idaho Code § 67-5279. Courts sitting in an appellate capacity should uphold an agency's
discretion only "ifthe findings are clear, dispositive and supported by the record." Angstman
v. City ofBoise, 128 Idaho 575,579,971 P.2d409, 413 (Ct. App. 1996). The County claims

thatthe "Board's Decision was supported by substantial evidence." Resp'ts Br. at 8. Again,
simply asserting that findings are supported by substantial evidence does not make it so. As
Bums illustrated in its Briefin Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, the
County's Third Findings are not ''clear, dispositive, and supported by the record." Pet'rs Br.
at 10-18. Nowhere do the Third Findings cite to any evidence in the factual record which
shows that Bums proposal would be incompatible with the surrounding industrial uses.
Because they are "not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole" and are
arbitrary and capricious, the Third Findings exceeded the limits of the County's discretion.
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Because the County abused its discretion, the Third Findings are entitled to no deference
from this Court. 1

3.

The County's Continued Efforts to Justify the Variance Argument Are
Arbitrary and Capricious
The case of Urrutia v. Blaine County sets forth the "law of the case" principle which

is applicable to, and controlling in, this case. 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000).

That

principle states that where an appellate court "states a principle of law" in a decision, that
principle is controlling on remand. Id. at 360, 2 P.3d at 745. In its earlier decision, this
Court rejected the County's use of the variance argument, noting that the Driggs ordinance
specifically directs those seeking to construct a building higher than forty- five feet to proceed
via a CUP application. Decision on Review at 12. The Court did not remand this matter
back for additional factual findings regarding whether a variance was appropriate. The
Court's statement on the issue was clear and conclusive: the County's argument was
disingenuous and not warranted under the applicable ordinance. Thus, under Urrutia the
Court's Order rejecting the variance argument was a principle oflaw which the County was
obliged to respect on remand. The County simply ignored the Court's previous Order and
again denied the permit on the basis that Bums should have sought a variance rather than a
CUP.
The County's Brief also misstates the issue regarding the variance. The issue is not,
as the County now suggests, whether Bums had notice that pursuing a variance was another
1

The County claims that it is entitled to special deference in the interpretation of its own ordinances. Resp'ts Br. at 78. It should be noted that the CUP ordinance at issue here is the Driggs City Zoning Ordinance, not a Teton County ordinance.
Furthermore, the dispute here does not involve differing interpretations of the Driggs Ordinance-- indeed the ordinance is very
clear. Rather what is at issue here is a complete absence of any evidence to support the County's Finding and conclusions.
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option or whether the opponents testifying at the hearing thought it was a variance
application. Regardless of what the witnesses at the September 13, 2007, hearing thought
the process should have been called, the Record clearly shows that the Chairman Young
knew the matter was properly considered as a CUP application.
CHAIRMAN YOUNG ... I had a brief procedural discussion about the next
item, which is a public hearing, which was advertised as the Bums Concrete
CUP ...
Page 3, 11. 4-7.
CHAIRMAN YOUNG The application for a conditional use permit in the
impact area has come to us with a recommendation from the Driggs Planning
and Zoning Commission.
Page 13, 11. 22-25.
CHAIRMAN YOUNG What was advertised is: Bums Concrete conditional
use permit, Bums Holdings are requesting a conditional use permit to build
and operate a cement batch plant.
Page 23, 11. 21-24.
KIRK BURNS

... this is strictly a CUP for height.

Page 26, 1. 12.
Moreover, contrary to what the County has suggested, counsel for Bums repeatedly stated
at that hearing, that a CUP was the proper vehicle for Bums to use to get the height it desired.
MR. STORER ... we believe that the only issue that is before this court is
the question of whether or not a conditional use permit for the additional
height should or should not be granted. That's the only issue.
Page 28, 11. 19-23.

6 -

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

MR. STORER

... I think the only issue is the CUP.

Page 35, 1. 15.
The only reason Burns' counsel used the phrase "you can put whatever label you want," was
to avoid getting hung up on the witnesses' confusion about the proper name for the
proceeding.
Fundamentally, the central issue is whether, pursuant to the Driggs ordinance, Bums
should have pursued a CUP or a variance. The Driggs ordinance clearly states that a Cl.JP
is the correct way to pursue a building higher than forty-five feet. DCZO § 2(13)(C). This
Court pointedly advised the County, both in oral argument and in the Decision on Review,
that the County's variance argument was "disingenuous." To again use that premise as the
basis for the County's denial in the Third Findings, was frivolous and borderline contempt.

4.

The County's Use of Aesthetics Was Inappropriate in this Case
As is true elsewhere in its brief, the County significantly overstates its case with

regard to aesthetic considerations. The County cites to Marcia T. Turner, L.L. C. v. City of
Twin Falls for the proposition that a local government did not abuse its discretion by denying

a special use permit based, in part, on aesthetic considerations. 144 Idaho 203,212, 159 P.3d
840, 849 (2007). That case is easily distinguishable from this case. In that case the city had
an ordinance requiring the zoning commission to evaluate, inter alia, whether the proposed
use will "result in the destruction, loss or damage of a natural, scenic or historic features of
major importance." Id. at207 n. l, 159 P.3d at 844. The use of specific, identifiable aesthetic
standards specified by ordinance in that case provided guidance and parameters for the

0 ·~
V
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commission's evaluation of aesthetic concerns and put the applicant on notice that asthestic
considerations were relevant. Such is not the case here.
By contrast, the County's use of aesthetics in this case is entirely without any basis
in the ordinance and provided no definable standard informing the applicant of the manner
in which aesthetic parameters could be considered. No aesthetic standards are to be found
in the Driggs ordinance. In fact, the Driggs Ordinance implicitly rejects aesthetic or scenic
considerations by its establishment of a scenic corridor that does not include the Burns'
property. See DCZO § 4(2)(A)( 1). In the Third Findings, the County attempted to justify its
reliance on aesthetics by citing to the Comprehensive Plan's vague statements about an
"attractive, functional, and memorable gateway." Third Findings at 6. However, the
Comprehensive Plan 2 in effect when Bums submitted its CUP application clearly states that
"[n]o official gateway has been identified or developed at either end ofDriggs on Hwy 33."
Comprehensive Plan at 59. The statement the County relies on is simply Driggs' "vision"
for the community. Without specific, codified standards which the Board could use to
evaluate Bums' project, the Board's use of vague, nonspecific terms such as "memorable
gateway" was impermissible and constitutionally void. See Anderson v. City ofIssaquah, 70
Wash.App. 67, 77, 851 P.2d 744, 752 (1993) (holding that using vague terms as standards
when evaluating land use permits is unconstitutional).
Additionally, the County's aesthetics evaluation fails in this case because- assuming
arguendo that the County did use sufficiently concrete and specific standards -the County

2

A copy of the Comprehensive Plan was included as an attachment to the CD-ROM included with Petitioner's first
brief in this protracted matter.
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failed to cite to any facts in the record which support its conclusion that Burns concrete plant
"cannot be adequately shielded in the area that Driggs would like to see become a memorable
gateway." 3 Third Findings at 6. The County merely states its conclusion without identifying
the specific area comprising the "gateway" or what aspects of Bums' proposal justified that
conclusion. The County's use of aesthetic considerations was "not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole," and thus violated Idaho Code§ 67-5279.
5.

There Is No Merit to the County's Continued Attempt to Justify its Denial on the
Basis of an Earlier "Conditional Rezone"
The County's attempt to breathe new life into the argument that the earlier rezone

"was expressly limited to a building height of 45 feet" is also frivolous. See Resp'ts Br. at
37-38. As Bums pointed out in its supplemental brief in this matter4 there are two problems
with the County's argument. First, the factual record simply does not support the conclusion
that the rezone was "expressly conditioned" on a forty-five foot high building. Nothing in
the Commission's motion approve the rezone attheFebruary27, 2007, hearing suggests that
the rezone was conditioned on a forty-five foot height limit. Rezone Tr., p. 36, L 18 through
p.37, 1. 7. Even the dialogue which the County cites shows that forty-five feet was a merely
a goal Bums was shooting for, not a condition of the rezone. Resp'ts Br. at 33-34.
Second, conditions which are not clearly stated in the record are not enforceable.
"Conditions that are not stated on the permit may not be imposed on the pennittee." In re

3

As Bums pointed out in its earlier brief, the proposed building will be well outside of the Scenic Corridor. Thus,
contrary to the Board's assertion, the building is not located in the "memorable gateway" but will be constructed in a spot
specifically identified by the Comprehensive Plan as being "an appropriate industrial area because of the noise impacts of the
airport and the fairgrounds." Comprehensive Plan at 82.
4
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AlfredKostenblatt, 161 Vt. 292,640 A.2d 39 (1994). The reasoning for requiring conditions

to be expressly stated in the permit are obvious, to wit: If land uses were governed by
unstated or vaguely articulated conditions or witness representations in a hearing, then a
prospective purchaser of land would have an impossible task of ascertaining restrictions or
conditions imposed upon his or her use of the land. Absent a record of limiting conditions
upon the use of the land, both the applicant and any subsequent purchasers would have no
idea or notion of the conditions to which he or she would be bound. Because the County
imposed no height restriction upon its approval of the earlier rezone application, it was clear
error for it to premise its denial of the CUP upon a non-existent condition precedent. 5

6.

Petitioner's Substantial Rights Were Prejudiced
The County argues for the first time that under Idaho Code§ 67-5279, Burns failed

to show that its substantial rights have been prejudiced. Resp'ts Br. at 11. Specifically,
County argues that Burns has suffered no harm because even without the CUP, Burns "is
able to conduct a myriad of activities on his property." Resp'ts Br. at 12. If the standard set
forth by the County were accurate, then no person could ever petition for judicial review of
a variance or a CUP because the petitioner could always make some use of the property
which did not require the variance or CUP. Clearly, this is not what the Legislature intended
when it adopted I.C. § 67-5279.
This Court has already held that:

5

Had the County so conditioned the earlier rezone, it would have been the denial of Burns' procedural due process
rights. Specifically, the Driggs Ordinance contemplates a separate application process for building heights in excess of forty-five
(45) feet (i.e. a CUP). It would have been an abuse of the County's discretion to impose such limitation without affording Burns
a separate hearing thereon.
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-

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

:\ '1 . '/

Bums has established that he has had a substantial right
prejudiced. Bums has a substantial right to have its conditional
use permit application reviewed according to Idaho law. Bums
has a right to receive a decision that reflects a thoughtful
analysis of the law and facts. Bums has a right to use its
property in a lawful manner.
Decision on Review at 12. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that an applicant "has
a substantial right to have its application evaluated properly" under appropriate zoning laws.
Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007).

Procedural errors and prejudicial actions on the part of a local government can also violate
an applicant's substantial rights. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley, 144 Idaho
584,591, 166 P.3d 374,381 (2007).
Once again, the County treads dangerously close to contempt. This Court has already
held that Bums has demonstrated the existence of a "substantial right." This finding oflaw
by the Court also became the "law of the case." The County again flaunts the Court's earlier
ruling and provides yet another illustration of the County's "moving target" proclivity in this
case. The "substantial rights" argument has never been heretofore asserted by the County
despite a plethora of Briefs and two earlier Hearings. Once again, the County takes the
disingenuous approach of throwing up new arguments very late in the case, once Bums
points out that the County's findings do not hold water.
In this case, Bums had a substantial right to have his permit evaluated under the
criteria established by the Driggs ordinance. Instead, he received an evaluation based on
vague, undefined, visionary goals and subjective aesthetic considerations not found in the
Driggs ordinance. Clearly, Bums' substantial rights have been prejudiced.
11
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7.

This Court Should Remand with Instructions to Grant the CUP
As Bums has argued in its earlier brief, courts may remand with instructions to grant

a permit where findings are not supported by substantial and competent evidence and where
there is no indication in the record that further findings can be made that would affect the
outcome of the case. Bonner!f General Hosp. v. Bonner County, 133 Idaho 7,981 P.2d 242
(1999). Further, the Court may direct issuance of the permit "in a case in which an agency
refuses to comply with the orders of a district court." Pet'rs Br. at 28; Workman Family

Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 38 n.8, 655 P.3d 926, 933 (1982). The
County flaunts this Court's authority by its continued resort to the variance argument and by
its "no substantial right" argument- both arguments which were previously disposed of by
the Court in its last ruling. If ever there was a situation where the extraordinary step of
remanding with instructions to grant the Permit was appropriate, it is this case.
This matter has been before this Court three times. This Court has twice instructed
the County to prepare findings which comply with Idaho Code § 67-653 5. Twice the County
has disregarded the Court's instructions. The County clearly has no intent to comply with
Idaho law in this respect. There are no facts in the record which, when considered in light
of proper CUP considerations,justifythe County's denial of the CUP. Pet'rs Br. at 18-22.
Consequently, this Court should remand this matter back to the County with instructions to
grant the Permit.
CONCLUSION
This Court has already noted that the County has issued findings that do not comply

,, ,_; . ll

with Idaho Code § 67-6535 and that the substantive grounds the County used to justify its
denial are unreasonable. Decision on Review at 14. Like the Findings previously issued by
the County, the Third Findings again do not comply with ILLlJP A and the Court's previous
Orders. The County has based the Third Findings on grounds already foreclosed by this
Court. The County has abused its discretion by denying the permit based on undefined and
unguided aesthetic considerations.
There simply is no justification in the factual record for the County's continued denial
of Bums' CUP. With each new attempt to justify its denial, the arguments the County puts
forth are increasingly frivolous. Now is the time for this Court to bring this matter to a close.
The Court should remand this matter to the County with instructions to grant the CUP.
DATED this

zc_

day ofMarch, 2010.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P .L.L.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TETON COUNTY

IN RE:

)
)

Application for a CUP Permit to exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone

)
)

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,

)

)
)

Petitioner,

Case No. CV-07-376

)
)

V.

THIRD DECISION ON REVIEW

)

)
)

TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
)
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a political )
subdivision of the State of Idaho,
)
)
)

Respondent.

I.

)

BACKGROUND

This is a petition for judicial review of the January 12, 2010 decision of the Teton
County Board of Commissioners ("County") entitled, "Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law." In its decision, the County once again denied Bums Holdings,
LLC's ("Bums") application for a conditional use permit to construct a 75-foot concrete
batch plant. This is Bums' third petition for judicial review. The Court will briefly
reiterate the facts and procedural history.
Bums owns 6.5 acres north of the City of Driggs, immediately north of the
airport. The property is located within the Driggs City Area oflmpact. In February
2007, the County changed the zoning on Bums' property from C-3 (commercial) to M-1
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(light industrial). Driggs' City Ordinance governs the uses allowed in an M-1 zone,
which include the following: "[m]anufacturing, assembling, fabricating, processing,
packing, repairing, or storage uses which have not been declared a nuisance by statute." 1
Bums is now seeking permission to construct a 75-foot high concrete batch plant.
Because the City Ordinance required a conditional use permit for buildings
exceeding 45 feet in height, 2 Burns submitted an application for a conditional use permit.
In July 2007 the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission unanimously approved Burns'
application. The County then held an evidentiary hearing before the Board of
Commissioners on November 15, 2007 and issued a verbal denial of the application.
Bums filed a petition for judicial review of the County's decision in December
2007, based in part on the lack of written findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. This
Court ruled in Burns' favor and remanded the case back to the County to provide written
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court stated:
[The County] failed to prepare written findings and a reasoned statement
as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535, thereby frustrating the ability of the
Court to perform an appropriate judicial review of the proceedings below. 3
On remand, the County produced written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, again denying Burns' application. Burns sought judicial review of the County's
second written decision. This Court again found in Bums' favor and remanded the case
to the County to produce written findings consistent with Idaho law.
In January 2010 the County filed its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. While these new findings address some of the deficiencies noted in the Court's
prior order, they also perpetuate some of the errors noted earlier.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW

Petitioner's Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review presents the
Court with the following issues on review:
1

City Ordinance 274-07, Chapter 2, Section 13(A)(l).
City Ordinance 281-07, § 13(c) (stating "any building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected
shall not exceed forty-five feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit").
3
Order, ~ 1 (Oct. 30, 2008).

2
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a. Do the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed by the
Teton County Board of Commissioners (Board) on November 9, 2009,
violate the provisions ofldaho Code§§ 67-6519 and 67-6535?
b. Was the Board's action denying Burns' Conditional Use Permit (CUP)
application - for the reason that Burns did not request a variance arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion?
c. Was the Boards decision that a conflict existed between the provision in
the Driggs City Ordinance allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet
when approved by a CUP and the Idaho Code arbitrary, capricious, and/or
an abuse of discretion?
d. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
interpret "as if it never existed" the provision of the Driggs City Ordinance
allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet when approved by a CUP?
e. Did the Board's decision to interpret "as if it never existed" that provision
of the Driggs City Ordinance allowing buildings over forty-give (45) feet
when approved by a CUP violate Bums' due process rights under the
Constitutions of the United States and the State ofldaho?
f.

Is the Board's interpretation of the Driggs City Ordinance entitled to any
deference from this Court on judicial review?

g. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
find that a building with a height of more than forty-five (45) feet is not
conditionally permitted by the Driggs City Ordinance?
h. Was is arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
find that there are no conditions which could mitigate the impact of the
building for which Burns sought the CUP and ensure its compatibility
with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood?
1.

Did the Use of the Comprehensive Plan, and the general goals stated
therein, as a regulatory ordinance for evaluating and considering Burns'
CUP application violate Bums' due process rights under the Constitutions
of the United States and the State of Idaho?

J.

Assuming, without admitting, that use of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan
was proper, is there substantial competent evidence in the record to
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support the Board's finding that the building proposed in Burns' CUP
application was in conflict with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan?
k. Is there substantial competent evidence in the record to support the
Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law?

1.

Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
base its decision in part on "testimony" submitted by Board members,
which testimony lacked evidentiary support in the record?

m. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
deny the CUP based on grounds that were never discussed by the Board
during the November 15, 2007, hearing and were not mentioned in the
initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Board?
n. Did Kathy Rinaldi's participation in the Board's November 9, 2009,
decision violate Burns' Constitutional right to an impartial tribunal, where,
prior to her election to the Board, Ms. Rinaldi appeared in the matter in
opposition to Burns' CUP application?

Ill

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person
aggrieved by a local governing body's decision on a conditional use permit to seek
judicial review of that decision. 4 The court reviewing a local governing body's decision
bases its review on the record created before the governing body. 5
Upon review, a court must affirm a local governing body's action unless it
determines such body's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (1) violate
constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) exceed the body's statutory authority; (3) were
made upon unlawful procedure; (4) were not supported by substantial evidence in the
record; or (5) were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 6 Local governing

4

1.C. § 67-6519(4); LC.§ 652l(d).
l.R.C.P. 84(e)(l).
6
LC. § 67-5279(3).

5
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bodies enjoy a strong presumption that their actions, where they have interpreted and
applied their own zoning and planning ordinances, are valid. 7
Additionally, a reviewing court will defer to a governing body's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. A governing body's factual findings are not clearly
erroneous "so long as they are supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting,
evidence." 8 "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than preponderance." 9
Indeed, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the governing body as to the
weight of the evidence on questions offact. 10 However, a reviewing court exercises free
review over questions of law, including whether a governing body violated statutory or
constitutional provisions. 11
To prevail, a challenger must show not only that the governing body has erred in a
manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3), but also that the challenger's substantial rights
have been thereby prejudiced. 12 If the court does not affirm the governing body's
decision, it shall set the decision aside, in whole or in part, and remand the matter to the
governing body for proceedings as necessary .13

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. The Amended Findings and Conclusions Perpetuate Similar Errors Noted
By the Court in its Previous Decision.

Two 2007 Idaho Supreme Court cases clarify when a local government zoning
action is "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." In Neighbors for a Healthy
Gold Fork v. Valley County, the Court found a county's interpretation of its development

7

Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003 ); Whitted v. Canyon County Board of
Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002).
8
Evans, 139 Idaho at 74, 73 P.3d at 88; Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196,
46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002).
9
Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
10
Whitted, 137 Idaho at 121, 44 P.3d at 1176; LC.§ 67-5279(1).
ll Friends of Farm to Market, 137 ldaho at 196, 46 P.3d at 13.
12
1.C. § 67-5279(4).
13
LC. § 67-5279(3).
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code reasonable;

14

in Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, the Court found the

city's interpretation of its municipal code unreasonable.

15

In both cases the Court applied the principles of statutory construction to interpret
the ordinance at issue; then the Court looked at the local government interpretation to
determine whether the local government interpretation was reasonable. In Neighbors, the
county reasonably interpreted its zoning ordinance: the Court started with a strong
presumption that the county's interpretation of its zoning ordinance was valid, and the
county's reasoning supported its conclusions.

16

But in Lane Ranch the Court found the City of Sun Valley acted arbitrarily: the
city applied an irrelevant municipal code section because it assumed that a private road
application was an application to build a subdivision, a successive subdivision application
it had denied in the past. Because the county's denial was founded on an unsupported
assumption, the denial lacked a rational basis.

17

Idaho Code§ 67-6535(b) requires a reasoned statement of the facts and the law
justifying the decision.
The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall
be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the
criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested
facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the
applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual
information contained in the record.
Burns argues that the County's decision was arbitrary and capricious for the
following reasons:
(1) The County found that Burns should have pursued a variance rather than a
conditional use permit after the fact;
(2) The County found a conflict existed between the provision in the Driggs City
Ordinance allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet when approved by a CUP
and the Idaho Code,
14

Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 176 P.3d 126 (Dec. 27, 2007).
Lane Ranch 175 P.3d at 780.
16
Neighbors, 176 P.3d at 136-142.
17
Lane Ranch, 175 P.3d at 780.
15
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(3) The County ignored the provision of the Driggs City Ordinance allowing
buildings over forty-five when approved by a conditional use permit;
(4) The County found that a building with a height of more than forty-five (45) feet is
not conditionally permitted by the Driggs City Ordinance,
(5) The County found that there are no conditions which could mitigate the impact of
the building for which Bums sought the CUP and ensure its compatibility with the
surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood,
(6) The County based its decision in part on "testimony" submitted by Board
members, which testimony lacked evidentiary support in the record,
(7) The County denied the CUP based on grounds that were never discussed by the
Board during the November 15, 2007 hearing and were not mentioned in the
initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Board.
There are portions of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that
continue to be both arbitrary and capricious. For example, the Court agrees with Burns
on the following issues enumerated above: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7. 18 \Vhile there are clearly
errors in the City Ordinance and inconsistencies with state law, at this stage in the
proceedings it is blatantly unfair for the County to rely upon these problems as the basis
for denying Burns' application. Even if the County was correct in concluding that this
application should have been made as a variance, not as a request for a conditional use
permit is correct, due process demands that they be at least given a second opportunity to
present their application. As this Court concluded in its last decision, the County's effort
to ignore or rewrite the express directive for applicants to seek a conditional use permit
for a structure over 45-feet tall is clearly unjust. Merely pretending that the confusion
created by the County's own drafting errors does not exist is no solution. The County
needs to correct this problem immediately.
Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that the City of Driggs Ordinance 281-07,
which requires height increases above 45-feet to be approved through a conditional use

18

These issues coincide with issues (b), (c), (d), (g), (h), (I), and (m) in Bums' Second Amended Statement
oflssues on Judicial Review.
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permit, is inherently in conflict with LC.§ 67-6516. Just because the LLUPA refers to
variances as a means of modifying "height of buildings," does not mean that a
conditional use permit cannot be granted for the same purpose. There is no reason why a
local government could not elect to regulate height through conditional use permits and
zoning variances. Nothing in LC.§ 67-6516 can be read to specifically exclude such a
practice. Because the LLUPA cannot be read to preempt such a practice; there is no
conflict with state law for purposes of Article XII, § 2, of the Idaho Constitution. Any
conflict now claimed by the County appears to be merely a convenient excuse to deny the
application.
However, even if a conflict with state law existed, the Court has concluded that it
is unnecessary for it to decide this case based on the apparent conflict between LC. § 676516, the City of Driggs Ordinance 281-07 and Article XII, § 2, of the Idaho
Constitution. As will be discussed below, the Court has concluded that sufficient
grounds exist to affirm the County's denial of Burn' s application as a conditional use
permit on its own merits. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Court to resolve the
constitutional issues raised by the County at this time.

B. The County's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Satisfy Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) and Workman.

This Court has twice remanded the County's decision based on the finding that
the County's decisions failed to meet the requirements of Idaho Code§§ 67-6535 and
6519(4). The Court found that the County's previous decisions denying Burns'
application lacked a sufficient explanation of the contested facts, the facts relied upon,
and the applicable law. Absent these elements, it was impossible for this Court to
determine whether substantial evidence supports the County's decision. 19
Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) includes the requirement that the governing board guide
the applicant in obtaining approval, if approval is possible:
Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning
commission grants or denies a permit, it shall specify:
19

Decision on Review, p. 14 (Sept. 29, 2009).
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a. The ordinance and standards used in evaluating the application;
b. The reasons for approval or denial; and
c. The actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a permit.
The legislature has clearly stated the purpose of these requirements: "It is the intent of the
legislature that decisions made pursuant to this chapter should be founded upon sound
reason and practical application of recognized principles of law. " 20

In its prior decision, this Court cited the 1982 Idaho Supreme Court case
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, wherein the Idaho Supreme Court
found that a governing body must produce a written decision that gives a district court
enough information to conduct judicial review. "[I]n order for there to be effective
judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning boards, there must be a record of
the proceedings and adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. " 21 The Supreme
Court clarified what constitutes "adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law" by
citing and adopting a decision by the Oregon Supreme Court.
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that to prevent ad-hoc or arbitrary
decisions, the governing body issuing the decision must "clearly and precisely state what
it found to be the facts and fully explain why those facts lead it to the decision it makes.
Brevity is not always a virtue." 22 The Oregon Court continued:
What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what,
specifically, the decision-making body believes, after hearing and
considering all the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon
which its decision is based Conclusions are not sufficient. 23
Based on this rationale, the Idaho Supreme Court in Workman ruled that the district court
should remand the case in order for the board of commissioners to produce findings of
fact and conclusions oflaw sufficient for the district court to perform judicial review.
As will be more fully developed below, the County's Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law satisfy Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) and Workman Family
20

LC.§ 6535(c).
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 ldaho 32, 36,655 P.2d 926,930 (1982).
22
Id, l 04 Idaho at 37, 655 P.2d at 931 (citing South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of
Commissioners, 280 Or. 3,569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977)).
23
Workman, l 04 Idaho at
655 P.2d at 931 (emphasis in the original).
21
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Partnership v. City of Twin Falls. The County has stated a sufficient explanation of the

contested facts, the facts relied upon, and the applicable law for this Court to conduct
judicial review of its decision.
C. The County's Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Do Not Violate Constitutional Provisions.

Burns raises three issues in its most recent petition for judicial review regarding
due process rights: (1) whether Bums' due process rights were violated due to the
County's interpretation of the Driggs City Ordinance, (2) whether the County used the
Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance for evaluating and considering Bums'
CUP application in violation of Bums' due process rights, and (3) whether Kathy
Rinaldi's participation in the Board's November 9, 2009, decision violated Bums'
constitutional right to an impartial tribunal. 24
Bums' first two arguments pertain to the County's interpretation of the Driggs
City Ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan. They claim the Findings and Conclusions
are vague, often refer to aesthetic conditions, and lack principles oflaw. It is the Court's
understanding that these two arguments go toward the issue of whether the County's
decision to deny the CUP was sufficiently rooted in the rule of law, whether the County
had specific facts, and whether its decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, the Court will address these two arguments under Sections
IV(D) and (E), infra.
Petitioner's third argument is that Kathy Rinaldi's signature on the Amended
Findings deprived Burns of an impartial tribunal. In the 2004 Idaho Supreme Court case
Eacret v. Bonner, the Court stated that the Due Process Clause "entitles a person to an

impartial and disinterested tribunal ... " 25 Since the Eacret decision cited by both parties,
the Idaho Supreme Court further defined "impartiality" as it applies to a quasi-judicial
body. In the 2007 case, Turner v. City of Twin Falls, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed
24

These issues coincide with ( e), ( i) and (n) in the Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial
Review.
25
Eacret v. Bonner, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004).
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whether Twin Falls City Council acted as an impartial decision maker when it granted
review of a planning and zoning decision. 26 While the facts of this case and Turner
differ, the Idaho Supreme Court's definition of "impartiality" applies here:
[Impartiality] means 'the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding. Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the law.
That is, it guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply
the law to him in the same way he applies it to any other party.' In the
context of due process, it does not mean 'lack of preconception in favor of
or against a particular legal view. This sort of impartiality would be
concerned, not with guaranteeing litigants equal application of the law, but
rather with guaranteeing them an equal chance to persuade the court on the
legal points in their case.' It does not mean having 'no preconceptions on
legal issues, but [being] willing to consider views that oppose his
preconceptions, and remain [ing] open to persuasion, when the issues arise
in a pending case.' Impartiality under the Due Process Clause does not
guarantee each litigant a chance of changing the judge's preconceived
view of the law. 27
The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed the problem of Commissioner bias and
due process rights in the 2002 case Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, et
al. 28 The Supreme Court listed three factors in determining whether commissioner bias

resulted in a violation of an applicant's due process rights: "(l) whether the member
disclosed the interest or the other council members were fully aware of it; (2) the extent
of the member's participation in the decision; and (3) the magnitude of the member's
interest. " 29
In this case, the Court finds that Rinaldi's participation did not violate Bums'
right to an impartial tribunal. First, Rinaldi was not a swing vote. The Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed by all three commissioners-the
decision to deny Bums' CUP would have passed even without Rinaldi's signature. 30
Second, Rinaldi did not participate in the November 2009 hearing. The minutes,
included in the record under the County's "Notice of Piling" on January 14, 2010, show
26

Turner v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).
Id. (citing Republican Party ofMinn. V White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002)).
28
Floydv. Board of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, et al., 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863 (2002).
29 Id.
.
30
Id. at 726.
27
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that the only two commissioners present at the hearing were Bob Bennett and Larry
Young. 31 For these two reasons, the Court finds that Ms. Rinaldi's signature on the
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not give rise to a claim that
Appellant was denied an impartial tribunal.

D. The County's Decision to Deny Burns' Conditional Use Permit is
Supported by Substantial Evidence in the Record.

Burns also objects to the County's decision to deny the CUP application on the
grounds that the County lacked substantial evidence in the record. According to Burns,
the County lacked substantial competent evidence in the record to support its finding that
Burns' proposed 75-foot height was in conflict with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan and
other local ordinances. Burns alleges that the County's Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law lacked substantial and competent evidence.
In Idaho, "[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than
preponderance. " 32 A court will not substitute its judgment for that of the governing body
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 33
The critical evidence before the County concerned the location of the plant.
Teton County considered the need of preserving the "gateway" at the north end of Driggs
that leads into the City. 34 Such gateways are listed as a "need" under Section 9.3 of
Driggs' Comprehensive Plan. Furthermore, the City of Driggs' Comprehensive Plan
Section 9.4 states:
The Vision for Hwy 33 outside of downtown is as an attractive, functional, and
memorable gateway into the community. The sense of arrival at each end of the
community should be dramatic, but in keeping with the beauty of Teton Valley and
the surrounding mountains. New buildings should be setback from the highway, with

31

Notice ofFiling (Jan. 14, 2010).
Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
33
Whitted, 137 Idaho at 121, 44 P.3d at 1176; LC.§ 67-5279(1).
34
Burns Holding, LLC CUP Denial, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 6
32
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ample landscaping, concealed parking and architecture that draws on the western and
agricultural vemacul ars ...
The County explained that in their opinion, a 75-foot high structure clearly interferes with
the City's objectives to preserve a "memorable gateway." 35 The Court finds no error in
reaching such a conclusion by reference to the Comprehensive Plan.
When drafting its Comprehensive Plan, the one apparent intention was to ensure a
dramatic view of the surrounding scenery. They expressed the need for buildings to be
"setback" so they do not interfere with scenery. In its Findings, the County concluded
that a 75-foot high by 60 foot wide building would noticeably interfere with the
surrounding scenery and detract from its effort to maintain "memorable gateways." 36
Bums argues that the County is impermissibly using their Comprehensive Plan as
a regulatory tool, in violation of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Urrutia v. Blaine
County, 2 P.3d 738, 134 Idaho 353 (2000). In Urrutia the Supreme Court held a board

may "refer to the comprehensive plan as a general guide in instances involving zoning
decisions." However, "the Board erred in relying completely on the comprehensive plan
in denying [the] applications." 37
The facts in Urrutia are distinguishable from the present case. While Urrutia
concerned a subdivision application, the case in hand deals with a conditional use permit
(which under the facts of this case, closely resembles a zoning variance). In Urrutia,
Blaine County relied "solely" on its comprehensive plan in denying the application. 38 In
this case, while Teton County has referenced its Comprehensive Plan, 39 it has primarily
relied on the ordinances of the City of Driggs, such as (1) a height limitation on all
buildings of 45 feet (Chapter 2, Section l3C of Ordinance 281-07), (2) the stated
purposes of conditional use permits (Section 2 of Ordinance 274-07), (3) the stated
purposes of the local ordinance (Chapter l(D) of Ordinance 274-07), and (4) the
35

36
37
38

Id.
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.6.
ld. 2 P.3d at 743-744, 134 ldaho at 358-359 (emphasis added).

Id., 2 P.3d at 743, 134 Idaho at 358.

39

The Comprehensive Plan is only discussed in Section 2(0) of the Findings. It constitutes only two
paragraphs out of the entire seven page document.
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conditions required by the ordinance for approval (Chapter 4, Section 2(A), Ordinance
274-07). While the Comprehensive Plan is referenced in Section 2(D) of the Findings,
and there are other references to "gateways" and aesthetics, it is clear to the Court that
Teton County was not "completely relying" on its comprehensive plan, as occurred in
Urrutia. 40

The concrete plant that Burns wishes to construct is a permitted use within the
zone where the building will be erected. Therefore, the intended use of the plant is not
the issue. The County was merely concerned with the height of the concrete plant, a
height which would exceed the maximum 45 feet allowed by the Ordinance by 30 feet.
The proposed structure would not just barely exceed the height limit, it would be almost
67% taller than currently allowed. In an effort to reach a compromise, the County
inquired of Burns any plausible way to mitigate the extra 30 feet of height.
Burns was unable to assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding
properties, uses and neighborhood to the County's satisfaction. "The County has not
been presented with any plausible way to mitigate the extra 30 feet of height now being
requested, nor is it able to craft any conditions that would assure surrounding properties,
uses, and neighborhoods protection and compatibility with the additional 30 feet of
height. " 41
At the November 2007 hearing, Burns suggested that moving the building back
from the edge of the property line would mitigate the additional 30 feet in height.
However, the County found that the top of the building would still obstruct views of the
Teton Mountains and would not be a plausible way of mitigating the extra height. No
other building in the area exceeds the maximum allowable height of 45 feet. Thus, an
additional 30 feet added onto such a large structure was considered to be simply too high.
In reaching this conclusion, the Commissioners relied upon testimony and their own
knowledge and familiarity with the location at issue. The site at issue is east of State
Highway 33, the most traveled road in the County, and is familiar to any resident of
Teton County. There is no rule oflaw requiring the Commissioners to divorce
40

41

Id., 2 P.3d at 744, 134 Idaho at 359.
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.6.
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themselves of all knowledge and observations gained by personally viewing the location.
Burns offered "line-of-site" drawings at the hearing, which the Court has carefully
considered. While it does appear to show that setting the tower back from the road
somewhat mitigates the apparent height of the building, it is difficult to discern from the
drawings its actual appearance in reality. The actual structure will not be a mere twodimensional silhouette. The County had clear skepticism about the overall aesthetic
impact of the structure, regardless of the setback. Arguably, even a building the size of
the Empire State Building would be dwarfed by the adjacent Grand Teton mountain
range, if it was set back far enough from the highway. While such concerns may be
debatable, they are not unreasonable.
This Court finds that reasonable minds could deny Bums' CUP application based
on the facts listed above. While a reasonable person may reach a different conclusion,
these concerns, as stated in the findings, are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The
commissioners based their decision on substantial evidence, which only needs to be
"more than a scintilla but less than preponderance."42 This Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the elected governing body as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact.
E. The County's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
Not Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion.

Within the LLUPA, the Idaho Legislature set forth its intent for the requirements
of findings of fact and conclusions of law:

It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to [the Local
Land Use and Planning Act} should be founded upon sound reason and
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such
decisions, the courts of the state are directed to consider the proceedings
as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant
decisions in light of practical considerations with an emphasis on
fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making.
Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or

42

Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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violation of fundamental rights, not the mere Bossibility thereof, shall be
entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision. 3
The County's decision, at its very essence, is a decision by elected officials in
Teton County that a 75-foot concrete batch plant in the proposed location is just too big
to be compatible with its local ordinances and its comprehensive plan. The County listed
several reasons throughout its Findings why the plant is too big. For example, the
County explained that their concern that the unusually tall structure would harm
neighboring property values, affect economic values in an area dependent on its "scenic
offerings," damage environmental assets by disrupting "scenic vistas," and more. 44 The
County was obviously concerned about aesthetics, the plant's proximity to the scenic
corridor, and its proximity to the "gateway" to the City of Driggs. The County was also
plainly concerned about the considerable size of the structure relative to surrounding
buildings: the plant was 75-feet high and 60-feet wide. This structure would be almost
67% taller than the tallest permissible structure in Teton County.
As stated above, Burns was given an opportunity to persuade the County that 75feet is not too tall. Bums presented sight diagrams, landscaping plans, noise pollution
studies, traffic studies, and still the County remained unassuaged. Burns was given an
opportunity to present his case, but the elected decision-makers were not persuaded.
Their denial was based on many findings of facts leading to one conclusion-a 75-foot
structure was simply too tall based on the rules and ordinances in existence for this rural,
tourist-oriented community. Although hotly contested by Burns, there are substantial
facts in the record to support such a conclusion.
Elections have consequences. Whether the Commissioners' decision is viewed by
Burns as personal or political is irrelevant, as long as it was founded on substantial facts
in the record. It is simply not the role of this Court to force a decision upon the County
that its elected officials have a right to make. Even assuming, arguendo, that the

43
44

LC. § 67-6535(c).
Bums Holding, LLC CUP Denial, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4.
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Commissioners' decision was unwise or short-sighted, such issues are almost always best
remedied in the voting booth, not the courtroom.

F. Neither Party is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Both parties are seeking recovery of their attorney fees. The award of fees and
costs are largely discretionary functions of the Court. Discretionary decisions require the
Court to (1) rightly perceive the issue as one of discretion, (2) act within the outer
boundaries of the discretion allotted, and (3) reach the decision through the exercise of
reason. 45 Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) states,
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a
county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
The Court finds that neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Although Teton
County is the prevailing party, Burns did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
As the Court has stated above, the County's Second Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law sufficiently stated the facts upon which it relied, and the County
reached a reasoned decision based on the facts before it. However, Bums had a
reasonable basis in law and fact to appeal the County's decision because of the issues set
forth in Section IV(A) of this decision. The Court's concerns with portions of the
County's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions oflaw are sufficiently stated
above.

V.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, the County's decision denying Burns' application
for a conditional use permit is AFFIRMED. However, inasmuch as the County has made
it clear in their pleadings that Burns' application should have been pursued as a variance
45

Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, l 12 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987).
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rather than a conditional use permit, justice demands that Burns have an opportunity to
resubmit their request to build the disputed structure by seeking a variance, if they
choose. This decision only affirms the County's determination denying the conditional
use permit.

So Ordered.
Dated this 10th day of June, 2010.
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Telephone: (208) 523-0620
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:Attorneys for Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC

IN Tl-IB DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVEN -I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND PORT
COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-07-376

INRE:
Application for a CUP Pem1it to Exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone

ETITI0NER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner and Applicant,
V.

TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

Respondent.

j

Pursuant to the provisions of I.R.C.P. ll(a (2), Petitioner moves the Court for an
Order reconsidering its Third Decision on Review lated June 10, 2010.
This Motion is made inter alia for the follo ing reasons:
1.

The Court failed to consider and did not address whether the phrase

. "memorable gateway" is unconstitutio11allyvague a 1d ambiguous and whether enforcement

208-523-'.::!518

T-415

P0003/0006 F-434

of such standard violates Petitioner's due proce. s rights under the Idaho and U.S.
Constitutions.

2.

Notwithstanding the Court's determinat on that the Cow1ty did not rely "solely''

bn its Comprehension Plan in denying Petitioner's ''onditional Use, the County made no
specific findings offoct with respect to any of these tions ofthe Driggs Ordinance quoted

j

on page 13 of the Court's decision.
3.

The County's finding quoted at fo ,lnotc 41 of the Court's decision is

bompletely ~~ncl~ory and fails to include any factj~l finding explaining ~hy Petitioner's
proposed mtl!gattve measures would not work nor id il1e Cou11ty 01hcrw1sc set forth any
facts supporting their apparent conclusion tlrnt it was mpossible to ensure compatibility with
I

surrounding uses.

4.

111e Comt's conclusion that the Comm./ sioners tnayrelyupon theirlmowlcdgc

!and observations of the site is enoneous as a matte of law. See Comer v. County of Twin

Falls, 130 Idaho 433,942 P.2d 557 (1997).
5.

The County's factual conclusionthatg ntingaCUJ)would "harm neighboring

'.property values, effect economic values and

domagt envir01m1ental assets" is arbitra1y and

•capricious and without any factual support iu tho Rrord.
Petitioner will file a briefin support of this M tion within fourteen (14) days from the
,date hereof, setting forth its arguments in support o · 1his Motion.
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166)
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-07-376

INRE:
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone

PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner and Applicant,
V.

TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.
Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC respectfully submits the following Brief in Support
of its Motion for Reconsideration.

INTRODUCTION
This case has a lengthy procedural history, as well as an extensive factual background
relating thereto, none of which need to be recited for the purposes of Petitioner's Motion for

ORIGINAL

Reconsideration. Such procedural history and background have been set forth in great detail
in the briefs before the Court and in the Court's Third Decision on Review. The instant
Motion focuses upon the Court's Third Decision on Review dated June 10, 2010, wherein
the Court denied Bums' Petition for Judicial Review.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Board's Most Recent Decision Violates the Idaho and United States
Constitutions and the Court Erred in Upholding That Decision.

The Board's last decision violates the constitutions of both the United States and the
State ofldaho for three reasons. First, the use of the broad and visionary goals of the Driggs
Comprehensive Plan as a basis for denying the CUP application is constitutionally
impermissible under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Second, the Board's use of the
Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory measure is not justified by the Board's arbitrary
application of the Driggs zoning ordinance and is contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's
holding in the Urrutia case. Third, the Board's use of extra-judicial evidence to deny the
CUP violates Petitioner's due process rights. Because of these constitutional defects, the
Court erred in sustaining the Board's decision.
A.

The Court Erred in Failing to Address Petitioner's Arguments That Teton
County's Use of the Comprehensive Plan as a Regulatory Measure
Violates Petitioner's Due Process Rights.

Petitioner steadfastly urged throughout all the proceedings in front of this Court,
including those before Judge Shindurling, that the County's use of the broad, visionary
criteria contained in the Driggs Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance violated its

2
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due process rights under the Idaho and United States Constitutions.' The Petitioner's voidfor -vagueness argument is complimentary to, but entirely different from the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Urrutia v. Blaine County,2 wherein the Court held that a comprehensive
- ___Q__lan should not be used as a regulatory ordinance. The Urrutia case was decided primarily
on the basis of statutory construction of the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act, rather than
on principles of constitutional law. Although the void-for-vagueness argument and Urrutia
statutory argument closely parallel each other, nevertheless they are separate and distinct
bodies oflaw and were so treated in Petitioner's briefs. In the Court's Third Decision on
Review, the Court discussed Urrutia and distinguished it from the facts of this case. 3
Importantly, however, this Court did not address the due process issue or the vagueness
arguments raised in Petitioner's Brief. Petitioner now invites the Court to squarely address
Petitioner's contention that County's reliance upon the "memorable gateway" language in
the Comprehensive Plan was constitutionally defective.
Every comprehensive plan is necessarily broad, idealistic and visionary. In other
words, a comprehensive plan is purposefully vague because it is only intended to serve as a
guideline, rather than as legally controlling law. As noted in the Urrutia case and its
predecessors, a comprehensive plan reflects the desirable goals and objectives or desirable
future situations for land within a jurisdiction. 4 Precisely for this reason, it does not operate
1

See Petitioner's Brief dated July 1, 2008, p. 25-30; Petitioner's Reply Brief dated August 26, 2008, p. 17-22;
Petitioner's Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, at FN 14.
2

3

4
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134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000).
Third Decision on Review at 13.

Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 358, 2 P.3d at 743.
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as legally controlling law -

it serves only as a guide to advise governmental agencies

responsible for making zoning decisions. 5 The goals and objectives contained in a
comprehensive plan necessarily must be broad and general in nature. Thus, they are not well
suited for the more precise task of applying specific facts to law. The broad, visionary
statements are by their nature too vague and imprecise to meet constitutional standards of due
process. Because a comprehensive plan lacks precise standards, its use as a regulatory
measure inevitably leads to arbitrary and capricious decision making. Inherent in any
comprehensive plan is a subjectivity with which the goals and objectives are necessarily are
framed. The County's use of the term "memorable gateway" in this case to evaluate a land
use application is a prime example of arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional use of a
comprehensive plan in violation of Petitioner's due process rights.
A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process oflaw. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926). The purpose of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is to limit arbitrary and discretionary enforcement of the law. Anderson v. Issaquah,
70 Wash. App. 64, 75, 851 P.2d 744, 751 (1993). An ordinance must be sufficiently clear
and definite as to give those reading it fair notice of prohibited [and permitted] conduct.

West Bloomfield Charter Township v. Karton, 29 Mich. App. 43, 50, 530 N.W.2d 99, 103
( 1995). An ordinance does not provide fair notice of proscribed conduct if it either forbids

5

4
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or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as its meaning and differ as to its application. Id.; See also In Re: Appeal
of Jam Gold, LLC, 185 Vt. 201, 969 A.2d 47 (2008) (holding that the city comprehensive

plan did not give specific standards to guide enforcement by local authorities). When
exercising discretion in zoning matters, a local board must be guided by standards which are
specific in order to prevent the ordinance from being invalid and arbitrary. Peterson
Outdoor Advertising v. City of Myrtle Beach, 327 S.C. 230,489 S.E.2d 630 (1997).

The Anderson case contains an excellent explanation of why using broad, visionary
statements to evaluate zoning and land-use applications is constitutionally impermissible. In
that case, court was confronted with a zoning ordinance that employed vague and undefined
terms which gave the commissioners no objective guidelines to follow:
Because the commissioners themselves had no objective
guidelines to follow, they necessarily had to resort to their own
subjective "feelings." The "statement" Issaquah is apparently
trying to make on its "signature street" is not written in the code.
In order to be enforceable, that "statement" must be written
down in the code, in understandable terms. The unacceptable
alternative is what happened here. The commissioners enforced
not only building design code, but their own arbitrary concept
of the provisions of an unwritten "statement" to be made on
Gilman Boulevard. The commissioners' individual concepts
were as vague and undefined as those written in the code. This
is the very epitome of discretionary, arbitrary enforcement of the
law. 6
Because of the broad, idealistic, and vague ordinance language used in that case, the court
concluded that the code sections "do not give effective or meaningful guidance to applicants,

6

Anderson, 70 Wash. App. At 77, 85 l P.2d at 752.The city in that case was attempting to enforce a reference in its
zoning ordinance to "signature streets."
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PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
l l /~...

t-·)

lJ ,J ·, t

to design professionals, or to the public officials of Issaquah who are responsible for
enforcing the code." Id.
This Court in this case expressly condoned the County's use of the "memorable
gateway" standard. 7 However, the phrase "memorable gateway" affords absolutely no
guidance or ascertainable standard by which an applicant could formulate a plan. It made
Petitioner's compliance subject to the subjective whims of the County Commissioners and
allowed them to inject their capricious "feelings" into the determination. The "memorable
gateway" standard is constitutionally defective not only because it employs the vague and
subjective terms "memorable" and "gateway," but the Driggs Comprehensive Plan contains
no definition of the area embraced within the "gateway." Indeed, the Comprehensive Plan
specifically notes, "No official gateway as been identified or developed at either end of
Driggs on Highway 33." 8 An applicant seeking a permit under the Commissioners'
interpretation would have no idea whether or not his or her land is included within such
"gateway" and no idea what standards will be used to evaluate his or her land use application.
As Petitioner noted in its earlier briefs, Teton County -

which is responsible for

implementation of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan in the area of impact -

has adopted a

"scenic corridor" which exactly paralleled both sides of Highway 33. 9 By creating a scenic
corridor provision in the Teton County Zoning Ordinance, the County apparently sought to
create the specific standards through which the visionary purposes of the Driggs

7
8
9

6

-
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See Section 9 .1, Driggs Comprehensive Plan.
It is undisputed that the property at issue in this case is located outside the scenic corridor.
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Comprehensive Plan could be constitutionally implemented. 10 The scenic corridor was
specifically defined as 330 feet on each side of Highway 33. 11 This process of specifically
identifying an area in which scenic considerations became paramount is exactly what the
Local Land Use Planning Act contemplates relative to the relationship between
comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances. That is, the comprehensive plan articulates
broad policy goals and the zoning ordinance implements them, with a greater degree of
specificity and clarity than can be undertaken in the broad, visionary comprehensive plan.
Implicitly, by adopting the scenic corridor ordinance, the Teton County officials concluded
that scenic considerations were not paramount outside the corridor and the County's effort
in this case to extend the concept of a "memorable gateway" beyond the scenic corridor
appears to be nothing more than an arbitrary, completely subjective effort to extend the
scenic corridor beyond what it was intended, in terms of area.
The County's use of the vague term "memorable" to deny Burns' CUP application is
also completely subjective and violates the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The term
"memorable" affords no guidance or direction whatsoever to an applicant attempting to
submit a land use application. Nor does it provide the County Commissioners any objective
standard by which to make a principled evaluation of any land use applications actually
submitted. What is "memorable" to one, may not be memorable enough to another. Just like
the "signature street" standard struck down in the Anderson case, the term "memorable

10

11

7 -

See Teton County Zoning Ordinance§ 8-5-2(0).
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gateway" gives no meaningful guidance to applicants, design professionals or public officials
who are responsible for enforcing it. It is so vague that men and women of common
intelligence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. Because the County
used an unconstitutionally vague standard to deny Petitioner's CUP application, the Court
should grant the relief requested in the Petitioner's Second Amended Petition of Judicial
Review.
B.

The County's Arbitrary Use of the Driggs' Zoning Ordinance Does Not
Justify Their Use of the Comprehensive Plan as a Regulatory Measure.

Throughout the briefing in this case Petitioner vigorously argued that the Board's use
of the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance contravened the holding of the
Supreme Court in Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (S. Ct. 2000). 12 The
Court disagreed with Petitioner's argument, holding that, "The facts in Urrutia are
distinguishable from the present case." 13 Specifically, the Court noted that in Urrutia, Blaine
County relied "solely" on its comprehensive plan in denying a subdivision application, unlike
the facts in this case where, according to the Court, Teton County "primarily relied on the
ordinances of the City ofDriggs." 14
Petitioner respectfully disagrees with the Court's reading of the Urrutia case. While
the Court is correct that the Urrutia court reversed Blaine County's denial of the subdivision
application because the County had relied exclusively on the comprehensive plan, the Urrutia

12

13

14

8 -

See Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, p. 27; Section III of Petitioner's Initial Brief.
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court did not hold that had Blaine County appropriately used other zoning regulations (i.e.
a zoning ordinance or subdivision ordinance), its reliance upon the comprehensive plan
would have been justifiable. Rather, the Supreme Court's "exclusively" qualification merely
means that if the County had other independent, justifiable reasons for denying the
application, it's use of the comprehensive plan as a regulatory ordinance would not, ipso
facto, mandate reversal. The Court did not hold that resort to such other grounds would have

justified the County's inappropriate use of the comprehensive plan as a regulatory ordinance.
Petitioner does not dispute that if a county premises its denial of a permit upon
appropriate standards contained in a subdivision or zoning ordinance and the denial is based
upon substantial, competent evidence, the fact that it may have inappropriately used its
comprehensive plan as a regulatory measure, would not necessitate reversal of the decision.
Stated simply, a county's appropriate use of subdivision or zoning ordinances would not be
negated by its misuse of the comprehensive plan as a regulatory measure. However, resort
to such other ordinance provisions would not justify misuse of the comprehensive plan as
controlling law. As explained by the Urrutia court, the "evil" of using a comprehensive plan
as a regulatory measure is that it "affords the board unbounded discretion in examining a
subdivision application and allows the board to effectively re-zone land based on the general
language in the comprehensive plan." 15 An appropriate use of a zoning or subdivision
ordinance as a basis for denial would not purge a County's arbitrary use of the

15

9

-
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comprehensive plan as a regulatory measure -

rather it would only justify upholding the

denial on independent grounds.
In this case, the County held that Petitioner's proposed 75-foot structure interferes
with the City's objectives to preserve a "memorable gateway." The Court, in examining that
holding, then stated that, "The Court finds no error in reaching such a conclusion by
reference to the Comprehensive Plan." 16 Thus, the Court has condoned the County's
arbitrary use of the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance, notwithstanding the
holding in Urrutia that a comprehensive plan cannot be used as such.
The Court errs in its reading of Urrutia in this fashion. If the Court's analysis were
correct, a county could be completely arbitrary in its denial of an application, premised upon
an alleged non-compliance with the zoning or subdivision ordinance, and then use such
arbitrary finding to justify its use of a comprehensive plan as a regulatory measure. Clearly,
the court's holding in Urrutia cannot be circumvented that easily.
In this case, the County has not pointed to any evidence in the record that would
justify the denial of Petitioner's CUP application. Thus, there are no valid grounds to justify
the County's denial, independent of its misuse of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan. Petitioner
has argued at great length that the County's findings with respect to Petitioner's compliance
with the Driggs CUP ordinance were conclusory and arbitrary. There is no evidence in the
record to support a finding that the additional height is incompatible with the adjoining
industrial uses. Further, there is no evidence supporting the County's finding that it is

16
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impossible to craft conditions that would mitigate the additional height vis-a-vis other
adjoining industrial uses. The County provided no rationale for its conclusory finding that
the mitigating measures put forth by Bums would not, indeed could not, mitigate the
additional height. That finding is totally conclusory and without any rationale or support in
the record.
In sum, the County's arbitrary use of the Driggs' zoning ordinance cannot justify its

misuse of the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory measure. The potential for
arbitrary decisions arising from the use of a comprehensive plan as a regulatory measure is
not resolved by the County's equally arbitrary use of the Driggs zoning or subdivision
ordinances. The Court's reading of Urrutia is misplaced.
C.

The Commissioners' Reliance upon Their Own Knowledge and
Familiarity with the Site as a Basis for Their Decision Violates Petitioner's
Due Process Rights.

As the Court noted, the County found that the top of the building would obstruct the
views of the Tetons and therefore Bums had not provided any plausible way for mitigating
the extra height. 17 The Court also noted that, "In reaching this decision, the Commissioners
relied upon testimony and their own knowledge and familiarity with the location at issue." 18
Bums has previously argued that the "view of the Tetons" was irrelevant under the Driggs'
CUP ordinance, given the fact that the property was situated outside the scenic corridor and
given that the scenic considerations were not relevant under the Driggs' ClJP ordinance.
Aside from the fact that a "view of the Tetons" is not a relevant consideration under the
17
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Driggs CUP ordinance, the Court's holding that, "There is no rule of law requiring the
Commissioners to divorce themselves of all knowledge and observations gained by
personally viewing the location," is contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Comer
v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 942 P.2d 557 (1997) and the recent case, Noble v.
Kootenai County, 148 Idaho 937,231 P.3d 1034 (2010).

In Comer, the Supreme Court held that the Twin Falls County Board of
Commissioners violated the appellant's due process rights when they viewed the property in
question without notice and without giving the parties or their representatives the opportunity
to be present. 19 Specifically, the court noted that because none of the parties were present
during such extra-judicial viewing and because no record was made of the viewing, the
parties have no way of knowing if the correct parcels of property were examined by members
of the board. 20 The problem with extra-judicial site visits is obvious, to wit: the interested
parties have no opportunity to ascertain exactly what knowledge is possessed by the county
commissioners, nor do they have an opportunity to present evidence in rebuttal to whatever
knowledge or erroneous conclusions the commissioners might have reached, premised upon
such extra-judicial site visits. Reliance upon such extra-judicially obtained evidence is a
clear violation of the Petitioner's due process rights.
In Noble v. Kootenai County, the Supreme Court also held that extra-judicial site
visits, without proper notice, also violate the Idaho Open Meeting Act. 21 Specifically, in the

19

20
21
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absence of proper notice, any action taken at a meeting held in violation of the open meeting
act is necessarily void. See I. C. §67-2347.
In sum, the Court's holding here that the Teton County Commissioner's resort to their
own knowledge obtained by extra-judicial site visits, does not comport with the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in Comer and Noble. To the extent their decision is premised upon
such visits, the decision cannot stand.

II.

The County's Most Recent Decision Does Not Comply with Idaho Code§ 676535.
The Court acknowledged that much of the Board's most recent decision "continue[ s]

to be both arbitrary and capricious,"22 but nevertheless upheld the Board's decision. The
decision to uphold the Board's decision was erroneous for two reasons. First, the County's
written decision to deny the CUP under the guise of the "memorable gateway" standard also
contains no reasoned statement setting forth the relevant facts and applicable legal principles,
as required by I. C. § 67-6535. Second, the Board's decision contains no rationale or
explanation of how they reached the conclusion that there was no way to mitigate the
proposed building's extra height and therefore does not satisfy the express requirements of

I. C. § 67-6535.
A.

The County's Finding Regarding the "Memorable Gateway" Are
Conclusory and Do Not Meet the Standards in Idaho Code§ 67-6535.

As noted in Petitioner's Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial
Review, the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act requires a local government body to provide

22
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a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant and explains
the rationale for the decision. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated on a number of occasions
the following principle:
What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement
of what, specifically, the decision-making body believes, at the
hearing and considering all of the evidence, to be relevant and
important facts upon which its decision is based. Conclusions
are not sufficient. 23
The County's finding regarding the "memorable" gateway are completely conclusory
and afford no rationale or explanation of how it arrived at its decision. Specifically, the
County's finding regarding a "memorable gateway" was contained in a single sentence: "The
County finds that the application conflicts with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan because it
creates a large industrial structure that cannot be adequately shielded in the area which
Driggs would like to see become a memorable gateway." 24

The County affords no

explanation of how it determined the area embraced within the "gateway" nor did it offer any
rationale or explanation of how it made the "memorable" determination or even more
importantly, why "shielding" was even necessary given Bums' use of design elements to
render the building profile in harmony with surrounding uses. Indeed, one has to wonder
how the Teton County Commissioners were able to determine that Bums' building was
within an area that Driggs would "like to see become a memorable gateway" when in fact
the City of Driggs' was itself unable to identify such area at the time it adopted its

23

Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 37, 665 P.2d 926, 931 ( 1982) (Italics added);
See also Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 511, 148 P .3 d 1247, 1257 (2006).
24
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Comprehensive Plan. 25 Further, the record is devoid of any testimony or evidence that the
structure with the additional height was not "memorable". The County apparently assumes
that industrial structures are not "memorable" by definition -

a strange proposition indeed

for structures located in an industrial zone. 26 The County's decision provides no factual
support for its conclusion that the structure "cannot be adequately shielded" - nor does it
identify from what facility or perspective the structure was to be shielded- and ignores the
design elements of the building itself (i.e. color, texture, roofline, landscaping, set-back and
other design features breaking up the building profile and making the building attractive).
The County's finding includes no explanation of why these design elements were insufficient
to make the building "memorable."
In sum, there is no "clear statement" as required by Workman and LC. § 67-6536, nor
is there any statement of the facts relied upon or any explanation of the County's rationale
for its conclusions. The decision should be reversed for failure to comply with LC. § 676535.
B.

The Board's Finding That Burns Had Presented No Plausible Way to
Mitigate the Additional Height Is Arbitrary and Fails to Meet the
Standards Required under Idaho Code§ 67-6535.

The Court noted the County's finding that, "The County has not been presented with
any plausible way to mitigate the extra 30 feet of height now being requested, nor is it able
to craft any conditions that would ensure surrounding properties, uses, and neighborhoods'
25

Section 9.1, City of Driggs Comprehensive Plan. Further, as noted above, Teton County later adopted a scenic
corridor wherein it did identify an area where scenic considerations were identified. As noted in Petitioner's briefs, such area
appears to be a specific implementation of the "memorable gateway" goal articulated earlier in the Comprehensive Plan.
26

Given the inherent character of manufacturing and industrial uses permitted in the M-1 zone, one has to question the
logic of requiring industrial structures to be "memorable" in the first place.
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protection and compatibility with the additional 30 feet ofheight." 27 The Court then held that
'This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of elected governing body as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact."
In Workman Family Partnership, the Idaho Supreme Court held:
What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement
of what, specifically, the decision-making body believes, after
hearing and considering all evidence, to be the relevant and
important facts upon which its decision is based. Conclusions
are not sufficient. 28
Further, Idaho Code§ 67-6535 requires the governing board to "state the relevant contested
facts relied upon and explain the rational for the decision ... " The Board's decision here
does none of the above. It does not explain its rationale, nor does it state the relevant facts
relied upon. Rather, the Board simply makes the wholly conclusionary statement that there
was no "plausible way to mitigate the extra 30 feet of height."
The record is replete with evidence submitted by Bums of the numerous means by
which the visual aspect of the additional height could be mitigated, including the use of
design elements of the building (i.e. color, texture, roofline, landscaping) and other design
features breaking up the building profile and rendering the building in harmony with the
adjoining industrial uses. The Board provides no explanation of why these design features
would not work and why the additional height was incompatible with adjoining industrial and
commercial uses. In contrast, no evidence was presented regarding incompatibility with

27

Third Decision on Review, p. 14.

28

Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falis, 104 Idaho at 37, 665 P.2d at 931; see also Cowan v. Board of
Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,511, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257 (2006).
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adjoining uses, nor was evidence presented tending to establish that the design elements
proposed by Bums would be ineffective. The County's conclusory decision making does not
comport with Workman Family Partnership or Idaho Code § 67-6535. 29

In sum, a "view of the Tetons" was not a relevant consideration, given the lack of
standards regulating scenic views and given the fact that the property was located outside the
scenic corridor. There is no evidence demonstrating that the additional height was
incompatible with the adjoining industrial uses. Rather, the Commissioners simply assumed
the extra height was incompatible with adjoining industrial uses and then found, without any
explanation, that the design elements proposed by Bums could not mitigate the assumed
incompatibility. The Commissioners' failure to point to any evidence demonstrating
incompatibility and their failure to provide any explanation why the design elements
proposed by Bums would not work is exactly the type of arbitrary decision making that the
Workman Family Partnership and Idaho Code § 67-6535 were designed to prevent. The

Court's decision appears equally arbitrary, because it too offers no citation to the record
demonstrating facts upon which the Commissioners' conclusions were justifiably premised.
The Court should not sanction the arbitrary process employed here and the County's decision
should be reversed and remanded with instructions to approve the CUP application. 30

29

See Petitioner's Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, p. l 0, where th is argument was
set forth in greater detail.
30

See Petitioner's Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for Review, p. 28, for a discussion of the conditions
under which such remand may be issued.
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CONCLUSION
The Court's decision appears to condone arbitrary decision making which violates
Idaho Code § 67-6535 and the holdings in Workman Family Partnership. The County's
resort to the "memorable gateway" referenced in the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan violates
the Supreme Court's holding in Urrutia and Petitioner's due process rights. The County's
reliance upon the Commissioners' own personal knowledge also violates the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Comer and Noble. Neither the Court or the County have pointed to any
evidence in the record supporting the Board's finding that the proposed building, with the
additional height, was incompatible with the adjoining industrial uses, nor is there any
evidence or explanation of why the proposed design elements would not be effective, as
required by Idaho Code § 67-653 5. The Board's conclusions, without explanation, rationale
or reference to the evidence, are arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed.
DATED this

J

r-d.
day of August, 2010.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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COMES NOW Respondent, Teton County Board of Commissioners, and submits

this Brief in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) grants broad planning and zoning
authority to local governments. To guide elected officials in their planning and zoning
decisions

LLUPA mandates

comprehensive plans.

that

local

governments

create

and

update

their

Because LLUPA mandates that the County make a finding of

compliance with the broad visionary goals of the comprehensive plan prior to granting a
conditional use permit, petitioners contention that the County erred in denying the
application because it conflicted with the plan is meritless. Equally lacking in merit is
Petitioner's argument that the void for vagueness doctrine applies to the comprehensive
plan which is not a legally controlling zoning ordinance, but merely a flexible guide to
aid the County in their discretionary zoning decisions such as the grant or denial of a
conditional use permit. Lastly, Petitioner wrongly equates familiarity with ones County
with extra-judicial site visits. The Commissioners have never conducted an extra judicial
site visit of the subject property.
II.

Argument
A.

THE Vorn FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS

The comprehensive plan is not a statute or ordinance, thus the void for vagueness
doctrine is not applicable. The constitutional concept of vagueness can be invoked only
in cases dealing with statutory terms. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 45859 (7th Cir.1999); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 357-58 (5th Cir.1999). A
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comprehensive plan imposes an obligation on the County, not on private citizens. It
dictates how the County effectuates its land use planning and zoning obligations and
decisions, one of which is the grant or denial of a conditional use permit (CUP).
Decisions made in accordance with the plan are policy decisions that affect citizens, but
their avenue for change is through the political process. Because a comprehensive plan is
not legally controlling zoning law, Petitioner's due process rights could not been violated.
"This Court has held that a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling
zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible
for making zoning decisions." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357-358, 2 P.3d
738, 742 (2000). An ordinance, on the other hand, is the translation of the comprehensive
plan's goals into measurable requirements for applicants.

Comprehensive plans and

zoning ordinances are "distinct concepts serving different purposes." Id. at 357.
Petitioner is confusing the two, holding the Comprehensive plan to the same standards as
an ordinance.
The Board may, therefore, refer to the comprehensive plan as a general
guide in instances involving zoning decisions such as revising or adopting a
zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, by contrast, reflects the permitted
uses allowed for various parcels within the jurisdiction. See I.C. § 67-6511.
Id. at 358. In deciding whether to allow a non-permitted use to take place in a zone, the
County must follow the vision of the comprehensive plan - just as it does when crafting a
zoning ordinance.
In State v. City of Hailey, the Court considered Hailey's comprehensive plan in
light of a vagueness challenge. The City Council had annexed a piece of property and the
annexation ordinance zoned approximately twelve acres as business property. The State
alleged that the creation of a twelve-acre business zone in the annexed parcel violated
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certain comprehensive plan provisions regarding commercial zoning and alternatively
that the plan was too vague to be enforced because the terms "downtown", "city center"
or "business core" were not defined. The plan stated that "(i)t is essential for the down
town area to be attractive so as to stimulate business and maintain the business core
within the city center." The Court acknowledged that plans are meant to be flexible in
order to serve as a guide for elected officials in making their decisions and that the lack
of definition of terms was not a problem.
The mere fact that these terms are undefined does not render the plan too
vague or indefinite to be enforced. To the contrary, block-by-block
definition of the downtown core may rob the plan of its flexibility. It is clear
that the above terms are subject to varying constructions, thus
accommodating physical expansion at the downtown business sector.
Nonetheless, the admittedly general language of the plan does serve to curb
the exercise of discretion on the part of the zoning authority. For example,
creation of a business sector on the north end of Northridge would clearly
conflict with the plan. However, given the proximity of the newly-created
business zone to existing commercial zoning, we cannot say the spirit or
letter of the plan was violated.

State v. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 515, 633 P.2d 576,580 (1981). The Court did not
spend much time on the vagueness argument, pointing out simply that, given the function
of the plan, this kind of flexibility is necessary.
B.

HOWEVER BROAD, IDEALISTIC AND VISIONARY, COMPREHENSIVE PLANS MUST
BE COMPLIED WITH WHEN MAKING CUP DECISIONS

The Local Land Use Planning Act's requirement of consistency with the
comprehensive plan applies to zoning ordinances and conditional use permits (which are
in essence "mini-zones") and not to other land use actions such as subdivisions. Idaho
Code §§67-6511, 67-6512(a), 67-6513. Conditional use permits are zoning decisions,
subdivisions are not. Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 786, 86 P.3d 494, 500
(2004).

The Board of County Commissioners is specifically directed by Idaho Code §
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67-6512(a) and by the Driggs Ordinance 274-07 Chapter 4, Section 2(A)(l) to find that
the proposed conditional use is not in conflict with the comprehensive plan. Courts have
consistently held that when evaluating a conditional use application conformance with
the comprehensive plan must be determined. Evans v. Board of Com 'rs of Cassia County

Idaho, 137 Idaho 428,434, 50 P.3d 443,449, (2002).
Petitioner continues to misinterpret the Urrutia v. Blaine County case, believing it
supports their proposition that the County erred by addressing compliance with the
comprehensive plan, this time stating they could not rely upon it because it is a visionary
document. Although Petitioner admits on page 3 of his brief that comprehensive plans are
supposed to be "broad, idealistic and visionary", because of its vagueness he claims that
the County cannot use it to make zoning decisions. His "analysis" is completely contrary
to legislative law and judicial opinion. It is well established that a comprehensive plan is
not a legally controlling law when governing bodies are analyzing subdivision
applications, but the comprehensive plan is legally controlling in making zoning
decisions such as the grant or denial of CUP applications. Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107
Idaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1984); Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,
357-358, 2 P.3d 738, 742-743 (2000). The Urrutia case is easily distinguished from the
present case because it involved a subdivision application, not a conditional use permit (a
zoning decision).

While it is true that the comprehensive plan plays a limited role in

subdivision applications, its role in zoning issues is different - zoning decisions must be
in accordance with the comprehensive plan. LC. § 67-6511; State v. City of Hailey, 102
Idaho 511, 514, 633 P.2d 576, 580 (1981). "Planning is a determination of public policy,
and zoning, to be a legitimate exercise of police power should be in furtherance of that
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policy." Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633, 181 P.3d 1238, 1241
(2008). For subdivisions, the comprehensive plan guides the interpretation and exercise
of a specific authority articulated in the ordinance but it cannot be used to create new
requirements or obstacles at odds with land uses permitted under the ordinance. The
applicant in Urrutia applied to subdivide property and his application complied with
Blaine County's zoning and subdivision ordinances. Id. at 356. Because subdividing land
into twenty-acre lots for single family residences was specifically permitted, the
comprehensive plan could not alone be used to deny the applicant what they were
otherwise by law permitted to do. Conditional use permits are different from subdividing.
Their whole purpose is to allow something that is not otherwise permitted by law.
Because there is no underlying zoning that affects them, they are discretionary zoning

decisions. Id.; SuperAmerica Group, Inc. v. City of Little Canada, 539 N.W.2d 264, 266
(Minn.App.1995), review denied (Minn. Jan. 5, 1996). In Howard v. Canyon County Bd.

of Com'rs, the applicant applied for a CUP and was denied. He argued that he satisfied
all reasonable conditions of the Canyon County CUP ordinance and thus should get a
CUP. The Court disagreed. Howard v. Canyon County Bd. of Com'rs, 128 Idaho 479,
481, 915 P.2d 709, 711 (1996). The Court concluded that the use was prohibited by the
comprehensive plan and that this was a proper reason for denial.
Moreover, we also affirm the decision that Howard's proposal is in
conflict with the Comprehensive Plan. . . . Substantial and competent
evidence supports the Commissioners' conclusion that approval of
Howard's subdivision in the middle of a large agricultural tract would be
the "scattered nonfarm" use prohibited by the Comprehensive Plan and
would cumulatively affect the area's character in conflict with the
Comprehensive Plan.

Howard at 482.
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For subdivision applications there is no need to address the comprehensive plan,
because LLUP A mandates no "accordance" or "not in conflict" requirement for them.
Section 67-6535 requires that the comprehensive plan be addressed where "appropriate"
and "applicable," that is, in the case of a rezone or a conditional use permit. The reason
for the special treatment of conditional use permits is that, by their nature. they allow
uses not in accordance with the normal zoning for an area, they are, in essence, minizones.
In the present case the County found that the proposed use was not in accordance
with the Comprehensive Plan. The Plan states that the area North of Driggs was intended
to be a gateway, that there should be a sense of arrival that was harmonious with the
Tetons and surrounding mountains. It is wholly within the discretionary authority of the
Board of County Commissioner's to make this determination.
C.

THE COMMISSIONERS DID NOT BASE THEIR DECISION ON AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL
SITE VISIT

In the section of Petitioner's brief addressing extra-judicial site visits, two cases
are cited and in both the commissioners intentionally went and viewed the subject
properties as a group. The issue in Noble v. Kootenai County, 148 Idaho 937, 231 P.3d
1034, 1039 (2010) was whether the commissioners intentional avoidance of the public at
their noticed site visit was improper. The issue in Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130
Idaho 433, 942 P.2d 557 (1997) was that the commissioners did not provide notice and an
opportunity to be present to the public. Never has there been a case in Idaho equating a
decision-makers knowledge of the area with an extra-judicial site visit. The property is
located adjacent to the County's main highway. Anyone who lives in the County or
comes from the North to work in the County has driven by this property. Any judge
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hearing this case would drive by this section of highway, and if Petitioner is correct,
would have to give notice and an opportunity to be present to the parties each time he
commutes past the site. Similarly, the Board of County Commissioners who must be
residents of the County for whom they work would have to provide notice and an
opportunity to be present to the public every time they drove past an area that had a
pending application. Obviously this is ridiculous and not the result that the legislature or
Court intended.
D.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

According to § 12-117 this Court must award attorney's fees if it finds that the
non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. As shown above,
there is no reasonable legal basis for this reconsideration and the County should be
awarded its legal fees.

II.

CONCLUSION

Conditional use permits are discretionary zoning determinations and the decision
makers must rely upon a visionary comprehensive plan. The comprehensive plan is
flexible, and a determination must be made by our elected officials as to a conditional
uses conformance with the plan.

The comprehensive plan must also guide elected

officials in other policy decisions such as crafting zoning laws. If this court determined
that the comprehensive plan is too vague to make a decision regarding a conditional use
permit, then the plan would also be too vague to guide the County in crafting its
ordinances. In his motion, Petitioner asks this Court to reach the absurd conclusion that
Counties cannot rely upon their comprehensive plans when making policy decisions
because they are broad. BUT the Local Land Use Planning Act mandates that they do

Page 8 ,QfrJO;

v "'-',

(,i
r ,_:;'

exactly that. Petitioner wants to hold the comprehensive plan to the same standards as
our statutes and ordinances, but it is not a statute or ordinance. If Petitioner feels that the
County should not have to comply with the comprehensive plan in making zoning
decisions then Petitioner should challenge the statute and ordinance mandating
conformance with the plan. If Petitioner feels that the comprehensive plan is too vague
then he needs to challenge the plan itself, not the County's reliance upon it for zoning
decisions.
il-\
DATED this / 0 day of August, 2010.
Respectfully submitted,

Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TETON COUNTY

INRE:

)
)

Application for a CUP Permit to exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone

)
)

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CV-07-376
AMENDED
THIRD DECISION ON REVIEW

)
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
)
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a
)
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, )
)
Respondent.
)

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 10, 2010, the Court issued its Third Decision on Review which affirmed
the January 12, 2010 decision of the Teton County Board of County Commissioners ("the
County"). This matter now comes before the Court on Burns Holdings, LLC's ("Bums")
motion for reconsideration. A hearing on Burns' motion took place on August 17, 2010.
Following oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.
This "Amended Third Decision on Review" addresses the additional issues raised
on reconsideration. It is intended to replace the Court's earlier decision of June 10, 2010.
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II. BACKGROUND
This is a petition for judicial review of the County's January 12, 2010 decision
entitled, "Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." In its decision, the
County once again denied Bums' application for a conditional use permit to construct a
75-foot concrete batch plant. This is Bums' third petition for judicial review. The Court
will briefly reiterate the facts and procedural history.
Burns owns 6.5 acres north of the City of Driggs. The property is located within
the Driggs City Area oflrnpact. In February 2007, the County changed the zoning on
Burns' property from C-3 (commercial) to M-1 (light industrial). Driggs' City Ordinance
governs the uses allowed in an M-1 zone, which include the following: "[m]anufacturing,
assembling, fabricating, processing, packing, repairing, or storage uses which have not
been declared a nuisance by statute." 1 Bums is now seeking permission to construct a
75-foot high concrete batch plant.
Because the City Ordinance required a conditional use permit for buildings
exceeding 45 feet in height, 2 Burns submitted an application for a conditional use permit.

In July 2007 the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission unanimously approved Bums'
application. The County then held an evidentiary hearing before the Board of
Commissioners on November 15, 2007 and issued a verbal denial of the application.
Bums filed a petition for judicial review of the County's decision in December
2007, based in part on the lack of written findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. This
Court ruled in Bums' favor and remanded the case back to the County to provide written
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court stated:
[The County] failed to prepare written findings and a reasoned statement
as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535, thereby frustrating the ability of the
Court to perform an appropriate judicial review of the proceedings below. 3
On remand, the County produced written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law which denied Bums' application. Bums sought judicial review of the County's
1

City Ordinance 274-07, Chapter 2, Section 13(A)(l).
City Ordinance 281-07, § 13 (c) (stating "any building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected
shall not exceed forty-five feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit").
3
Order, ,r 1 (Oct. 30, 2008).
2
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second written decision. In September of 2009, this Court again found in Bums' favor
and remanded the case to the County to produce written findings consistent with the
requirements of Idaho law. 4
In January 2010 the County filed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. While these new findings address some of the deficiencies noted in the Court's
prior order, they also perpetuate some of the errors noted earlier.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW
Petitioner's Second Amended Statement oflssues on Judicial Review presents the
Court with the following issues on review:

a. Do the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed by the
Teton County Board of Commissioners (Board) on November 9, 2009,
violate the provisions ofldaho Code§§ 67-6519 and 67-6535?
b. Was the Board's action denying Burns' Conditional Use Permit (CUP)
application - for the reason that Burns did not request a variance arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion?
c. Was the Boards decision that a conflict existed between the provision in
the Driggs City Ordinance allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet
when approved by a CUP and the Idaho Code arbitrary, capricious, and/or
an abuse of discretion?
d. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
interpret "as if it never existed" the provision of the Driggs City Ordinance
allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet when approved by a CUP?
e. Did the Board's decision to interpret ''as if it never existed" that provision
of the Driggs City Ordinance allowing buildings over forty-give (45) feet
when approved by a CUP violate Bums' due process rights under the
Constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho?
f.

4

Is the Board's interpretation of the Driggs City Ordinance entitled to any
deference from this Court on judicial review?

Decision on Review (September 29, 2009).
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g. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
find that a building with a height of more than forty-five (45) feet is not
conditionally permitted by the Driggs City Ordinance?
h. Was is arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
find that there are no conditions which could mitigate the impact of the
building for which Burns sought the CUP and ensure its compatibility
with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood?
1.

Did the Use of the Comprehensive Plan, and the general goals stated
therein, as a regulatory ordinance for evaluating and considering Burns'
CUP application violate Burns' due process rights under the Constitutions
of the United States and the State ofldaho?

J.

Assuming, without admitting, that use of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan
was proper, is there substantial competent evidence in the record to
support the Board's finding that the building proposed in Burns' CUP
application was in conflict with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan?

k. Is there substantial competent evidence in the record to support the
Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law?

1.

Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
base its decision in part on "testimony" submitted by Board members,
which testimony lacked evidentiary support in the record?

m. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to
deny the CUP based on grounds that were never discussed by the Board
during the November 15, 2007, hearing and were not mentioned in the
initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Board?
n. Did Kathy Rinaldi's participation in the Board's November 9, 2009,
decision violate Burns' Constitutional right to an impartial tribunal, where,
prior to her election to the Board, Ms. Rinaldi appeared in the matter in
opposition to Burns' CUP application?
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person
aggrieved by a local governing body's decision on a conditional use permit to seek
judicial review of that decision. 5 The court reviewing a local governing body's decision
bases its review on the record created before the governing body. 6
Upon review, a court must affirm a local governing body's action unless it
determines such body's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (1) violate
constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) exceed the body's statutory authority; (3) were
made upon unlawful procedure; (4) were not supported by substantial evidence in the
record; or (5) were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 7 Local governing
bodies enjoy a strong presumption that their actions, where they have interpreted and
applied their own zoning and planning ordinances, are valid. 8
Additionally, a reviewing court will defer to a governing body's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. A governing body's factual findings are not clearly
erroneous "so long as they are supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting,
evidence." 9 "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than preponderance." 10
Indeed, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the governing body as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 11 However, a reviewing court exercises free
review over questions of law, including whether a governing body violated statutory or
constitutional provisions. 12

5

I.C. § 67-6519(4); LC.§ 652 l(d).
I.R.C.P. 84(e)(l).
7
LC. § 67-5279(3).
8
Evans v. Teton County, 13 9 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003); Whitted v. Canyon County Board of
Com'rs, 137 ldaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002).
9
Evans, 139 Idaho at 74, 73 P.3d at 88; Friends of Farm to Marketv. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196,
46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002).
10
Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
11
Whitted, 137 Idaho at 121, 44 P.3d at 1176; LC.§ 67-5279(1). ·
12
Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196, 46 P.3dat 13.
6
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To prevail, a challenger must show not only that the governing body has erred in a
manner specified in LC. § 67-5279(3), but also that the challenger's substantial rights
have been thereby prejudiced. 13 If the court does not affirm the governing body's
decision, it shall set the decision aside, in whole or in part, and remand the matter to the
governing body for proceedings as necessary. 14

V. DISCUSSION
This Court has twice remanded the County's denial of Burn's application for a
conditional use permit because the County's decisions failed to meet the requirements of
Idaho Code§§ 67-6535 and 6519(4). The Court found that the County's previous
decisions denying Bums' application lacked a sufficient explanation of the contested
facts, the facts relied upon, and the applicable law. Absent these elements, it was
impossible for this Court to determine whether substantial evidence supported the
County's decisions. 15
Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) includes the requirement that the governing board guide
the applicant in obtaining approval, if approval is possible:
Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning
commission grants or denies a permit, it shall specify:
o. The ordinance and standards used in evaluating the application;
p. The reasons for approval or denial; and
q. The actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a permit.
The legislature has clearly stated the purpose of these requirements: "It is the intent of the
legislature that decisions made pursuant to this chapter should be founded upon sound
reason and practical application ofrecognized principles oflaw."

16

In its prior decision, this Court cited the 1982 Idaho Supreme Court case

Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, wherein the Idaho Supreme Court
found that a governing body must produce a written decision that gives a district court
13

I.C. § 67-5279(4).
LC. § 67-5279(3).
15
Decision on Review, p. 14 (Sept. 29, 2009).
16
I.C. § 6535(c).

14
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enough information to conduct judicial review. "[I]n order for there to be effective
judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning boards, there must be a record of
the proceedings and adequate findings of fact and conclusions oflaw." 17 The Supreme
Court clarified what constitutes "adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law" by
citing and adopting a decision by the Oregon Supreme Court.
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that to prevent ad-hoc or arbitrary
decisions, the governing body issuing the decision must "clearly and precisely state what
it found to be the facts and fully explain why those facts lead it to the decision it makes.
Brevity is not always a virtue." 18 The Oregon Court continued:
What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what,
specifically, the decision-making body believes, after hearing and
considering all the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon
which its decision is based. Conclusions are not sufficient. 19
Based on this rationale, the Idaho Supreme Court in Workman ruled that the district court
should remand the case in order for the board of commissioners to produce findings of
fact and conclusions of law sufficient for the district court to perform judicial review.
As will be explained more fully below, the County's Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, despite the ongoing problems noted in Section V(A), infra,
satisfy Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) and the standard announced in Workman Family
Partnership v. City of Twin Falls. The County has sufficiently set forth the contested

facts, the facts relied upon, and the applicable law for this Court to conduct judicial
review of its decision.

17

Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 36,655 P.2d 926,930 (1982).
Id, 104 ldaho at 37, 655 P.2d at 931 (citing South ofSunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of
Commissioners, 280 Or. 3,569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977)).
19
Workman, 104 Idaho at 37,655 P.2d at 931.
18
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A. It was arbitrary and capricious for the County to deny Burns' application
because it was filed as a conditional use permit, rather than as a variance.

The County's most recent decision denied Bum's application, in part, because
they contend it should have been filed as a CUP rather than a variance. 20 They have once
again reached this conclusion despite the fact that the applicable ordinance specifically
directed Burns to file his application as a CUP. In so doing, they have ignored the
Court's Decision on Review, dated September 29, 2009. 21
Two recent Idaho Supreme Court cases clarify when a local government zoning
action is "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." In Neighbors for a Healthy
Gold Fork v. Valley County, the Court found a county's interpretation of its development

code reasonable. 22 However, in Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley, the Court
found the city's interpretation of its municipal code unreasonable. 23 In both cases, after
first applying principles of statutory construction to interpret the ordinance at issue, the
Court then looked at the local government's interpretation to determine whether it was
reasonable. In Neighbors the Court started with a strong presumption that the county's
interpretation of its zoning ordinance was valid. It then concluded that the county's
reasoning supported its conclusions. 24
In Lane Ranch, however, the Court found the City of Sun Valley acted arbitrarily

when it applied an irrelevant municipal code section. This occurred because the City
assumed that a private road application was an application to build a subdivision-a
successive subdivision application it had denied in the past. Because the county's denial
was founded on an unsupported assumption, the denial lacked a rational basis. 25
Idaho Code§ 67-6535(b) requires a reasoned statement of the facts and the law
justifying the decision.

20

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion No. 1, pp. 1-2.
Decision on Review, pp. 12-13 (September 29, 2009).
11
NeighborsforaHealthyGoldForkv. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 176P.3d 126(Dec.27,2007).
13
Lane Ranch 175 P.3d at 780.
24
Neighbors, 176 P.3d at 136-142.
15
Lane Ranch, 175 P.3d at 780.
21
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The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall
be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the
criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested
facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the
applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual
information contained in the record.
Bums argues that the County's decision was arbitrary and capricious because (1) the
County concluded that Burns should have pursued a variance rather than a conditional
use permit after the fact, and (2) the county denied the CUP based on grounds that were
neither discussed by the Board during the November 15, 2007 hearing nor mentioned in
the initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Board. 26 The Court
agrees. While there are clearly errors in the City Ordinance, and perhaps even
inconsistencies with state law, at this stage in the proceedings it is blatantly unfair for the
County to rely upon confusion of their own creation as the basis for denying Bums'
application. Even if the County was correct in concluding that Bums' application should
have been made as a variance, rather than as a request for a conditional use permit, due
process demands that Bums at least be given a hearing on the issue. As this Court
concluded in its earlier Decision on Review (September 29, 2009), the County's effort to
ignore or rewrite the express directive for applicants to seek a conditional use permit for a
structure over 45-feet tall is clearly unjust. Merely pretending that the confusion created
by the County's own drafting errors does not exist is no solution. The County needs to
correct this problem immediately.
Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that the City of Driggs Ordinance 281-07,
which requires height increases above 45-feet to be approved through a conditional use
permit, is inherently in conflict with LC.§ 67-6516. Just because the LLUPA refers to
variances as a means of modifying "height of buildings," does not mean that a
conditional use permit cannot be granted for the same purpose. There is no reason why a
local government could not elect to regulate height through conditional use permits and

26

These issues coincide with issues (b) and (m) in Burns' Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial
Review.
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zoning variances. Nothing in LC.§ 67-6516 can be read to specifically exclude such a
practice. Because the LL UP A cannot be read to forbid such a practice; there is no
conflict with state law for purposes of Article XII, § 2, of the Idaho Constitution. Any
conflict now claimed by the County appears to be merely a convenient excuse to deny the
application.
However, even if a conflict with state law existed, the Court has concluded that it
is unnecessary for it to decide this case based on the apparent conflict between I. C. § 676516, the City of Driggs Ordinance 281-07 and Article XII, § 2, of the Idaho
Constitution. As will be discussed in Section V(B), infra, the Court has concluded that
sufficient grounds exist to affirm the County's denial of Burn' s application as a
conditional use permit on its own merits. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Court to
resolve the legal issues raised by the County at this time.

B. The Remaining Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Comply with Constitutional and Statutory Requirements.

Bums raised numerous issues in its most recent petition for judicial re_view.
Those issues generally fall into three main areas: (1) whether the Findings and
Conclusions improperly used the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance for
evaluating and considering Bums' CUP application, (2) whether the Findings and
Conclusions are clearly erroneous due to insufficient facts supporting the County's
decision, and (3) whether Kathy Rinaldi's participation in the Board's November 9, 2009
decision violated Burns' constitutional right to an impartial tribunal. 27
(1) The County's Findings and Conclusions are Supported by
Substantial Evidence, and Do Not Improperly Rely upon the
Comprehensive Plan.

Bums objects to the County's decision to deny the CUP application on the
grounds that the County lacked substantial evidence in the record. According to Burns,
27

Although these issues specifically coincide with (e), (i) and (n) in the Second Amended Statement of
Issues on Judicial Review, they also overlap with the remaining issues.
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the County lacked substantial competent evidence in the record to support its finding that
Burns' proposed 75-foot height was in conflict with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan and
other local ordinances. Burns alleges that the County's Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law lack substantial and competent evidence.
In Idaho, "[sJubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than
preponderance. " 28 A court will not substitute its judgment for that of the governing body
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 29
The critical evidence before the County concerned the location of the concrete
plant. Teton County considered the need of preserving the "gateway" at the north end of
Driggs that leads into the City .30 Such gateways are listed as a "need" under Section 9 .3
of Driggs' Comprehensive Plan. Furthermore, the City of Driggs' Comprehensive Plan
Section 9.4 states:
The Vision for Hwy 33 outside of downtown is as an attractive, functional, and
memorable gateway into the community. The sense of arrival at each end of the
community should be dramatic, but in keeping with the beauty of Teton Valley and
the surrounding mountains. New buildings should be setback from the highway, with
ample landscaping, concealed parking and architecture that draws on the western and
agricultural vernaculars ...
The County explained that in their decision that a 75-foot high structure, located squarely
between the highway and the Teton Range, clearly interferes with the City's objectives to
preserve a "memorable gateway." 31 While there are other areas in the County where
these mountains are not visible from the highway, this location north of town is clearly a
"dramatic" and "memorable" vista-the iconic view of the Teton Valley. The Court
finds no error in reaching such a conclusion by reference to the Comprehensive Plan.
In reviewing the Comprehensive Plan, the most obvious intention was to ensure
and preserve this dramatic view of the surrounding scenery. The Teton Range in general,
and the Grand Teton in particular, are arguably the most famous and attractive part of the
28

Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Whitted, 137 Idaho at 121, 44 P.3d at 1176; J.C.§ 67-5279(1).
30
Bums Holding, LLC CUP Denial, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 6
31
Id.
29

AMENDED THIRD DECISION ON REVIEW -- PAGE 11

0 3 '.

~J

local scenery. The drafters of the Plan expressed the need for buildings to be "setback"
so they do not interfere with this scenery. In its Findings, the County concluded that a
75-foot high by 60 foot wide building would noticeably interfere with the surrounding
scenery and detract from its effort to maintain "memorable gateways." 32
Bums argues that the County is impermissibly using their Comprehensive Plan as
a regulatory tool, in violation of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Urrutia v. Blaine
County, 2 P.3d 738, 134 Idaho 353 (2000). In Urrutia the Supreme Court held a board

may "refer to the comprehensive plan as a general guide in instances involving zoning
decisions." However, "the Board erred in relying completely on the comprehensive plan
in denying [the J applications." 33
The facts in Urrutia are distinguishable from the present case. While Urrutia
concerned a subdivision application, the case in hand deals with a conditional use permit
(which under the facts of this case, closely resembles a zoning variance). In Urrutia,
Blaine County relied "solely" on its comprehensive plan in denying the application. 34 In
this case, although Teton County references its Comprehensive Plan, 35 it has primarily
relied on the ordinances of the City of Driggs, such as (1) the height limitation on all
buildings of 45 feet, 36 (2) the stated purposes of conditional use permits, 37 (3) the stated
purposes of the local ordinance, 38 and (4) the conditions required by the ordinance for
approval. 39 While the Comprehensive Plan is referenced in Section 2(D) of the Findings,
and there are other references to "gateways" and aesthetics in the Findings, it is clear to
the Court that Teton County was not "completely relying" on its comprehensive plan, as
occurred in Urrutia. 40

32

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.6.
Urrutia, 2 P.3d at 743-744, 134 Idaho at 358-359 (emphasis added).
34
Id., 2 P.3d at 743, 134 Idaho at 358.
35
The Comprehensive Plan is only discussed in Section 2(D) of the Findings. It constitutes only two
paragraphs out of the entire seven page document.
36
Driggs City Ordinance, Chapter 2, Section 13C of Ordinance 281-07.
37
Id., Section 2 of Ordinance 274-07.
38
Id, Chapter l(D) of Ordinance 274-07
39
Id, Chapter 4, Section 2(A), Ordinance 274-07
40
Urrutia, 2 P.3d at 744, 134 Idaho at 359.
33
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Bums argues that the problem with relying on the comprehensive plan at all is
that it uses inherently vague terms such as "memorable gateway." Burns cites substantial
authority from other jurisdictions for the position that such provisions are "void for
vagueness" because they inevitably lead to arbitrary and capricious decisions. 41 Bums
asserts that "broad, idealistic, and vague language" 42 gives rise to rulings based on
"feelings" and "arbitrary concepts" of the commissioners. 43
The County correctly responds by noting that the void for vagueness doctrine only
applies to statutes. 44 A comprehensive plan, as noted in Urrutia, "does not operate as
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental
agencies responsible for making zoning decisions." Idaho Code§ 67-6508 specifically
sets forth a wide variety of appropriate items a comprehensive plan may cover: "[tJhe
plan shall consider previous and existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and
objectives, or desirable future situations for each planning component. ... " 45 LLUPA
specifically allows comprehensive plans to address issues such as "preservation," 46
"natural resources," 47 "future corridors," 48 areas with "scenic significance," 49 and
"standards for community ... beautification." 50 It is also noteworthy that LC. § 67-6508
concludes by noting: "Nothing herein shall preclude the consideration of additional
planning components or subject matter."
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a) specifically mandates that a conditional use permit
should only be granted "when it is not in conflict with the plan." This is consistent with
the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Evans v. Board of Com'rs of Cassia County Idaho,
137 Idaho 428, 50 P.3d 443 (2002), which expressly recognized the need for county
commissioners to consider the objectives of the comprehensive plan. Therefore, the

41
42
43

44
45

46
47
48

49
50

Anderson v. lssaqua, 70 Wash. App. 64, 75, 851 P.2d 744, 751 (I 993).
Petitioner's Brief in Support of Reconsideration, p. 5 (August 6,2010).
Anderson, 70 Wash. App. at 77, 851 P.2d at 752.
Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222(1972).
I.C. § 67-6508
I.C. § 67-6508(e)
I.C. § 67-6508(£)
LC. § 67-6508(i)
I.C. § 67-6508(k)
I.C. § 67-6508(m)
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Court concludes as a matter of law that given the breadth of appropriate subject matter
for a comprehensive plan, the County's reference to the phrases "scenic corridor" and
"memorable gateway" is appropriate. Rather than using the comprehensive plan for
"evil" as a regulatory tool, 51 the County has referenced the plan as just a part of its
broader vision or "desirable goal" for the community. The local ordinance, with its
relatively low height restrictions, appears to reflect the greater vision of the
Comprehensive Plan. This is exactly what a comprehensive plan is intended to
accomplish.
The concrete plant that Burns wishes to construct is a permitted use within the
zone where the building will be erected. Therefore, the intended use of the plant is not
the issue.

52

The County was primarily concerned with the height of the concrete plant, a

height which would exceed the maximum 45 feet allowed by the Ordinance by 30 feet.
The proposed structure would not just barely exceed the height limit, it would be almost
67% taller than currently allowed. In an effort to reach a compromise, the County
inquired of Burns any plausible way to mitigate the extra 30 feet of height.
Burns was unable to assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding
properties, uses and neighborhood to the County's satisfaction. "The County has not
been presented with any plausible way to mitigate the extra 30 feet of height now being
requested, nor is it able to craft any conditions that would assure surrounding properties,
uses, and neighborhoods protection and compatibility with the additional 30 feet of
height." 53
At the November 2007 hearing, Bums suggested that setting the building back
from the edge of the property line several hundred yards could mitigate the additional 30
feet in height. However, the County found that the top of the building would still
obstruct views of the Teton Mountains and would not be a plausible way of mitigating

51

Petitioner's Brief in Support of Reconsideration, p. 9.
Although Finding of Fact 2(D) mentions "use" in the heading, the text of the finding focuses on the
inability to "shield" such a large building. Other references to "use" in the Findings also appear to be more
concerned with aesthetics and not the intended purpose of the plant. Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, p.6.
53 Id.
52
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the extra height. No other building in that area exceeds the maximum allowable height of
45 feet. Thus, an additional 30 feet added onto such a large structure was considered to
be simply too high. In reaching this conclusion, the Commissioners relied upon
testimony from the witnesses at the hearing, the common knowledge of the geographic
features of their community, and their reasonable interpretation of the applicable
ordinances. Although Burns characterizes the testimony as "weak," the Commissioners
are entitled to rely upon it. Even in the absence of testimony, the Commissioners can still
apply their reasoned judgment to interpreting their local ordinances.
Within LLUPA, the Idaho Legislature specificaJly sets forth its intent for
decisions made pursuant to the Act:
It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to [the Local
Land Use and Planning Act] should be founded upon sound reason and
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such
decisions, the courts of the state are directed to consider the proceedings
as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant
decisions in light of practical considerations with an emphasis on
fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making.
Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or
violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be
entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision.
LC.§ 67-6535(c) (emphasis added).
This Court finds that although reasonable minds may differ, a denial of Burns'
CUP application can be reasonably and practically supported based upon the existing
ordinances, the comprehensive plan, and the facts in the record. While Bums
understandably wishes the Commissioners had reached a different conclusion, their
reasons were neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Commissioners based their decision on
substantial evidence, which only needs to be "more than a scintilla but less than
preponderance." 54 This Court will not substitute its own judgment for the "reasoned
decision-making" of the duly elected governing body as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact.

54

55

55

Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 ldaho 117, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Whittedv. Canyon County Board of Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002).
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(2) The County's Findings and Conclusions are not Clearly Erroneous.

At its very essence, the County's decision is a determination by elected officials
that a 75-foot high and 60-foot wide concrete batch plant in the proposed location is just
too big to be compatible with its local ordinances and its comprehensive plan. In its
Findings, the County listed several reasons why Bums' proposal is incompatible. For
example, the County was concerned that the unusually tall structure would harm
neighboring property values, affect economic values in an area dependent on its "scenic
offerings," damage environmental assets by disrupting "scenic vistas," and more. 56 The
County was obviously concerned about aesthetics, the plant's proximity to the scenic
corridor, and its proximity to the "gateway" to the City of Driggs. The County was also
plainly concerned about the considerable size of the structure relative to surrounding
buildings; the proposed structure would be almost 67% taller than allowed by the City's
ordinance.
In an effort to rebut these concerns, Burns offered "line-of-site" drawings at the
hearing, which the Court has carefully considered. While they appear to show that
setting the tower back from the road somewhat mitigates the apparent height of the
building and its damage to the view of the Teton Mountains, it is difficult to discern from
the drawings its appearance in reality. The actual structure will not be a mere twodimensional silhouette. The County had clear skepticism about the overall aesthetic
impact of the structure, regardless of the setback. Arguably, even a building the size of
the Empire State Building would be dwarfed by the adjacent Teton Mountains, if it could
be set back far enough from the highway. While such concerns are debatable, they are
not unreasonable.
In a further attempt to persuade the County that the proposed structure would be
compatible, Burns presented landscaping plans, noise pollution studies, traffic studies,
and still the County remained unassuaged. Although Burns was given a full hearing on

56

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4.
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its application, the elected decision-makers were not persuaded. The Commissioners'
denial was based on many findings of facts, all leading to one conclusion-a 7 5-foot
structure was simply too tall for this rural, tourist-oriented community. This conclusion
was not based merely on a "feeling" of the Commissioners, but upon the existing local
ordinances and comprehensive plan. The Commissioners' sensitivity to the uniqueness
of their alpine community, and the preservation of its scenic vistas, cannot be disregarded
as merely provincial thinking. These concerns are also echoed throughout the applicable
ordinances and the comprehensive plan. Although capably contested by Burns, there are
substantial facts in the record to support the County's conclusions.
At oral argument, Burns derisively characterized the County's decision as a "back
door re-zone." It is difficult for the Court to share this view because there is little in the
County's Findings and Conclusions which take great exception to the proposed industrial
use of the facility. The County's clear intent was not to prevent industrial usage of the
property. Rather, the primary concern of the County appears to be maintaining the
current height restrictions mandated by their ordinance. It must be fairly noted that Burns
is the party seeking to substantially deviate from the existing ordinances, not the County.
Nevertheless, the Court understands Burns' frustration. However, whether the
Commissioners' decision is viewed by Burns as personal, provincial, or political is
irrelevant, as long as it was founded on substantial facts in the record. It is simply not the
role of this Court to force a decision upon the County that its elected officials have the
right to make. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commissioners' decision was unwise
or short-sighted, such issues are almost always best remedied in the voting booth, not the
courtroom.

(3) The Inclusion of Kathy Rinaldi's Signature does not Invalidate the
Amended Findings and Conclusions.

Petitioner's third argument is that Kathy Rinaldi's signature on the Amended
Findings deprived Burns of an impartial tribunal. Rinaldi had earlier submitted a written
opposition to the application. Both parties cited the 2004 Idaho Supreme Court case
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Eacret v. Bonner, where the Supreme Court stated that the Due Process Clause "entitles a

person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal ... " 57 Since the Eacret decision, the
Idaho Supreme Court further defined "impartiality" as it applies to a quasi-judicial body.

In the 2007 case, Turner v. City of Twin Falls, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed
whether Twin Falls City Council acted as an impartial decision maker when it granted
review of a planning and zoning decision. 58 While the facts of this case and Turner
differ, the Idaho Supreme Court's definition of "impartiality" is equally applicable here:
[Impartiality] means 'the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding. Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the law.
That is, it guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply
the law to him in the same way he applies it to any other party.' In the
context of due process, it does not mean 'lack of preconception in favor of
or against a particular legal view. This sort of impartiality would be
concerned, not with guaranteeing litigants equal application of the law, but
rather with guaranteeing them an equal chance to persuade the court on the
legal points in their case.' It does not mean having 'no preconceptions on
legal issues, but [being] willing to consider views that oppose his
preconceptions, and remain[ing] open to persuasion, when the issues arise
in a pending case.' Impartiality under the Due Process Clause does not
guarantee each litigant a chance of changing the judge's preconceived
view of the law. 59
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the problem of Commissioner bias and due
process rights in the 2002 case Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, et al. 60
The Supreme Court listed three factors in determining whether commissioner bias
resulted in a violation of an applicant's due process rights: "(l) whether the member
disclosed the interest or the other council members were fully aware of it; (2) the extent
of the member's participation in the decision; and (3) the magnitude of the member's
·
,,61
interest.

In this case, the Court finds that Rinaldi's participation did not violate Burns'

right to an impartial tribunal. First, Rinaldi was not a swing vote. The Amended
57

Eacretv. Bonner, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494,498 (2004).
Turner v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).
59
Id. (citing Republican Party of Minn. V. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002)).
6
Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs ofBonneville County, et al., 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863 (2002).
61
Id.
58

°
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed by all three commissioners-the
decision to deny Burns' CUP would have passed even without Rinaldi' s signature. 62
Second, Rinaldi did not participate in the November 2009 hearing. The minutes,
included in the record under the County's "Notice of Piling" on January 14, 2010, show
that the only two commissioners present at the hearing were Bob Bennett and Larry
Young.

63

For these two reasons, the Court finds that Ms. Rinaldi's signature on the

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not give rise to a claim that
Appellant was denied an impartial tribunal.

C. Neither Party is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Both parties ask the Court to award them their attorney fees. The awarding of
attorney fees and costs is normally a discretionary function of the Court. However, Idaho
Code§ 12-117(1) takes some discretion from the Court:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a
county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(Emphasis added). The use of the word "shall" means that if the Court finds that Burns
"acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law," it must award attorney fees to the
County.
After reviewing the entire history of this matter carefully, the Court finds that
neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Although Teton County is the
prevailing party, Bums did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law. In fact, up to
this point Burns has prevailed on almost every contested issue. Burns raised legitimate
issues oflaw and fact that were only resolved by this court after hours ofresearch and
sober reflection.

62
63

Id. at 726.
Notice ofFiling (Jan. 14, 2010).
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As the Court has stated above, the County's Second Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law sufficiently stated the facts upon which it relied, and the County
reached a reasoned decision based on the facts before it. However, Bums had a
reasonable basis in law and fact to appeal the County's decision because of the issues set
forth in Section IV(A) of this decision. The Court's concern with certain portions of the
County's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions oflaw are sufficiently stated
above.

VI. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the above, the County's decision denying Burns' application
for a conditional use permit is AFFIRlvIED. However, inasmuch as the County has made
it clear in their pleadings that Bums' application should have been pursued as a variance
rather than a conditional use permit, justice demands that Bums have an opportunity to
resubmit its request to build the disputed structure by seeking a variance, if it so chooses.
This decision only affirms the County's denial of the application for a conditional use
permit. Both parties' requests for attorney fees are DENIED.
So Ordered.
Dated th'.s I" day of October,. 20 I 0 ~

dge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision on
Review was this ~5_,_______ day of October, 2010, served upon the following individuals via
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, unless otherwise indicated:
Dale W. Storer
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
Kathy Spitzer
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
89 N. Main Street
Driggs, ID 83455

Clerk of the Court

By:
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166)
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-07-376

INRE:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Filing Category: I.4
Filing Fee: $101.00

Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner - Appellant
V.

TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
COM1v'IISSIONERS,
Respondent.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERSANDITSATTORNEYKATHYSPITZERANDTHECLERK
OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant, Bums Holding, LLC, appeals against the above

named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Third Decision on Review dated
June 10, 2010, issued by the Hon. Gregory Moeller.
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2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment

or order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule
11 (a)(2).
3.

Appellant intends to assert the following issues on appeal:
a.

Whether there was substantial evidence supporting the Respondent's
decision to deny Appellant's conditional use permit application.

b.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that Respondent's resort to the
Teton County Comprehensive Plan was not an impermissible attempt
to use the comprehensive plan as a regulatory ordinance.

c.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to consider Appellant's
argument that Respondent's use of the comprehensive plan as a
regulatory measure violated its due process and equal protection rights
under the Idaho and United States Constitutions.

Appellant reserves the right to assert other issues on appeal.
4.

No Order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not necessary or requested since the underlying matter

involved a Petition for Judicial Review and no trial proceedings were conducted.
6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a.

The entire record and transcripts of all proceedings before the City of
Driggs, as lodged with the District Court.
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b.

The entire record and transcripts of all proceedings before Respondent
Teton County Board of Commissioners, as lodged with the District
Court.

7.

c.

All decisions and orders of the District Court.

d.

All briefs filed in the District Court by Appellant and Respondent.

Appellant requests that all exhibits, documents, charts, maps and photographs

attached to or included within the items listed above be copied and sent to the Supreme
Court.
8.

I certify that:
a.

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter
for the District Court of Teton County.

b.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporters transcript.

c.

The estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid.

d.

The appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this

/D

1\
day of November, 2010.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a copy of the following described pleading or document
on the individuals listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, on this

tf' day of November, 2010.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

INDIVIDUALS SERVED:

Kathy Spitzer
Teton County Prosecutor
89 N. Main Street, #5
Driggs, ID 83422

( ~ail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Courthouse Box

Honorable Gregory Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
P.O. Box 389
Rexburg, ID 83440-0389

Chambers Copy
( ~Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

Court Reporter for Judge Moeller
Teton County Courthouse
150 Courthouse Drive, #307
Driggs, ID 83422

( _.,}Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Courthouse Box

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
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NOV 3 0 2010
TETON CO., ID
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TETON COUNTY

IN RE:
Application for a CUP Permit to exceed
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone

BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-376

FINAL JUDGMENT

)

)
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF
)
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a
)
political subdivision of the State· of Idaho, )
)
Respondent.
)

The Court having issued its Amended Third Decision on Review, dated October
1, 2010, which denied Petitioner's appeal and both parties' requests for attorney fees, and
all matters before the Court now having been fully adjudicated;
NOW THEREFORE, Petitioner's appeal is hereby dismissed with prejudice. This
shall be deemed as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a) and Idaho Appellate Rule

1l(a)(2).
SO ORDERED this 30th day of November, 2010.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL
JUDGMENT was this
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day of November, 2010, served upon the following

individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, unless otherwise indicated:
Dale W. Storer
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
Kathy Spitzer
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
89 N. Main Street
Driggs, ID 83455

Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF TETON

)
)
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
)
)
BURNS HOLDII\JGS, LLC
)
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR A CUP
PERMIT TO EXCEED 45' HEIGHT
LIMIT FOR M-1 ZONE

Supreme Court No. 38269-2010

Petitioner/ Appellant, )
- vs TETON COUNlY BOARD OF
COMMISSIOI\IERS

)
)
)
)
)
)

TETON COUNlY CASE NO.
CV 2007-376

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Respondent-Respondents on Appeal.)

I, Phyllis A. Hansen, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Ida ho, in and for the County of Teton, do hereby certify that the
following is a list of exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the
Supreme Court or retained as indicated:
Exhibits
Agency Record
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CD - Respondent's Brief
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Transcript dated January 16, 2007

Yes

Transcript dated February 26, 2007
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Transcript dated September 13, 2007
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I, Phyllis A. Hansen, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Teton, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was complied and bound under
my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents
under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all documents, charts and pictures requested in the
above entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with
the Court Reporter's Transcripts and Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
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I, Phyllis A. Hansen, deputy clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Teton County, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their attorney of
record as follows:
Dale W. Storer, Esq.
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

Kathy Spitzer, Esq.
89 N Main,# 5
Driggs, Idaho 83422
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